Constant comments on Some Heuristics for Evaluating the Soundness of the Academic Mainstream in Unfamiliar Fields - Less Wrong

73 Post author: Vladimir_M 15 February 2011 09:17AM

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Comment author: CuSithBell 20 February 2011 06:47:44AM 1 point [-]

Okay, this makes sense, though I think I'd use 'belief' differently.

What does it mean in a situation where I take precautions against two possible but mutually exclusive dangers?

Comment author: [deleted] 20 February 2011 10:58:43AM *  0 points [-]

Here's a concise answer that straightforwardly applies the rule I already stated. Since my rule only applies above 50% and since P(being shot)=10% (as I recall), then we must consider the negation. Suppose P(I will be shot) is 10% and P(I will be stabbed) is 10% and suppose that (for some reason) "I will be shot" and "I will be stabbed" are mutually exclusive. Since P<50% for each of these we turn it around, and get:

P(I will not be shot)is 90% and P(I will not be stabbed) is 90%. Because the cost of being shot, and the cost of being stabbed, are so very high, then the threshold for being convinced must be very high as well - set it to 99.9%. Since P=90% for each of these, then it does not reach my threshold for being convinced.

Therefore I am not convinced that I will not be shot and I am not convinced that I will not be stabbed. Therefore I will not go without my bulletproof body armor and I will not go without my stab-proof body armor.

So the rule seems to work. The fact that these are mutually exclusive dangers doesn't seem to affect the outcome. [Added: For what I consider to be a more useful discussion of the topic, see my other answer.]