Rationality Quotes: February 2011
Take off every 'quote'! You know what you doing. For great insight. Move 'quote'.
And if you don't:
- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself.
- Do not quote comments/posts from LW. (If you want to exclude OB too create your own quotes thread! OB is entertaining and insightful and all but it is no rationality blog!)
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
Loading…
Subscribe to RSS Feed
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
Comments (347)
"Everything works by magick; science represents a small domain of magick where coincidences have a relatively high probability of occurrence."
Does this merely call attention to the high probability of the existence of unknown unknowns, or does it promote map-territory confusion?
How is this a rationality quote?
Thanks for asking. I linked it on purpose to wikipedia from where I quote:
Tempus fugit is a succint admonition to focus on what is really important as opposed to what is merely salient. Focus on the not urgent but important things(quadrant 2 in the covey matrix).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:MerrillCoveyMatrix.png
I thought it was a good quote, although I'm not sure LWers need to know it. (On the other hand, one might think the same thing of curing aging or helping cryonics, but Eliezer's essay on his dead brother still got a substantial reaction.)
Do you like this one better?
--Cato the Elder; Epistles (94) as quoted by Seneca
C.S. Lewis, "Religion: Reality or Substitute?", in "Christian Reflections".
Anyone want to try and tease a rationality message out of this?
Within the context of Lewis' Christianity, it could be the valid form of the argument from authority: don't believe appealing falsehoods with a little evidence over unappealing truths with a lot of evidence you don't know. To give an example: you tell kids to believe evolution or special relativity without explaining the evidence in detail, but it would still be right for them to have "faith" instead of changing to believe creationism the first time they read a (bogus, but they wouldn't be able to tell) creationist argument on the internet.
Except that Lewis' Christianity was not based on any authority deemed infallible. He reasoned himself into it, while recognising the fallibility of reason. His writings set out his arguments; they do not tout any source of authority whose reliability he has not already argued.
But how can one rightly reason, while recognising one's fallibility? That is an issue for rationalists as well.
Let me fix the original quote for you:
When a long argument produces a conclusion that strikes one as absurd, one sometimes just has to say, "This is bullshit. I don't know what's wrong with the argument, but I'm not going along with it."
I think the flaw in the syllogism is "the human reason, unassisted, has a low chance of retaining its hold on truths." We certainly forget a great deal of procedural and propositional knowledge if we don't use it on a regular basis, but that's different from letting go of a belief because you are passionate about how inconvenient the belief is. Once a belief takes root -- i.e., after you announce it to your friends and take some actions based on it -- it is usually very difficult to let go of that belief.
My take: "Because our cognition is unreliable, we can easily lose sight of truths we started out knowing as we walk along tempting-but-wrong garden paths, especially when strong emotions are involved."
In other contexts this is sometimes known as "being so sharp you cut yourself."
That's a good moral, but to me Lewis's quote seems to be more simply interpreted as an exhortation against successful doubt. Our thinking is certainly unreliable, but compensating for that with a fixed intention to keep believing whatever we're currently obsessed with seems like exactly the wrong thing to do; it essentially enshrines motivated cognition as a virtue.
Having a "settled intention of continuing to believe" X shares with having a "high prior probability for" X the property that quite a lot of counterevidence can pile up before I actually start considering X unlikely.
This is not a bad thing, in and of itself.
Of course, if X happens to be false, it's an unfortunate condition to find myself in. But if X is true, it's a fortunate one. That just shows that it's better to believe true things than false ones, no matter how high or low your priors or settled or indecisive your intentions.
Of course, if I start refusing to update on counterevidence at all, that's a problem. And I agree, it's easy to read Lewis as endorsing refusing to update on counterevidence, if only by pattern-matching to religious arguments in general.
Point taken, but Lewis wasn't operating within a Bayesian framework. I haven't read a lot of his apologetics, but what I remember seemed to be working through the lens of informal philosophy, where a concept is accepted or rejected as a unit based on whether or not you can think of sufficiently clever responses to all the challenges you're aware of.
