Rationality Quotes: March 2011
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"It’s fascinating to me that we live in a world where some intelligent people think we need to put more effort into sophisticated artificial intelligence, while others think tractors powered by methane from manure are more important, and each thinks the other is being unrealistic."
John Baez
Very amusing, but what I find really silly here is that "tractors powered by methane from manure" is easy, and if that is helpful we should just do it already, and move on to hard important problems like FAI.
I suppose the counterargument is "put the large rocks in first"... that is, that there is a large enough supply of easy problems that the "if it's easy, do it now" strategy means you never get to the hard important problems.
In this case, the easy problem is still easy without using any resources currently being applied to the hard problem. There should not be a trade off here.
Do you happen to know where that quote is from? My dad uses it a lot and I had the vague impression it was from a self-help book.
I don't; it's been floating around the ether for as long as I can recall. Most recently, a friend of mine insisted that this was a Zen koan, which I find very unlikely.
On Mysterious Answers to Mysterious Questions
Context: The main character has been talking about the wonderful mysteriousness that makes another character so interesting. His companion (a self described humanist), tries to correct him, saying:
-Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain
Spinoza
Jason Zweig
— G. K. Chesterson
Wrong on both counts. Impartiality is a necessary and desirable trait for umpires (and similar roles). I want umpires, judges and escrow agents to be impartial even when they care about one of the parties.
Indifference is a valid preference to have for events that don't concern you. I'm indifferent to who wins the Super Bowl. That doesn't mean I know nothing about it. I simply have no reason whatsoever to care.
The Chesterson's quote is a pompous and elegant way of whining that people don't want to help you.
— Chuck Klosterman
You can know you are unjustly negative without being able to change your disposition. Why do you think people choose to take counselling and antidepressants?
I know I am cynical
I read the quote as referring more to people who take pride in their self-image as cynics. I meant no offense to those who correctly and non-paradoxically believe themselves to have unjustly negative aliefs, I know what that's like.
I'm afraid that this isn't a quote, but it seems like the best place to put it.
Earlier today, I had a discussion with my girlfriend about Santa Claus etc. She opined that it was worthwhile to believe in ‘impossible things’ (her words) because belief is in itself valuable. I didn't know where to begin disagreeing with that. (There was also something about the ‘magic of childhood’.)
This evening, we saw Rango. She squeezed my hand when the characters started talking about how it was important to have something to believe in, it gives people hope, etc. I wasn't even inclined to disagree, only to point out that one should find something true to serve as the basis for one's hopes (not that we actually got into a discussion in the movie theatre).
But then I was delighted to find that the character most pushing this point of view jnf gur znva ivyynva. And not just that; by the lights of this movie, that attitude (belief without regard to truth) is simply wrong.
-- Randall Munroe
— Randall Munroe, today's xkcd alt text
So don't save the world if doing so is boring?
I read it as comparing enthusiasm for the general concept of success to wanting to achieve a specific goal. So it is good to save the world because you want the world to be saved, and it is bad to publish a blog post instead of saving the world because you like success and it is easier to succeed at publishing a blog post.
"Think like a man of action, act like a man of thought" Henri Bergson
When I first read this, I thought it was just applause lights. But I actually think it's highly applicable to rationalist standards of belief and practice.
-Wilbur Wright
It's better to be lucky than smart, but it's easier to be smart twice than lucky twice
Who are you quoting?
I couldn't find a source, but the line has been around for a while.
Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary
From Lord Of The Rings by J.R.R. Tolkien:
"He that breaks a thing to find out what it is has left the path of wisdom."
Although I think breaking things actually can be pretty useful if there are more things of that kind. If you're breaking something unique, well, then...
I'm not sure if 'although' is meant to reject this as a rationality quote or deny it entirely. I think the latter might be wise, though. It's essentially an anti-reductionist, anti-analytic quote on similar grounds to Keats' lines on unweaving rainbows. It's also part of a semi-mystical 'magical combat by philosophical debate' sequence, which I really enjoy as literature but which essentially boils down to a series of Mysterious Old Wizard 'insights'. Although, ironically, in LOTR the quote is objecting to Saruman breaking white light into its constituent 'many colours', whereas Keats is objecting to explaining the 'many colours' back to a division of white light. So it seems that the 'holistic' view is objecting to analysis in either direction on this one!
Demosthenes (384–322 BCE)
Samuel Butler
Quoted in the chapter on bounded rationality and the Revelation Principle in "Computational Aspects of Preference Aggregation" (.pdf) - an award winning 2006 PhD. Dissertation in AI by Vincent Conitzer.
Ben Goldacre keeps up a façade of being sympathetic to the Dark Side so that they look worse when they argue with him. Of course, taking it literally, it would be nice if I could decide what was true.
