HughRistik comments on Rationalist Diplomacy, Game Two Post-game Discussion - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (28)
Interesting. Though I'm not sure I agree that you would have been terribly far behind me. You could have moved into Galicia in Spring 1903 and gotten Budapest in 1904.
It's not just that you didn't articulate that you weren't allying me, it's that you blatantly stabbed me. Supporting Italy into Serbia was a stab. Furthermore, letting Italy think he might get somewhere from attacking me was what caused him to gain centers. Otherwise, he would have played Vienna supports Budapest, and moved Vienna to Trieste. To me, your moves only made sense if you were declaring war on me with Italy, which is why I made such a big deal of it.
If you'd warned me that you were supporting Italy into Serbia to sow confusion, then I wouldn't have been so bothered. But even so, I think you needed to pick sides between Italy and me that season. You looked like you had picked Italy, so I was correct to warn the West about IR.
I deliberately created this situation by preemptively striking Italy in the Ionian, which would have only succeeded if he went for two Austrian builds without telling me. I deliberately burned diplomatic capital with Italy to make it easier for you to work with me without worrying that I would stab you with Italy.
That's right. I was a bit confused about why my emails didn't move the West. Did they think that I would stab you myself to get revenge, even though I made it very clear that I wouldn't act alone against you? Did I manage to annoy them with my messages? Did they fail to understand the significance of a strong IR (which switched to an RT in 1904)? Or both: they failed to understand the significance of the growing alliance in the East, which led them to interpret me as being a big windbag?
This sums up my mistake pretty well. My deception had no purpose and I gained nothing from it. I attribute this to the way that I was compartmentalizing negotiations at the time. The agent in charge of Turkish negotiations considered us as already allied, and wanted to signal accordingly. Self-deception is a wonderful signalling tool sometimes, except when you actually succeed in deceiving yourself.
I know France and I were pretty closely allied until England resigned, and Germany has talked about her take on your e-mails, but I don't know why England didn't take you up on the offer.