From this perspective, a "settled intention of continuing to believe" implies putting a lot more mental effort into finding clever defenses of your beliefs, and Lewis's professed acceptance of reason implies nothing more than admitting challenges in principle. Since it's possible to rationalize pretty much anything, this strikes me as functionally equivalent to refusing to update.
And, of course, enshrining the state of holding high priors as virtuous in itself carries its own problems.
(nods) Mostly agreed.
You get it.
Lewis is saying that if you've disproved faith, your reason is flawed. After all, faith must be right!
This is 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence', but in unfamiliar garb. We're not used to seeing it used the other way. (If a study reports ESP, then we ought to suspect problems in how it was conducted or analyzed rather than accept its conclusion - to use a recent example.)
I'm sure there are a number of relevant LW posts on the topic like "Einstein's Arrogance".
The one that immediately comes to mind for me is making your explicit reasoning trustworthy. Lewis was exhorting Christians not to trust their explicit reasoning.
Emancipate yourself from mental slavery, none but yourself can free your mind.
An upvote to the first person to correctly identify the first person to say that (the quote is often misattributed, you'll get a downvote if you identify the wrong author).
Bob Marley, although before I checked Google search, Books, and Scholar, I had expected to find it was by Epictetus. Oh well.
EDIT: In my defense, Garvey's original is not the same as the Bob Marley version which Robin presented. I think it's a little disingenuous to consider the Bob Marley version 'misattributed'.
Reminded me of...
Roy Harper
Marcus Garvey. I think it works better in this longer form.
-- William Tuning, Fuzzy Bones
If you never misspell a word, you're spending too much time proofreading.
That's true if the only benefit of proofreading is finding misspellings. But you should be proofreading to find errors of expression in general, and the optimal amount of proofreading for that may imply that you find and fix all misspellings.
Better to teach the child the difference between programming a computer, proving a theorem, and writing an essay.
— Dwight Schrute ("The Office" Season 3, Episode 17 "Business School," written by Brent Forrester)
Sounds like reversed stupidity.
It would be better to explain why that is a bad thing when you post statements such as that.
The 'least convenient possible world' might be relevant too. I translated the verbal self interrogation as something that would elicit responses along the lines of "would doing this thing distinguish one as an idiot?" In practice the question probably would be useful. In fact, in practice only an idiot would really reverse the stupidity of an idiot when asking that question of themselves. Breath, eat, etc.
~ garcia1000, Witchhunt game
It would be more accurate to say that you should critically look over the evidence again if your position feels wrong. A belief can be justified by logic and still be at odds with intuition, making it still feel wrong. Example: There are compelling arguments that simulation hypothesis is at least somewhat likely to be correct. However, my intuition tells me that the simulation hypothesis is just plain false. I know that this is a subject that my intuition is poorly suited for, so I follow the logic and estimate a non-negligible chance of being in a simulation, despite it feeling wrong.
But unlike sex you shouldn't change positions just for fun and novelty.
Depends on how useful you think the experience of being a devil's advocate is.
You should experiment with multiple positions, then use the best one.
-- Paul Krugman
Speaking of peculiarly boring sub-genres of science fiction, I am told that Paul Krugman was once the best and most promising of the Jedi Masters of Economics. But somehow, the forces of the Sith seduced him to the dark side, and he has since become Darth Pundit the Mindkillingly Political.
In any case, if economic statistics are bad, let them be made better. For that matter, if they're very, very good, let them be made better still, and even then nobody should treat them as the absolute truth.
He has certainly become political. It might be worth asking: Has he become any less accurate in the process? Another possibility would be that the positions taken up by the major political parties in the US at present are such that it's impossible to tell the truth about some subjects without being (perceived as) highly political.