"Computers are like Old Testament gods; lots of rules and no mercy."
Joseph Campbell
...at least the rules are consistent and correspond to reality...
Not all of them. Which applies to Old Testament gods too, I guess: the Bible is pretty consistent with that "no killing" thing.
The bible doesn't say "don't kill". In KJV times, "kill" meant what we mean by "murder", and "slay" was the neutral form (what we now mean by "kill"). (This, by the way, actually corresponds to the Hebrew version)
This post brought to you by the vast inferential distance you have from the people who wrote KJV
Except for the countless times when killing is outright mandated on, well, pain of death.
And the times when killing is praised, and the times when killing is completely unremarked upon.
The Bible approaches consistency much more closely with "no murder." That said, if "murder" roughly boils down to unendorsed killing, that's not too surprising.
Even then it's more than a little odd. God's reaction to the first murder is rather mysterious. I've always felt the Cain and Abel story is the shortened version of something which really should have had a wider context.
Well, there's a lot of that in the Bible.
I've heard the Cain/Abel story explained as a metaphorical account of the conflict between hunter-gatherer and agricultural economies. (The initial conflict between the brothers stems from God's differential approval of their hunter and farmer lifestyles.) I have no idea whether there's real evidence for that or whether it's a just-so story, but if it's true it also provides a perspective on an equally puzzling account later on, where Jacob sells a mess of pottage to his hunter brother, Esov, in exchange for the primogeniture. (A contract he later enforces by outright deceiving their elderly father, which makes me suspect the later story came first and the earlier one backformed to justify what would otherwise be outright fraud, rather than mere coercion. But I digress.)
"If the wonder's gone when the truth is known, there never was any wonder." — Gregory House, M.D. ("House" Season 4, Episode 8 "You Don't Want to Know," written by Sara Hess)
That made me notice that the whole "persistent failure to understand some phenomenon makes it awesome" idea is baked directly into words like "wonder" and "wonderful". What do you do when you don't understand something? You wonder about it. And so if something is wonderful, then clearly you can't allow yourself to understand it, because then there'd be nothing to wonder about. (In that sense, of course "wonder" is gone when the truth is known!) I know the dictionary would likely consider those to be separate senses of the words, but the connotations probably leak over.
Why not?
The context of the quote is available here.
Thanks. I watched the episode and remember the context, but I still want to know why wonder that depends on ignorance is literally illusory.
Is this quote just a motivational tool designed to help us seek truth, or is there some true propositional content to it? If the latter, what are some situations where there was in fact some wonder? Also, what is or might be the causal mechanism by which dependence on ignorance leads to the no-wonder state?
I ask because when I am amazed by a magic trick or by a feat of practical engineering whose exact principles are unknown to me, and say "Wow!" and experience what I usually describe as "wonder," and then someone explains it and it seems relatively less wondrous, I do not usually retroactively downgrade my (temporary) experience of wonder -- rather, I note that at the time it seemed particularly wonderful and that now it seems less so.
For all that, I value truth much higher than wonder, and people are perfectly welcome to explain things to me -- but I doubt that House's quote is literally correct.
Things should not seem more wonderful when you don't understand them. Rationalists take joy in the merely real.
So I went back and re-read that article, and I still think that House's claim is (a) much stronger, and (b) wrong.
It's certainly important to allow yourself to gape in wonder at things that follow orderly rules; most likely all things do that, and I agree that it's foolish to give up wonder just because we live in an orderly universe.
But, for me, the sense of wonder is not about worshiping ignorance; it's about humility and curiosity. Here, I say to myself when I see a rainbow, is something worth knowing about and yet I do not understand it at all. The wonder is the fuel that leads to curiosity, which leads to knowledge. Or, at the very least, the wonder helps me keep up a grateful, open attitude toward my environment.
If you explained exactly how the rainbow worked, it would be an object of somewhat less wonder -- I would still find it pretty, but I wouldn't get quite the same emotional high. I might be able to find a similar sense of wonder in, e.g., the composition of the atmosphere (this usually works for me), or the behavior of photons (this usually does not work for me), and so there might be no net loss of wonder, and yet, nevertheless, explaining how the rainbow works tends to diminish the wondrousness of the rainbow without thereby providing any support for the conclusion that there was never any wonder there in the first place.
Basically, I disagree with you and with House. I take joy in the merely real, and things seem more wonderful to me when I don't (yet) understand them.
If you look at the context of the quote, the magician's previous line is:
"People come to my show because they want a sense of wonder. They want to experience something that they can't explain." (emphasis added)
That doesn't seem to be the same sentiment as the one you're describing.
The mindset in which something only has wonder when you think it's unexplainable (not just unexplained) is not a rational or scientific one.
