There is another option you might have not considered. Eliezer (IE) can not be described to either make use of the words or not. To get from wrong to right you need change. If you reached maximally right you don't need change, therefore you become static. Eliezer (IE) might simply reach a completely static world state that is optimally right, after which it simply holds or becomes unchanging. A program that doesn't run, or is static, can neither be described to make use of a labeling nor to not make use of it.
One might argue that Eliezer (IE) has to preserve an optimal right world state. But that argument implicitly assumes that a world state has to be static. But even a dynamic world state involving a periodic function could not reasonably be described to be right compared to something better if it is optimal. There is no light without darkness, if nothing is wrong then right ceases to exist.
So maybe Eliezer (IE) should not be thought of as either making use of such labels or not but simply as Eliezer (IE).
I think I've found a better argument that Eliezer's meta-ethics is wrong. The advantage of this argument is that it doesn't depend on the specifics of Eliezer's notions of extrapolation or coherence.
Eliezer says that when he uses words like "moral", "right", and "should", he's referring to properties of a specific computation. That computation is essentially an idealized version of himself (e.g., with additional resources and safeguards). We can ask: does Idealized Eliezer (IE) make use of words like "moral", "right", and "should"? If so, what does IE mean by them? Does he mean the same things as Base Eliezer (BE)? None of the possible answers are satisfactory, which implies that Eliezer is probably wrong about what he means by those words.
1. IE does not make use of those words. But this is intuitively implausible.
2. IE makes use of those words and means the same things as BE. But this introduces a vicious circle. If IE tries to determine whether "Eliezer should save person X" is true, he will notice that it's true if he thinks it's true, leading to Löb-style problems.
3. IE's meanings for those words are different from BE's. But knowing that, BE ought to conclude that his meta-ethics is wrong and morality doesn't mean what he thinks it means.