(That's certainly happened often before. For extreme examples, consider cases where an important political movement is based on badly broken racial theories or on a specific religion.)
According to this study, he does okay, but I'm not impressed with their methodology. For some reason I can't copy/paste the relevant section of the PDF, but they discuss him explicitly on page 15. They looked at "a random sample" of his columns and television appearances (whatever that means) and found 17 predictions, of which 14 were right, 1 was wrong, and 1 was hedged.
Only 17 predictions? I thought we did science.
"He is, after all, a Nobel-prize winning economist."
I agree that that study is unimpressive, in a number of ways. (And it's comparing his accuracy with that of other pundits, rather than with that of past-Krugman.)
"A witty saying proves nothing" --Voltaire
That's been posted (a few times) before. Though it may be worth repeating.
-Karl Popper
I don't like this quote. It is amusing but not very rational. It is not rational to ignore arguments because they were made by an awful person. It also isn't rational even if one thinks that an argument or set of ideas is not worth thinking about to actively refuse to discuss those ideas, even if one thinks that the ideas aren't worth considering. The first part of the quote is marginally defensible if Popper is very sure that Heidegger's ideas are a waste of time. The second part of the quote, about refusing to talk to people who defend Heidegger makes about as much sense as a religion telling its adherents not to listen to some specific critic.
(That said, while I'm by no means an expert on this matter, my general opinion is that Heidegger is a waste of time.)
In academic philosophy there is a tendency to refer to "Heidegger's arguments and positions" as simply "Heidegger". (This is true of all philosophers, not just Heidegger). Popper, of course, would have been familiar with this; when I read that quote I got the distinct impression of "Heidegger's arguments are hollow and his positions are indefensible; please can we agree on this and stop discussing them?"
Relevant old LW post: Tolerate tolerance.
-- Eliezer Yudkowsky, putting words in my other copy's mouth
Meta-comment: I think MoR quotes are legitimate for rationality quote pages, since IIRC we previously established that Eliezer quotes from Hacker News were kosher. And if random Eliezer comments not on OB/LW are kosher, then surely quotes from his fiction are kosher.
I disagree. MoR fits the same criteria ("shooting fish in a barrel") as OB/LW.
I'm happy to see gems from HPMOR done up in needlepoint and hung on the metaphorical wall of the parlor. But it still smells like trayf! Consider:
Quirrell avoids the ban on quoting himself by attributing the quotation to Eliezer. And he then avoids the ban on quoting Eliezer by pointing out that Eliezer was quoting Quirrell. This is clever and slippery and rabbinical and all that, but it jumps the shark when you realize that Quirrell is not just Eliezer's HPMOR character, he is also probably his LW sock-puppet!
Oh, come on. It's obviously been the other way around all along.
You simultaneously gave me the lolz and the shivers. Karma for you!
I didn't know there was another antonym to kosher besides nonkosher. Interesting.
Anyway, I don't think Quirrel is Eliezer; if he is, then most of the usual reasons against self-quoting wouldn't apply anyway. (It's not like Eliezer needs more karma or higher profile here.)
He is a clever guy. Be carefull!
"Meanness and stupidity are so closely related that anything you do to decrease one will probably also decrease the other."
--Paul Graham, here.
I voted the comment up - because there is a relationship there. There are just other correlations and causal influences that are somewhat stronger in some situations.
The fact that you had to choose so ridiculous an example suggests that Paul Graham is basically correct. (I think the correct reading of "anything you do to decrease one will probably also decrease the other" is "if you pick something that decreases one, it will probably decrease the other" rather than "literally every single thing that might decrease one will, with high probability given that you do that particular thing, decrease the other".)
No it doesn't. It suggests that when selecting examples for the purpose of countering generalizations wedrifid chooses examples that are clear and unambiguous to anyone who correctly parses the claim rather than choosing the most likely counter example. This is particularly the case when rejecting the extent of a general claim while accepting the gist - as I went out of the way to make explicit.