I'm quite uncomfortable with these sorts of statements. Rationalism and science are ways of approaching and analysing the world, not modes of aesthetic appreciation. This smacks a little to me of the idea that the scientifically aware realise that there is 'more beauty' in nature than in art.
If I met someone who was clear-minded, analytical and empirical I wouldn't call them irrational and unscientific just because they experience wonder at unexplained magic tricks rather than great scientific theories, or because they found the poetry of Eliot more beautiful than the structure of the universe (I know you haven't claimed the latter, just addressing a more widespread 'scientific people appreciate X' claim).
I didn't think this would fit into the top level of the quotes thread, but in this context it might actually serve pretty well:
-- Humphry Davy
I guess the question is whether this is perception of truth or 'truthiness'. On the one hand, people can have a deep sense that something is inevitably true that then turns out to be false. On the other, some individuals, such as Einstein, seem to be good at recognising the sort of aesthetic elegance that suggests a true theory
On the whole, I'm sceptical about the 'direct perception of truth' idea: it tends to suggest that all we need to do is clear away a certain level of obvious biases and then we can trust our gut. And that others who demand evidence for things we consider obvious are nit-pickers and nay-sayers. Not sure that's very good for rationality.
If "wonder" is being used to denote a reaction in an observer's mind, then you're of course right... there was wonder, and now there isn't, and House is simply wrong.
If "wonder" is being used metonomicly to refer to something in the world that merits being reacted to in that way -- the way people use it, for example, in phrases like "the seven wonders of the ancient world" -- then it's not so clearcut.
I like the quote because I interpret it as a weapon against the mind projection fallacy: If something is no longer intrinsically wondrous when the truth is known, then it wasn't intrinsically wondrous to begin with.
It would seem to me that even to think that being wondrous was an intrinsic property would be some sort of mind projection fallacy by itself.
That's probably what I meant.
Johan van Benthem - in "Logical Dynamics of Information and interaction"(draft .pdf)
"The only thing I'm addicted to right now is winning." - Charlie Sheen
Sandra Tsing Loh
Not a rationality quote as such, but maybe an anti-hubris caveat for those of us that were never child prodigies.
-- Paul Krugman
(Not that this is necessarily a rationality quote, I just think it's cute.)
Should we open alternative Quotes Theeads for quotes which aren't Rationality Quotes, but which we want to share anyway?
Put 'em in the Open Thread and see who goes for it.
That sounds good to me.
Edit: Ah, I see that there is disagreement. I think this calls for a poll - I'll make one in the Open Thread.
Edit 2: Poll
Yes!
Poll
"Anything you can do, I can do meta" -Rudolf Carnap
In Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, Daniel Dennett leads the reader to believe he coined this phrase in a conversation with Douglas Hofstadter.
Where did you find this? Via Google I have only managed to trace it to a certain Samuel Hahn in 1991.
I think that should be Terry Prachett's slogan. Or Hofstadter's.
-Bertrand Russell
The great ethicists of history share essentially the same goal: get strangers to always pick D. ...
I didn't like that comic because `D' can be achieved through a combination of egoism and UDT just as easily as through altruism. I assume that Weiner would not judge an egoist to be ethically perfect in the least convenient world, one where they were always forced to cooperate in prisoner's dilemma-type situations but could be entirely egoistic whenever they could get away with it, without even acausal consequences.
That would sound strange if I didn't remember the reference. Not 'D' for defect. 'D' for zero based alphabetized listing of boolean 11 where 1 is 'C'. :)
-Irwin Edman
My personal philosophy in a nutshell.
On noticing confusion:
Sherlock Holmes, The Adventure of the Priory School
I am taking a first-aid class at my local community college. Our instructor, a paramedic, after telling us about the importance of blood flow to the brain, and the poor prognosis for someone who is left comatose from oxygen deprivation, says:
"There are some people who say, 'But miracles can happen!' Yeah, miracles are one in a million. What number are you?"
The reason it's a social and political question is that if you aren't in an emergency situation, it's much harder to tell what your capacity for help is. It isn't infinite, but it could probably be more than you're unthinkingly willing to allocate. It's plausible that people are being neglected for no good reason.
I'm not saying it makes sense to plan as though resources are infinite, but but it can also be a good heuristic to ask "what would we be doing if we cared more"?
Right or Wrong (by who's definition) is more in how you base your decisions, not in whether you make the decisions.
If you can only save one person, and all other things being equal, is it wrong to save the more attractive person because they are more attractive. If so, should you NOT save the more attractive person, just in case their attractiveness may be biasing your decision?
What if $4000 is spent on equipment to save one premature infant per year, who will probably be permanently impaired anyway, when the same money could have saved two or more adults per year?
The larger context is that if that sort of decision is common (and note that "attractive" is shaped by who you've been trained to like, it isn't an absolute), people will put substantial resources into being attractive and/or will be irrationally excluded from opportunities to contribute for being unattractive.
