endoself comments on The Urgent Meta-Ethics of Friendly Artificial Intelligence - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (249)
Are you familiar with desirism? It says that we should want to fulfill others' desires, but, AFAI can tell, gives no reason why.
No. This is not what desirism says.
From your desirism FAQ:
The moral thing to do is to shape my desires to fulfill others' desires, insofar as they are malleable. This is what I meant by "we should want to fulfill others' desires," though I acknowledge that a significant amount of precision and clarity was lost in the original statement. Is this all correct?
The desirism FAQ needs updating, and is not a very clear presentation of the theory, I think.
One problem is that much of the theory is really just a linguistic proposal. That's true for all moral theories, but it can be difficult to separate the linguistic from the factual claims. I think Alonzo Fyfe and I are doing a better job of that in our podcast. The latest episode is The Claims of Desirism, Part 1.
I will listen to that.
Unfortunately, we're not making moral claims yet. In meta-ethics, there is just too much groundwork to lay down first. Kinda like how Eliezer took like like 200 posts to build up to talking about meta-ethics.
Ah, oops. I wasn't familiar with it, and I misunderstood the sentence.