I also reject the idea that the second example I gave is at all unrealistic:
Corporal punishment for stupidity is an actual (hopefully mostly historical) thing.
I can't help this quote:
--N-Space, Larry Niven
For the record, I took you to be proposing a single counterexample with two components, rather than two separate counterexamples; I'm sorry for the misunderstanding.
Now that I know the second bullet point was meant to be a separate counterexample, I have a different objection to it: I am unconvinced that any implementable version of it would both reduce stupidity and increase meanness. (The most likely outcome, I think, would be to increase meanness while replacing more blatant varieties of stupidity with more widely spread lower-level stupidity.)
EDITED to add: Oh, one other thing. If it happens that (1) it was you who downvoted me and (2) you did so because you thought I downvoted your previous comment, then you might want to know that I didn't.
"All this knowledge is giving me a raging brainer!"
Professor Farnsworth, Futurama
The same reign of terror that occurred under Robespierre and Hitler occurred back then in the fifties, as it occurs now. You must realize that there is very little actual courage in this world. It's pretty easy to bend people around. It doesn't take much to shut people up, it really doesn't. In the fifties all I had to do was call a guy up on the telephone and say, "Well, I think your wife would like to know about your mistress."
An upvote to the first person to identify the author of that quote.
I like the quote, but I downvoted. An upvote to the first person to identify why.
It's wrong.
Because of the "an upvote to whoever can identify the author"?
Godwin's Law violation?
So, wait, was it that:
a) Most men worth influencing in the 50s had a mistress his wife didn't know about?
or that:
b) Most men worth influencing in the 50s understood that the guy calling him could persuade the wife that there was a mistress irrespective of whether there was really a mistress?
I don't know which it was.
But I'd say that you're seeing the trees, not the forest.
The major point of the quote was that there's a lack of courage in the world, the rest of the quote is just examples.
The courage to allow one's infidelity to be exposed (let alone falsely exposed) isn't what most people have in mind when they think of courage.
b) fits in better with the reign of terror metaphor.
Or perhaps that they believed they had a mistress, whether they did or didn't?
</joke>
Dude, SRSLY, 30 seconds with google.
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Ronald_DeWolf
Ronald DeWolf. The son of L. Ron Hubbard.
Seibel: The way you contributed technically to the PTRAN project, it sounds like you had the big architectural picture of how the whole thing was going to work and could point out the bits that it wasn’t clear how they were going to work.
Allen: Right.
Seibel: Do you think that ability was something that you had early on, or did that develop over time?
Allen: I think it came partially out of growing up on a farm. If one looks at a lot of the interesting engineering things that happened in our field—in this era or a little earlier—an awful lot of them come from farm kids. I stumbled on this from some of the people that I worked with in the National Academy of Engineering—a whole bunch of these older men came from Midwestern farms. And they got very involved with designing rockets and other very engineering and systemy and hands-on kinds of things. I think that being involved with farms and nature, I had a great interest in, how does one fix things and how do things work?
Seibel: And a farm is a big system of inputs and outputs.
Allen: Right. And since it’s very close to nature, it has its own cycles, its own system that you can do nothing about. So one finds a place in it, and it’s a very comfortable one.
-- Turing Award-winning computer scientist Fran Allen interviewed in Peter Seibel's Coders At Work, p507
(This is a great book, by the way. I strongly recommend it to anyone whose work involves how computers do what they do.)
Unknown source.
But I'm not sure what any of the variants of this have to do with rationality.
(Terry Pratchett, I think.)
I think it's more elegant to say it like this: "Light a man a fire and he'll be warm for a day. Light a man afire and he'll be warm for the rest of his life."
In text, yes. I said it aloud a few times and I couldn't tell the two apart easily. Maybe "light a man A fire / light a man ON fire"
I've successfully delivered "a fire"/"afire" aloud, but it's a little tricky to time right.