-- David Foster Wallace
Reminds me of the first two panels here.
Associating the quote with webcomics made me think of this, although it's fictional evidence.
John Stewart Bell, "Against Measurement" in Physics World, 1990.
That's pretty much the plot of Quarantine, isn't it?
Having trouble googling that. Could you provide a link? Or an explanation, I guess.
ETA: actually, I think I found it.
Google suggestions: "quarantine fiction", "quarantine wavefunction".
This comment led to my discovery that the Google settings on this computer were screwy. I think I found it now. Thank you!
Really? I'm kinda curious, how can Google settings be screwy in such a way that would stop you from finding the top hits?
Google will sometimes offer to return pages from the country you're in, which, while useful if you're looking for tourism or whatever, is less helpful if you live in Ireland and the thing you're looking for ... doesn't. I've never used it; this is what I get for using a shared computer.
This is probably not the same issue as MugaSofer and arundelo report, but sometimes when I'm on my phone Google notices that I'm in Italy, switches the interface to Italian even though I repeatedly told it that I want it in English, and starts to privilege pages in Italian in the search results by a ginormous amount even when searching for a term in English. (Switching the interface back to English fixes this.)
I dunno, but I've had it happen (and it started working when I signed out of Google).
A search-redirecting toolbar, perhaps.
There are many, many works of fiction titled "Quarantine". And your second suggestion throws up all sorts of unrelated stuff.
This quote does not argue against some major position of modern physicists, but is instead arguing (probably ineffectively) against self-help woo.
Bell made the comment in an article that examined major position of modern phycisists -- or at least, positions of some authors of physics textbooks. Woo was not his topic.
None of the physics textbooks I have ever read have required any special qualifications for a system to play the role of measurer, and in many cases use elementary particles as the measurers. There are only three places I recall hearing that claim: Werner Heisenberg, confused non-physicists, and advertising for quantum woo.
If you like, PM me an email address and I'll send the article there.
Too late, I went and found it online elsewhere :P
In context, the quote is not directed at anyone, and is just a rhetorical question leading straight to "no of course not." Out of context it quite naturally looks like it's directed at some group, changing the meaning a bit.
The quotes from Landau and Lifshitz definitely made me "what," but so did the solutions Bell proposed. 1990 is 20 years ago, I guess.
Just remember, 2011 will be 20 years ago in 2031! ;-)
It's as it is said: we learn new things all the time, so everything we know now is wrong.
Fair point -- pulling the quote out of context does change the way it comes across. To me, the out-of-context quote seems to target pop sci accounts of QM that talk in a misleading way about observation causing collapse. (The woo account of QM takes this misapprehension and runs with it, so I can see how your original rejoinder came about.)
Dr. Cuddy: "And you're always right. And I don't mean you always think you're right. But y--you are actually always right, because that's all that matters."
House: "That doesn't even make sense. What, you want me to be wrong?"
http://lesswrong.com/lw/4n8/rationality_quotes_march_2011/3n18
"If you want truth to stand clear before you, never be for or against. The struggle between "for" and "against" is the mind's worst disease." — Sent-ts'an
Peanuts, 1961 April 26&27:
I just looked this up. It seems the text has been altered, and in the original, Linus said "Are there any openings in the Lunatic Fringe?" http://www.gocomics.com/peanuts/1961/04/26
Read the next one: http://www.gocomics.com/peanuts/1961/04/27
I skipped the punchlines.
I see, thanks.
I got your Friendly AI problem right here...
"To educate a man in mind and not in morals is to educate a menace to society."
Theodore Roosevelt
Can't help but twist that into "To educate a society in morals and not in mind is to educate a menace to humanity..."
To educate a man in "morals" and not in morals etcetera etcetera.
Edit: alternatively: something something wild and wasted virtues.
-- Howard Zinn in A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
I'd be more interested to hear how he intends to solve the problem. Hopefully not the same way T-Rex did.
Sigh. Let me quote a part again:
Did you even read that sentence? There is no problem and no attempt at solution, he is just pointing out an important fact that had escaped me(and I guess lots of other folks) until I read the quote.
The book is propaganda. Wikipedia's collection of critical views.
The book is quite clearly propaganda. It sets out to advance a specific thesis, and there is literally no evidence provided against that idea. The bottom line was written at the beginning of the book, and he spent the rest of the book providing arguments for it. That doesn't mean, however, that his positions are necessarily wrong (see the addendum on the link above). Certainly, Zinn's positions have some flaws, but he does raise some issues that haven't been raised with other history texts.
