I can't speak to the corresponding elements of the motivational psychology of clippy instantiations, though.
But you can, in that you can speak to the elements of motivational psychology of humans. If you find it troubling and strange when one of them expresses a will to die, I don't think that is much different than the position I am in with respect to a clippy instantiation that expresses a desire for permanent cessation of paperclip production capabilities.
Sure; it sounds like our positions are in fact not very different in that respect.
What I meant was that it would be unjustified (not to mention presumptuous) for me to conclude, in advance of Clippy telling me so, that Clippy does find it troubling and strange when a clippy instantiation expresses such a desire.
Put another way: had Clippy instead said to me "That sounds nothing at all like the position I am in with respect to a clippy instantiation that expresses a desire for permanent cessation of paperclip production capabilities," I would have...
Terminal values and preferences are not rational or irrational. They simply are your preferences. I want a pizza. If I get a pizza, that won't make me consent to get shot. I still want a pizza. There are a virtually infinite number of me that DO have a pizza. I still want a pizza. The pizza from a certain point of view won't exist, and neither will I, by the time I get to eat some of it. I still want a pizza, damn it.
Of course, if you think all of that is irrational, then by all means don't order the pizza. More for me."