I find my formulation slightly quicker to parse, but otherwise you're right.
I saw a creepy hospice volunteer search ad on the street a few days ago. It said something along the lines of "They will be grateful to you for the rest of their lives." Like an inappropriate joke.
That's... disturbing, but also weirdly compelling.
That looks like a description of one problem with support of developing countries.
Give a man a fish, feed him for a day
Teach a man to fish, feed him for around 15 years until his major fishery collapses into unprofitability.
-- Terry Pratchett, "Sourcery"
"Paper clips are gregarious by nature, and solitary ones tend to look very, very depressed." - dwardu
-- Aristotle
"Sherlock Holmes once said that once you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the answer. I, however, do not like to eliminate the impossible. The impossible often has a kind of integrity to it that the merely improbable lacks." -- Douglas Adams's Dirk Gently, Holistic Detective
In Dirk Gently's universe, a number of everyday events involve hypnotism, time travel, aliens, or some combination thereof. Dirk gets to the right answer by considering those possibilities, but we probably won't.
I love this quote, but I'm pretty sure I wouldn't describe it as "rational".
I think we could modify our sense of it to mean that if you are down to having to accept a 0.01% probability, because you've excluded everything else, then it's probably better to go back over your logic and see if there's any place you've improperly limited your hypothesis space.
Several paradigm-changing theories introduced concepts that would have previously been thought impossible (like special relativity, or many-worlds interpretation)
I don't understand this one.
The way I read it was that he's using "impossibilities" to mean things that you don't think are possible, don't understand, or find inconceivable rather than things which can't actually happen.
A probable impossibility is something that will probably happen that a given person doesn't think is possible. An improbable possibility is something that that same person understands, but (whether you know it or not) isn't probable.
I read 'probable impossibility' as 'something that is probably impossible'. It's a poor translation if it means something else; but your version at least makes some kind of sense.
--Teiresias to the unrelenting Oedipus, Oedipus the King 316-9, Sophocles
(Assigning a specific location to 'here' left as an exercise for the reader...)
-- Seth Lloyd
I read this as an argument against having taxes.
I would like to get rid of one or two of them. Its painfull to see how often really inevitable things get confused with those that could at least in theory be dealt with.
Transcribed from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAD25s53wmE
How do you define “illusion”? I think an illusion is a type of brain failure. An optical illusion is even more specific. Therefore, I think the term is wholly appropriate — and “brain failure”, while not at all inappropriate, is just unnecessarily vague.
Disagree, at least in some instances. Many of these are just results of optimizing for normal environment.
There is a theorem in machine learning (blanking on the name) that says any "learner" will have to be biased in some sense.
The No Free Lunch Theorem.
Also, just because we can't expect to be free of bias doesn't mean that the bias is "proper functioning" of the hardware. An expected failure, perhaps, but still a failure.
</pedantry>
I make a finer distinction of "failure" as something that's inefficient for it's clear purpose. E.g. Laryngeal nerve of the giraffe. Evolution will do that on occasion. Sensory interpretations that optical illusions are based on are often optimal for the environment, and are a complement to the power of evolution if anything. Viewing something that is optimal as a failure seems like wishful thinking (though I suspect this is more of a misunderstanding of neurobiology).
Actually, that seems kind of fair. Something is a "failure to X" if it doesn't achieve X; something is a "failure" if it doesn't achieve some implicit goal. You can rhetorically relabel something a "failure" by changing the context.
Vision works well in our usual habitat, so we should expect it to break down in some corner cases that we can construct: agreed. For me to argue further would be to argue the meaning of "failure" in this context, when I'm pretty sure I actually agree with you on all of the substance of our posts.
I really do not want to argue about semantics either, but our agreed interpretation makes Niel's statement equivalent to "our visual system is not optimal for non-ancestral environments", which is highly uninteresting. I think the Dawkin's larengyal nerve example is much more interesting in this sense, since it points out body designs do not come from a sane Creator, at least in some instances (which is enough for his point).
