So you think that one-boxing is correct in the regular version of Newcomb's paradox but incorrect in the 'transparent boxes' version?

Not quite. Thinking it over, what I'm saying is that one-boxing in transparent Newcomb requires a level of committment that's different in kind to the level of commitment required by normal Newcomb. Here's why:

• Our primary goal is to get a box filled with $1.000.000

• In normal Newcomb, we can succeed in this by committing to taking the opaque box. Therefore we just have to trust Omega's predictive capabilities were good enough to predict us one-boxing, so that the opaque box IS the box with $1.000.000

• In transparent Newcomb, we can succeed in getting a box filled with $1.000.000 only by committing to take an empty box instead if an empty box appears.Unless our senses are deluding us (e.g. simulation), this is a logical impossibility. So we must commit to a logical impossibility, which being a logical impossibility should never happen.

So normal Newcomb just requires a bit of trust in Omega's abilities, while transparent Newcomb requires committing to a logical impossibility (that the empty box is the filled box). Or perhaps altering your utility function so that you no longer want money-filled boxes.