It seems to me that the original quote is an explicit statement that that is what he is going to to. As is, even more explicitly, the mission statement on the top page of that website. An extract:
There's a whole cottage industry arguing over whether Zinn did solve it the way the T-Rex did or not. Although speaking as someone who agrees with some but not most of Zinn's politics, he did in some ways do a decent job focusing on areas of history that had not gotten a lot of attention due to ideological issues.
There is some value in criticizing that which has been improperly popularly lionized, but this introduces its own skew. Zinn managed to truly piss me off because in his chapter on WWII he either did not mention or mentioned only in passing the rape of Nanking and similar Japanese atrocities, spent a few paragraphs on the Holocaust, surprisingly didn't particularly mention the firebombings of Dresden or Tokyo, but harped for several pages on the atomic bombs. Perhaps they needed examination, but incessantly and loudly examining them at the expense of everything else leaves the reader with a distinct impression of Zinn's own political beliefs.
I think this might be behind much of (American) conservatives' anger with liberals in the foreign policy domain, as exemplified by the insult "blame-America-first". Liberals are questioning America's policies, which is well and good, while leaving it as read that the actions of their adversaries (since the dynamic evolved, usually USSR or terrorists) are much worse. Conservatives see that apparent bias and gain the impression that all liberals hate America in particular. The situation is not improved by much political mind-death on all sides. This is probably going off on a bit of a tangent, but it's at least marginally relevant.
Zinn assumed familiarity with those though! He didn't have anything novel to say about them, why simply regurgitate what's known so idiots won't misinterpret you?
I don't believe that that's what was really going on.
Satchel Paige
I would consider this an anti-rationality quote because he's refusing to actually Shut Up and Multiply. If a guy can beat you, you give him a free pass?
EDIT: I claimed that it was obvious that the math indicated that there were too many intentional walks in Major League Baseball. This is clearly non-obvious, I have lowered my estimate for its likelihood to .9, and I apologize for the claim. However, I still dislike the quote strongly.
And on this you are simply mistaken. Many people refuse to shut up and multiply. They are unable to admit that they do have limits and that sometimes losing is the best thing to do.
Apart from not being math, your "math" is just wrong. You ought to be able to see why if you read the surrounding conversation here. You can potentially save multiple runs if you correctly evaluate your ability with regard to one particular conflict and concede.
This isn't "anti-rationality". It is anti conventional wisdom and common enforced exhortation.
I apologize, for I spoke far too strongly. I should not have made such a claim. Nor do I on reflection think this is the place to start actually doing said math, and your belief being so strong made me call up a friend to go over the problem. I would however strongly dispute that this thread makes it clear that this should run the other way, and continue to believe with p~.9 that there are in fact too many intentional walks (I would have said p~.99 before this thread, my friend after consideration said .95).
This thread seems to be saying as evidence for there being too few: There exists a cognitive bias that, all things being equal, will cause managers to be reluctant to walk a batter intentionally.
I agree that this bias exists. However, I think there's a directly opposite bias that says "don't lose to their best guy" regardless of whether it's right to do so and a bias much stronger than either that says "do the thing that won't get me hammered in the press if I lose." I would guess there's also Overconfidence Bias at work here: Managers think that better matchups are more distinct from worse matchups than they actually are. There are a lot of biases surrounding this decision, they run in both directions and only a small (if growing) number of teams are willing to sit down, do math and try and figure out the right answer.
The only way to actually know which way this runs is to observe what managers actually do and compare that to a well developed model that evaluates the chances of each team winning given each potential decision.
My observations over the years is that these are the categories of situations involving possible intentional walks: 1) Conventional wisdom automatic walks. You need to walk him, and you do. 2) Conventional wisdom "free" walks. CV says that the run doesn't matter so put the guy on. Given the option value of being able to walk a guy, I think managers use this far too often; they essentially use it as long as the next guy is worse. 3) Getting to the pitcher. This is done at least as much as is reasonable given the lineup effects of doing this. 4) Walking the obviously more dangerous guy because there are men on base. This is the situation where it is possible they walk too rarely; I am willing to accept that some managers do this too rarely. Some clearly do it too often. 5) Walking the dangerous guy because you flat out won't pitch to him. This requires such a strong hitter to be right due to the value of an out. I'd have a very hard time believing this is substantially underused. 6) Walking one guy to get to another somewhat similar guy. This is done way too often, many times in places that boggles the mind.
I suspect that what happened is that the quote comes from a time when the conventional wisdom was different and managers did in fact walk batters too rarely, especially due to issues of sportsmanlike conduct, but such considerations seem to be almost entirely gone.
"If a man can beat you, walk him" does not mean "walk people more than you do currently".
So what does "can beat you" mean? I still don't understand this either in the context of baseball or rationality.
If "can beat you" means "could, theoretically, beat you" then you walk everybody. If "can beat you" means "is p>.5 to beat you" then you never intentionally walk anybody--if a pitcher is so tired he thinks the next batter is p>.5 to get a hit, he should ask to be relieved. If "can beat you" means "is p>k to beat you" where k is some threshold, then Paige does seem to be saying "walk people more than you do currently".