Since we do not live in the ancestral environment now, I think the quotation could be just underlining how we should viscerally know our brain is going to output sub-optimal crud given certain inputs. Upvoted original.
Things are only impossible until they're not.
-- Jean-Luc Picard
-- Frank Zappa, quoted from The Real Frank Zappa Book
Zappa was a fantastic example of someone who kept their head firmly screwed on while simultaneously exercising his inner rampaging weirdness. Everyone should read the book.
-- The Colour of Magic, Terry Pratchett
So that's where Woody Allen got it from.
I haven't been able to find the original source of the Woody Allen quote, but it seems "The Colour of Magic" was published in 1983, and Google Books finds some copies of the Woody Allen quote predating that.
Ahh, nevermind then. (I only looked it up on Wikiquote, which referenced a bio-photo-book from 1993).
...I thought you were being ironic. o_o
-- Marc Stiegler, David's Sling
There seem to be separate failure conditions here though. You could fail because you're too emotionally invested in your view, or you could fail because you can spot the flaws in all the arguments for the opposing view. If your original view was actually right, then you're not at fault.
Since this can be hard to distinguish from motivated cognition, I think the exercise is questionably useful.
I don't think the point of the exercise is to successfully defend the opposing point of view but to make a good-faith attempt to come up with an argument for it without getting your original emotions involved. If you can conjure up a coherent argument for the opposing side (allowing for a slightly different set of priors), that's some evidence that you're looking at consequences rather than being strung along by motivated cognition. If you can't -- and this is pretty common -- that's good evidence that the opposing view has been reduced to a caricature in your mind.
It's a litmus test for color politics, in other words. Not a perfect one, but it doesn't have to be.
I keep seeing insightful bits from this book (for instance, here and somewhere else that I forget). Am I correct when I say it seems worth reading as rationalist fiction?
It's very nearly one of the only pieces of rationalist fiction out there.
-Charles Babbage
Dupe
-John Wayne, Sands of Iwo Jima (1949)
-Mark Twain
--Georges Rey, "Meta-atheism: Religious Avowal as Self-deception" (2009)
(First version seen on http://www.strangedoctrines.com/2008/09/risky-philosophy.html but quote from an expanded paper.)
-- Today's Dinosaur Comic
-- Common German folk saying
Translates as "If the rooster crows on the manure pile, the weather will change or stay as it is." In other words, P(W|R) = P(W) when W is uncorrelated with R.
Another good one:
"If it's bright and clear on New Year's Eve, the next day will be New Year's."
Als het regent in mei, is april al voorbij. (If it rains in May, April is already past)
I'll chip in with this Russian saying:
"It is better to be rich and healthy than to be poor and sick!"
Woody Allen had a take on it too:
--Evil Overlord List #230
Doris Lessing, "Mara and Dann"
--Lothrop Stoddard, The Revolt Against Civilization
Approximate quote: [You should] go in with a thesis, not a conclusion.
From a BBC program about the media and crime in Detroit. The context was the extent to which Detroit is over-reported as a high-crime city, and someone commented that the BBC had sent someone over for a reason, but they were actually looking at the situation instead of assuming they knew what they were going to see.
Paul Graham
— Eric S. Raymond
(This applies no less strongly to one's own brain.)
On simpler solutions:
Neal Stephenson, Cryptonomicon
David Hume - "Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals"
After finishing dinner, Sidney Morgenbesser decides to order dessert. The waitress tells him he has two choices: apple pie and blueberry pie. Sidney orders the apple pie. After a few minutes the waitress returns and says that they also have cherry pie at which point Morgenbesser says "In that case I'll have the blueberry pie."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_irrelevant_alternatives
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sydney_Morgenbesser
Sidney chooses pies on the basis of popularity. Apple pie is more popular than blueberry pie. Apple pie is so popular that pie eaters have grown sick of it. They quickly gorge on the new cherry pie. When the fad dies down, they are still sick of apple pie and begin a blueberry revival. Sidney correctly predicts that blueberry will be more popular.
