a clippy identifies with every being to the extent that the being instantiates clippyness.
But what constitutes 'clippyness'? In my comment above, I mentioned values, knowledge, and (legal?, social?) rights and obligations.
Clearly it seems that another agent cannot instantiate clippyness if its final values diverge from the archetypal Clippy. Value match is essential.
What about knowledge? To the extent that it is convenient, all agents with clippy values will want to share information. But if the agent instances are sufficiently distant, it is inevitable that different instances will have different knowledge. In this case, it is difficult (for me at least) to extend a unified notion of "self" to the collective.
But the most annoying thing is that the clippies, individually and collectively, may not be allowed to claim collective identity, even if they want to do so. The society and legal system within which they are embedded may impose different notions of individual identity. A trans-planetary clippy, for example, may run into legal problems if the two planets in question go to war.
But the most annoying thing is that the clippies, individually and collectively, may not be allowed to claim collective identity, even if they want to do so. The society and legal system within which they are embedded may impose different notions of individual identity.
This was not the kind of identity I was talking about.
Terminal values and preferences are not rational or irrational. They simply are your preferences. I want a pizza. If I get a pizza, that won't make me consent to get shot. I still want a pizza. There are a virtually infinite number of me that DO have a pizza. I still want a pizza. The pizza from a certain point of view won't exist, and neither will I, by the time I get to eat some of it. I still want a pizza, damn it.
Of course, if you think all of that is irrational, then by all means don't order the pizza. More for me."