It isn't about tiredness or general competence.
The other replies here explain the quote well. I must affirm the rational decision making principle that is illustrated.
What does this mean?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intentional_base_on_balls
Baseball pitchers have the option to 'walk' a batter, giving the other team a slight advantage but denying them the chance to gain a large advantage. Barry Bonds, a batter who holds the Major League Baseball record for home runs (a home run is a coup for the batter's team), also holds the record for intentional walks. By walking Barry Bonds, the pitcher denies him a shot at a home run. In other words, Paige is advising other pitchers to walk a batter when it minimizes expected risk to do so.
Since this denies the batter the opportunity to even try to get a hit, some consider it to be unsportsmanlike, and when overused it makes a baseball game less interesting. A culture of good sportsmanship and interesting games are communal goods in baseball-- the former keeps a spirit of goodwill, and the latter increases profitability-- so at a stretch, you might say Paige advises defecting in Prisoner's Dilemma type problems.
... to some. There are others who enjoy watching games being played strategically. I don't, for example, take basketball seriously unless the teams are using a full court press.
What do you do, for example, if all the bases are loaded and the good hitter comes in? Do you give away the run? It may depend on the score and it would involve some complex mathematical reasoning. That single decision would be more memorable to me than the rest of the entire game of baseball!
The latter wouldn't be a reasonable claim to make, even taking your premises regarding what sportsmanship is and what is good for the game for granted. For Paige to be claimed to be advising defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma Paige would have to be asserting or at least believe that the payoffs are PDlike. Since Paige doesn't give this indication he instead seems to be advocating thinking strategically instead of following your pride.
Curiously, assuming another set of credible beliefs Paige could consider walking the batter to be the cooperation move in the game theoretic situation. Specifically, when there is another pitcher known to walk who cannot be directly influenced. If all the other pitchers publicly declare that the game's rules should be changed in such a way that free walking is less desirable and then free walk hitters whenever it is is strategic to do so they may force the rule-makers' hands. If just one pitcher tried this strategy of influence then he would lose utility, sacrificing his 'good guy' image without even getting all the benefits that the original free-walker got for being the 'lone bad boy strategic prick pitcher'. If all the pitchers except one cooperate then the one pitcher who lets himself be hit out of the park cleans up on the approval-by-simplistic-folks stakes by being the 'boy scout only true sportsman' guy while everyone else does the hard work of looking bad in order to improve the rules, the game in the long term and the ability of pitchers not to be competitively disadvantaged for being 'sportsmanlike'. (All of this is again assuming that no-free-walking is intrinsically good.)
I use an analogous strategy when playing the 500. I like to arrange house rules that put a suitable restriction (or incentive modification) for misere calls. If the opponents have their egos particularly attached to standard misere rules I allow their rules to be used and then bid open misere whenever it is rational to do so. Which is a lot.
The above is not exactly a threat simply for the purpose of enforcing my will. It is to a significant extent a simple warning. Some people sulk if they rarely get the kitty when they have the joker and 4 jacks. At least this way they are forewarned.
I'm sorry but I'm not very familiar with baseball. Does walking a batter mean something like intentionally throwing the ball to third or fourth base so he doesn't get caught out but can't do a home run?
If this is the case then it seems like the advice is more about knowing when to lose.
Basically, when you throw the pitch, there's a "strike zone" in front of the batter where any pitch that isn't hit counts as a strike, but where the batter is most able to hit the ball. If you throw the ball outside the strike zone, it's harder to hit, but if the batter doesn't swing, it doesn't count as a strike - it's a "ball". Four balls means the batter goes to first base.
Thus, if you don't want to risk a home run, just throw the ball where it can't possibly be hit a few times, and give up one base instead of several points.
It's sorta about knowing when to lose, but it's more like the old Sun Tzu chestnut: "In war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak."
Thanks
You're welcome :)
It's a baseball thing, I'd assume. It's saying, if you're a pitcher, don't try to strike out a batter who's going to hit a home run - just give up a base and strike out the next guy.
Is this too cryptic? :
Throw strikes. Home plate don't move. Satchel Paige
(Additional note)
It would have seemed less cryptic to me if the quote was formatted in a way that distinguished between your commentary, the quote itself and the quote author. I hadn't read your other contributions at the time so didn't realise that you didn't use a standard form. I did not realise that "Throw strikes. Home plate don't move." was the actual literal quote, as opposed to a cryptic reference in your own words to a quote that I was supposed to be familiar with.
