I agree that the state of one's body changes cognition quite a bit. Still, if someone becomes a quadriplegic or acquires locked-in syndrome, we don't consider them to be dead or a different person. And compared to extracting a mind from a cryopreserved brain, rebuilding a (simulated or real) body from memories and DNA isn't that hard.
Definitely. But some people really, really like being a body - it's a major part of who they consider themselves. Cryonics may have trouble reaching them if it doesn't address this. (Which may be minor to all the other marketing deficiencies it seems to have.)
Many approaches to cryonics assume that a detailed map of the neural patterns in a brain (via brain scanning technology) may be sufficient, using future technology, to bring that person "back to life." But cognition is greatly shaped by more than just the neural pattern: it is shaped by biology - by the body. (See Noe 2009; Pfeifer et al. 2006; Lakoff & Johnson 1999.)
I admit I'm pretty unfamiliar with the cryonics literature. I assume this is a standard objection, and has standard responses. Where can I find those responses?
Thanks!