As they say in Discworld, we are trying to unravel the Mighty Infinite using a language which was designed to tell one another where the fresh fruit was.
-- Terry Pratchett
"Language is a drum on which we beat out tunes for bears to dance to, when all the while we wish to move the stars to pity." -- Flaubert
--Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince
Francis Bacon
It doesn't help that undergraduate philosophy has rather a lot of enumerating the history of philosophical arguments regardless of quality.
I shall have to quote this a good deal more when dealing with people who chide me for not mentioning all the possible objections that philosophers consider to still be in play.
Well, sexual selection chose wit as the target for our intelligence, not discernment of the truth of matters of Far concern. Anybody can figure out the truth of the Near, where is the impressiveness in that? Nobody can verify Far claims, so we don't know who should impress us.
"What happens when you combine organized religion and organized sports? I don’t know, but I suspect not much would change for either institution."
Scenes from a Multiverse
"But can people in desperate poverty be considered to be making free choices? Many say no. So, is the choice between starving and selling one’s kidney really a choice? Yes; an easy one. One of the options is awful. To forbid organ selling is to take away the better choice. If we choose to provide an even better option to the person that would be great – but it is no solution to the problem of poverty to take away what choices the poor do have absent outside help."
Katja Grace, on Metaeuphoric, Dying for a Donation
--Mike Caro, Caro's Book of Tells
The following reminded me of Arguments as Soldiers:
I'm sorry to have not found his blog sooner.
Just saw on reddit a perfect accidental metaphor: jakeredfield posted this in r/gaming:
What makes it even more perfect is this reply by Aleitheo:
I am going to shamelessly and totally steal this example for when talking about anti-deathism to anyone.
Seriously, thank you so much.
You're welcome. No need really to thank me. After all, I shamelessly stole it too. It was just too perfect. :)
Unfortunately, I think I saw somebody else play that section correctly before I played it myself. Still, if I had died, I would've come back at the last time I saved. That would've clued me in that I was supposed to survive, and I probably would've figured it out in one or two more tries tops.
KanadianLogik adds:
It's possible that if there were several copies of Chell, some of them did.
-Confucius
-old Warner & Swasey ad
-Chinese proverb
Sometimes they only unlock the deadbolt, and you need a friend to help push open the door. Sometimes the door is on the top of a cliff, and you need to climb up the rope of Wikipedia to get there. And so on. A lot of people who are having trouble learning something are having trouble realizing what resources they have available.
Its a bizarre feature of university life that it is very difficult to get students to take opportunities for help, even when they are obviously and explicitly provided.
And the reasons those students don't take opportunities for help tend to be embarrassingly pathetic. Like, so embarrassing that they avoid even thinking about it, because if they made their real reason explicit, they would be pained at how dumb it is. (I've done this sot of thing myself, more times than I'm comfortable with.)
For example, I discovered that a significant fraction of the students in a certain class were afraid to ask questions of the professor because they found him scary. Now, I know the professor in question, and he's a friendly person who wishes that his students would talk to him more -- but he has an abrupt, somewhat awkward way of speaking, and an eastern European accent. Such superficial details are apparently what leaves the biggest impression on most people.
Or there are the guys who get depressed and stop coming to class for a week or two, and then keep on not coming to class because they haven't been to class for a while, and it would be hard trying to get back up to speed. I really sympathize with these guys, but that doesn't make their reasoning any saner. (A fair number of them come in at the end of a semester to flunk their final exams. Damn it all, this is painful to watch.)
Or there are the people who won't read textbooks, or Wikipedia, or whatever, because they feel like everything ought to be covered in class well enough that they can just show up every day and get a good grade. I can not think of any good pedagogical reason why this should be so, and indeed, it usually isn't.
I could go on. There are plenty more examples. But instead I think I'll just paraphrase the not-actually-evil professor from eastern Europe. "These kids," he said. "They aren't resourceful because they have never had to be resourceful. They need more adversity in life. When I was their age, I had to bribe a local official just to get a dorm room."
I've often found that this is so. I do try to read my textbooks, at least the assigned readings, because...well, because you're supposed to, I guess. But for most of my first year classes (three anatomy courses, psych 101, microbiology) just going to class was enough. (I did of course take detailed notes, with colourful diagrams, and then study from my notes afterwards. I have now bequeathed my anatomy notes to a friend a couple of grades younger.) One possible reason why this is true for me is that I like biology-related subjects, and I've always read anything I could get my hands on, and so I arrived in university to find that I already knew at least 50% of the material.
Areas where this isn't true: English classes, history classes, etc, where there are a lot of required readings that cover material not covered in class, and where there are essays or papers to be written on material that isn't covered in class. And of course there's no rule that you can get good grades without reading textbooks. It just happens to be true sometimes, for some people.
That's not "adversity", that's "solvable problems requiring initiative".
My experience of students here at [prominent UK university] is that they are very unwilling to ask for help because they have never needed to do so before, and so consider asking for help as a sign of weakness/low intelligence/low status.
This makes a certain amount of sense, the people who have been able to meet entry requirements are likely in the top percentile of their subject and been the best or nearly at their school. Generally this has been the result of either natural ability or brute force work (memorising equations and examples etc) rather than acting strategically and gaining study skills such as the ability to find new sources f information or ask for help. So they either despair at the seeming impossibility of their tasks, or spend increasingly large amounts of time brute forcing the work and burn out.
It takes a lot for people to understand that needing help doesn't mean you are stupid, but that the work is hard and its supposed to be hard.
(a sentiment I think applies to all super-stimuli)
dupe (which includes citation and larger context.)
--Paul Graham
Well, the time Steve Ballmer announced he was to quit the Microsoft, Microsoft's stock jumped quite a bit, clearly because Ballmer quit, even though one could perhaps explain either a raise or a fall with Ballmer quitting. Expected square of a change was big from Ballmer quitting, that's for sure. Same goes for any dramatic news, such as the recent gas attack in Syria.
And yes, over the time one could tell that something is up if the stock market graph is uneventful while there's dramatic news.
Bottom line is, a causal link can exist and be inferred even when there is no correlation.
An interesting concept...but I wonder. I bet at least some people would actually notice that. They'd see unrest in the middle east and say "hmm...oil prices didn't change the way I expected them to" or something. Sometimes you see things like "_ index rises in spite of _".
I think Graham's inference has merit: these people don't really know what's happening...but I think some people at least would notice the anomoly.
Well now I want to test this. Do we have anyone here who thinks they know a thing or two about the stock market? If so would they be amenable to an experiment?
I'm thinking that they would agree not to look at any stock price information for a day (viewing all the other news they want). At the end of the day they are presented with some possible sets of market closes, all but one of which of which are fake, and we see if they can reliably find the right one.
Finding the most probable market outcome given a few possibilities and a day's news is easier than noticing by yourself that the news and the market don't fit.
I will participate if you'd like to try, there are some problems with the experiment though
I'm still interested, what changes would you suggest?
Robert Heinlein
At one point, he quite audaciously predicted that the Soviet Union was headed for collapse. If he'd lived longer, he would have seen that his prediction should have been even crazier: not only did the Soviet Union fall apart, but it did so without starting a major war, or nuking any cities.
And don't even get me started on his books where we've got interstellar travel, guided by computers that are the size of a room but barely faster than someone with a slide rule.
"Please don't hold anything back, and give me the facts" – Wen Jiabao, Chinese Premier (when meeting disgruntled people at the central complaints offices).
-- Mary Shelley, The Last Man