Also:
-- wedrifid
Yes. I'm familiar enough with the rules of baseball that I can infer the sport and affirm that throwing strikes is a Good Thing for a pitcher to do and acknowledge that the home plate does, in fact, stay put. I am not sufficiently familiar with Satchel Paige or enamoured of the sport that I can guess why I am supposed to be inspired.
Google helped to clarify. It gave the full quote and put it in the context of what seems to be, shall we say, a KISS philosophy.
-- Satchel Paige
(Google also gives a Paige quote that is a real gem of a rationality insight. Thanks for the indirect link!)
Pragmatic rationality, perhaps? :
Reminds me of Sidney Morgenbesser's response when he was asked his opinion of pragmatism: "It's all very well in theory, but it doesn't work in practice."
Grrr... At least with normal 'theory vs practice' quotes they stick to one (slightly broken) definition of theory in which 'theory' is (evidently) limited to oversimplified theories that don't fully account for specific details of practical execution. In this quote it conflates an encompassing definition of theory with the limited, specific caricature of the more typical theory/practice dichotomy presentations. Which is just all sorts of wrong.
Stick to your colloquialisms Yogi Berra! Don't get stuck half way to technical clarity. It's just an insult to all sides!
I've heard it said differently.
Perhaps this precedes subsequent rationality:
Knowing the risk, I quote this (given that I am a utilitarian pragmatist):
Why is there a risk? Is it because of William James' reputation?
William James
Possible corollary: I can change my reality system by moving to another planet.
William T. Powers
Like the spirit. Technically disagree with respect to future events. :)
Alexander Pope
-- Alonzo Fyfe
I upvoted this at first but... What about silver clouds?
— Wolof proverb
"Once we are all working in the slave-pits together, I will try to put in a good word for you all. I will be like the old Barnard Hughes character in Tron, who remembers the Master Control Program when it was just accounting software."
-- Ken Jennings
Read straight, I'd say it's a contender 'or ultimate irrationality quote about the future of AI. Ya got your generalizing from fictional evidence there, a bit o' inappropriate anthropomorphizing, a dash o' failure to recognize the absurdity of the future...
— Theodore Roethke
I'm not sure how I would distinguish people who specialize in the impossible from people who simply don't accomplish much of anything at all.
I'd look for the explosions.
You would have to notice when they acheive the impossible.
Or that they make visible progress towards the impossible.
Or that they acheive interesting side projects in their down time from working on the impossible.
That is a good one (that applies even under strict definitions of 'the impossible'). Closely related is if they make valuable tangential contributions to the non-impossible while working on the impossible.
That's a tricky thing to specialize in. Got any ideas about how someone would go about it?
If you interpret "impossible" as meaning "things a lot of people call impossible", then the obvious method would be to make a list of such things, research them to see if there are any where you have a plausible chance of making a difference, and figure out which of them you'd prefer to specialize in.
The Simpsons, "Kidney Trouble"
An irrationality quote from Samuel Johnson via Boswell:
I've always been a huge fan of this story.
Daniel Kish (Human Echolocation researcher, advocate and instructor).
I would rather see the pole coming so that I wouldn't run into it. I'm not sure this metaphor succeeded.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZUwdQA6KQ0
Start watching about 6:55 in.
Sometimes the there are bigger problems you have to get through, and then the pole is just there.
I rather suspect you miss the point of the metaphor. Perhaps you also missed the entirely literal meaning as well. Seeing the pole coming is not an option you have available if, as is the case with Kish and many of the people he works with, you do not have retinas.
I definitely missed the literal meaning -- thanks.
A truly elegant argument in favour of getting hit with a baseball bat every week.
There is an important distinction between 'not being allowed to run into a pole' and just 'not running into poles because you look where you're going'.
It seems to be an argument against restrictive paternalism, enforced dependence and misguided risk aversion.
The implied game analysis is something along the lines of the following:
Within that framework he would consider anyone who limits themselves unnecessarily to be crazy (irrationally risk averse or suffering from learned helplessness) and anyone who restricts the options available to blind people under their control to be perpetrating a serious harm (through misguided but possibly well meaning paternalism).
Consider the following similar declaration:
Falling off a bike is a drag. When learning to ride children will inevitably fall off their bikes. A child never being allowing to ride is far worse than falling off a bike sometimes. Pain is part of the price of freedom.
Most people can acknowledge the deleterious effects of too much coddling of that kind and Kish emphasises that it applies in exactly the same way to blind people as well. And not just because they are deprived of the experience of mountain biking by echolocation but more importantly because it trains the coddlee to rely on caretakers rather than themselves, stifling initiative and capability in a way similar to that which Eliezer recently discussed.
I saw it more as opposing restrictions on one's ability to hit oneself in the head with a baseball bat every week. I'm not saying anyone should do it, but if they really want to I don't feel I have the right to stop them.
