This could be a nit-pick, but your risk aversion should be factored into your utility function
Not according to Against Discount Rates ...and I agree - though this may be a tangent.
I think these are two different things. I'd agree in opposing temporal discounting, but I'm not sure there's anything (normatively) problematic about being risk-averse with money.
(Also, I believe Larks's statement "your risk aversion should be factored into your utility function" didn't mean to imply necessarily "you should be risk averse"; I just read it to mean "if you're risk-averse, you don't need to put that outside the framework of expected utility maximization, and decide not to always maximize expected utility; rather, your utility function itself can represent however much risk aversion you have".)
Mathematician and climate activist John Baez finally commented on charitable giving. I think the opinion of highly educated experts who are not closely associated with LessWrong or the SIAI but have read most of the available material is important to estimate the public and academic perception of risks from AI and the effectiveness with which the risks are communicated by LessWrong and the SIAI.
Desertopa asked:
John Baez replied:
What can one learn from this?