I recall thinking about this as a possible objection to whole brain emulation in general – specifically in the context of a Hansonian singularity.
Strangely, I've never seen a response. It seems as if transhumanist folks and embodied cognition folks don't interact much with each other.
Can you summarize why it's a significant objection in that context?
From my novice perspective, the fact that in practice "whole-brain emulation" will also require the emulation of various sensory and motor and endocrine systems to achieve anything we'd recognize as intelligent seems like mere "haggling over the price," not a significant objection. If we can emulate cortical functions, it seems likely that we figured out how to emulate the other stuff generations back.
Many approaches to cryonics assume that a detailed map of the neural patterns in a brain (via brain scanning technology) may be sufficient, using future technology, to bring that person "back to life." But cognition is greatly shaped by more than just the neural pattern: it is shaped by biology - by the body. (See Noe 2009; Pfeifer et al. 2006; Lakoff & Johnson 1999.)
I admit I'm pretty unfamiliar with the cryonics literature. I assume this is a standard objection, and has standard responses. Where can I find those responses?
Thanks!