I can certainly imagine situations where I would choose to kill babies (for example, where I estimate a high probability that this baby continuing to live will result in other people dying), but I assume that doesn't qualify as "intrinsically the right thing to do."
That said, I'm not sure what would.
Most of the usual thought experiments that justify expected utilitarialism trade off fun for fun, or suffering for suffering. Here's a situation which mixes the two. You are offered to press a button that will select a random person (not you) and torture them for a month. In return the machine will make N people who are not suffering right now have X fun each. The fun will be of the positive variety, not saving any creatures from pain.
1) How large would X and N have to be for you to accept the offer?
2) If you say X or N must be very large, does this prove that you measure torture and fun using in effect different scales, and therefore are a deontologist rather than a utilitarian?