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Roko comments on Don't Revere The Bearer Of Good Info - Less Wrong
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EDIT: I agree with your conclusion, but...
(Checks Don Loeb reference.)
While, unsurprisingly, we end up adding to the same normality, I would not say that these folks have the same metaethics I do. Certainly Greene's paper title "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality" was enough to tell me that he probably didn't have exactly the same metaethics and interpretation I did. I would not feel at all comfortable describing myself as a "moral irrealist" on the basis of what I've seen so far.
Drescher one-boxes on Newcomb's Problem, but doesn't seem to have invented quite the same decision theory I have.
I don't think Nick ever claimed to have invented the Simulation Argument - he would probably be quite willing to credit Moravec.
On many other things, I have tried to use standard terminology where I actually agree with standard theories, and provide a reference or two. Where I am knowingly being just a messenger, I do usually try to convey that. But you may be reading too much into certain similarities that also have important points of difference or further development.
EDIT2: I occasionally notice the problem you point to, and write a blog post telling people to read more textbooks. Probably this is not enough. I'll try to reach a higher standard in any canonicalized versions.
In this case, I'd actually say email me first with a quickie description.
Roko exaggerates. It's only 377 pages and written in an accessible style.
It summarizes the ethical literature on moral realism, and takes the irrealist view that XML tags on actions don't exist, and that even if they did exist we wouldn't care about them. It then goes into the psychology literature (Greene does experimental philosophy, e.g. finding that people misinterpret utility as having diminishing marginal utility in contravention to experimental instructions), e.g. Haidt's work on social intuitionism, to explain why it is that we think there are these moral properties 'out there' when there aren't any. Lastly, he argues that we can get on with pursuing our concerns (reasoning about conflicts between our concerns, implications, instrumental questions, etc), but suggests that awareness of the absence of XML tags can help us to better understand and deal with those with differing moral views.
This explains a LOT.
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Baron-JBDM-01.pdf
Enjoy.
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There is no objective truth about which actions are the right ones, no valuation inherent in the actions themselves. And even if there was, even if you could build a right-a-meter and check which actions are good, you won't care about what it says, since it's still you that draws the judgment.