Nisan comments on Non-personal preferences of never-existed people - Less Wrong

12 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 10 March 2011 07:54PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (69)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: Nisan 11 March 2011 03:24:24PM 0 points [-]

If I understand correctly, you're saying that if you had Down Syndrome and your neighbor were healthy then you would want your neighbor to help you; so therefore in reality you are healthy and help your neighbor who has Down Syndrome; and this constitutes your obligation to them.

Is this correct?

Comment author: Perplexed 12 March 2011 12:43:05AM 1 point [-]

Yes. Roughly speaking, a Nash bargain could-have/should-have been made to that effect in the "Original Position" when we were both operating under Rawls's "Veil of Ignorance". I don't completely buy Rawls's "Theory of Justice", but it makes a lot more sense to me than straight utilitarianism.