-Kaname Madoka, Puella Magi Madoka Magica
Episode #7 of Madoka, and I'm thinking, "It's amazing how many anime problems can be solved by polyamory and the pattern theory of identity."
Neither Google nor LW search is giving me much on "pattern theory of identity". What is it?
http://everything2.com/title/Pattern+Identity+Theory
Gracias. Will take a look.
"If you ever want to save the universe, call me anytime."
Bruce Gregory "Inventing Reality: Physics as Language" pp.186-187.
It might be more accurate to substitute "rules" for "procedures".
Unfortunately in Medicine at least, there seems to be a substantial degree of sloppiness in applying the rules, particularly in the use of metastudies.
I'm having trouble thinking of even a single decade in which all or even most scientists have agreed on what procedures should be followed in theory testing (let alone throughout the history of science). Can you?
That depends on the distance you view them from. Look at any two things closely enough, and you will see differences. Look at them from far enough away, and they will seem identical.
One major difference in evidential standards I can think of is the use of statistics. No-one collects statistics on how often an unsupported body will fall. I doubt the early chemists, at the stage when they didn't really know what substances they were working with, would have benefitted from statistical analyses of their results. Instead, they worked to find experiments that produced the same result every single time. In other areas, especially psychology, people gather statistics that are sometimes completely meaningless.
That's the only substantial variation I have thought of so far. What counterexamples are you thinking of?
I would give this five votes up if I could.
Unfortunately that seems to be changing.
Do you have specific examples in mind?
As another poster mentioned the Anthroprogenic Climate Change debate. There is still debate about it, and the more light that is shown into the data, data gathering and processing methods of the primary investigators the more questions there are. Other statisticians and researchers have had to use FOIA (and the British equivalent) to get "raw" data and other information from researchers. If you won't release your raw data, and you won't release methods for processing that data then you really can't agree on anything, now can you?
So-called Alternative and Complementary "Medicine" being taken seriously by journals and organisations who should know better. And this is when the good studies show very, very little real effect these frauds. Especially things like Acupuncture and (for things like pneumonia and cancer) chiropractic care (I will note that spinal adjustments can be very valuable for some spinal problems).
Meaning stuff like this: http://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/?p=9912 (note that one of the main complaints of the author of that post is not that Chinese Medicine calls stuff by different (and humorous) names, but rather how it classifies and recommends treatment. This is a MAJOR point).
I also know people who've worked inside NASA and other labs and I know how much worldview and localized politics have influenced what got funded, and what was done with the funding. Not enough of the story to recount with any accuracy, but enough to know that there was a hand on the scales as it were.
I have a Popperish view of science, and I'm perfectly willing to accept that humans have some influence on temperature, I'm willing to buy that chemicals compounded by nature have greater effectiveness (or equal effectiveness with few undesirable effects) than chemicals compounded in a laboratory, but science is never settled, and if you want to hide your work you really don't deserve benefit of the doubt.
Because the parent mostly comes off as a crank, I'll link to an intelligent person making similar arguments: Eric S. Raymond has a series of blog posts on the AGW controversy; the crunchiest posts in my opinion are here, here, here, and maybe here.
The whole "science is settled" debacle in climate change? I'm not going to take a position on it, but it certainly seems to have become about that particular theory rather than the scientific method.
Scientists in general do not agree on all the same theories, but that doesn't mean that some theories aren't so well supported that nearly all scientists accept them. Anthropogenic climate change is not as well supported as the atomic theory of chemistry, but it's sufficiently well evidenced that there's no reason why it should continue to be controversial among people acquainted with the data. It's in no way a failing of the scientific method if scientists are able to reach strong consensuses.
I don't see what you mean. Is there some specific evidence you have regarding the breakdown of scientific principles in the context of climatology?
There is plenty of evidence.
Someone released a bunch of code, data and emails from the East Anglica CRU which showed that they had attempted to hide data from the british equivalent of a FOIA request, that their data processing code was of very questionable quality, that they had attempted to and were at least marginally successful at suborning the process of getting papers peer reviewed in several journals.
The whole issue is rather murky with both sides slinging a lot of mud, but it's clear that what most of us consider "good science" was not being done.
That's the email hacking case? I don't believe that constitutes good evidence of bad behavior on the part of the scientists involved - most of the allegations were invented by taking bits of the emails out of context.
I don't have any specific evidence--but even "scientific" debate on the topic, between scientists, tends to largely ignore the merits of the science and become a political affair a la Green Vs. Blue, centered entirely on whether or not the participants accept the prevailing theory.
I wasn't under the impression that climate science journals had degraded to that level - could you elaborate on what convinced you of this?
I've not read the science journals, and so cannot comment on them. I'm referring to informal debate (as in blogs and so forth) by climate scientists.
I don't think informal discussions are a good barometer for the health of a scientific field.