A far more likely compromise would be CEV.
The people who get to choose the utility function of the first AI have the option of ignoring the desires of the rest of humanity. I think they are likely to do so, because:
Also, Putin and Ahmadinejad are much more likely than the average human to influence the first AI's utility function, simply because they have a lot of money and power.
I disagree with all of these four claims
- They know each other, and so can predict each other's CEV better than that of the whole of humanity
I believe the idea is that the AI will need to calculate the CEV, not the programmers (or it's not CEV). And the AI will have a whole lot more statistical data to calculate the CEV of humanity than the CEV of individual contributors. Unless we're talking uploaded personalities, which is a whole different discussion.
...
- They can explicitly trade utility with each other and encode compromises into the utility functio
At the recent London meet-up someone (I'm afraid I can't remember who) suggested that one might be able to solve the Friendly AI problem by building an AI whose concerns are limited to some small geographical area, and which doesn't give two hoots about what happens outside that area. Cipergoth pointed out that this would probably result in the AI converting the rest of the universe into a factory to make its small area more awesome. In the process, he mentioned that you can make a "fun game" out of figuring out ways in which proposed utility functions for Friendly AIs can go horribly wrong. I propose that we play.
Here's the game: reply to this post with proposed utility functions, stated as formally or, at least, as accurately as you can manage; follow-up comments explain why a super-human intelligence built with that particular utility function would do things that turn out to be hideously undesirable.
There are three reasons I suggest playing this game. In descending order of importance, they are: