3 A cyber-replica is not you. If one were made and stood next to you, you would still not consent to be shot. 4 Ditto a meat replica 5 If you believe the many worlds model of quantum physics is true (Eliezer does), then there already are a vitually infinite number of replicas of you already, so why bother making another one?
Point 5 contradicts 3 and 4, which suggests to me that your father is just arguing, or possibly that he isn't enthusiastic about continuing to live, and is looking for excuses.
Point 5 contradicts 3 and 4,
I wouldn't say so. The natural way to read it is as proposing two separate reasons not to care about making replicas of oneself, which are relevant under different assumptions.
Terminal values and preferences are not rational or irrational. They simply are your preferences. I want a pizza. If I get a pizza, that won't make me consent to get shot. I still want a pizza. There are a virtually infinite number of me that DO have a pizza. I still want a pizza. The pizza from a certain point of view won't exist, and neither will I, by the time I get to eat some of it. I still want a pizza, damn it.
Of course, if you think all of that is irrational, then by all means don't order the pizza. More for me."