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prase comments on Is Morality a Valid Preference? - Less Wrong
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Sorry for misunderstanding, then. But what's the point of the big number, if the claim is only about proportion?
There's a certain intuition that one should assign greater weight to an other-moral-belief if many other people believe it.
Then this would a clear abuse of that intuition. Among 3^^^3 people with varied beliefs, all moral beliefs that exist today on Earth would be believed by many people.
Actually I think that the intuition applies only if "many" is measured relatively to the size of population.
I think the population-ratio measure sounds about right. Phrased in those terms, the original idea was that as the number of people unanimously agreeing with you increases, the proportion of total belief-weight represented by your own opinion approaches zero.
What is belief weight? Does your assertion mean that with 3^^^3 people, any person's own opinion has approximately zero value?
You said in the 3-parent that "many" should be measured relative to the size of the population. I interpret that to mean that beliefs should be weighted by the number of people who believe them, in the sense of a weighted average (although we're computing something different from the average, the concept of "weighting" analogizes over). The weight of a belief is then the number of people who believe it divided by the number of people polled.
Yes.