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Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Less Wrong Rationality and Mainstream Philosophy - Less Wrong

106 Post author: lukeprog 20 March 2011 08:28PM

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Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 20 March 2011 10:28:21PM 7 points [-]

I'm highly skeptical. I suspect that you may have failed to distinguish between sensory empiricism, which is a large standard movement, and the kind of thinking embodied in How An Algorithm Feels From the Inside which I've never seen anywhere else outside of Gary Drescher (and rumors that it's in Dennett books I haven't read).

Simple litmus test: What is the Quinean position on free will?

"It's nonsense!" = what I think standard "naturalistic" philosophy says

"If the brain uses the following specific AI-ish algorithms without conscious awareness of it, the corresponding mental ontology would appear from the inside to generate the following intuitions and apparent impossibilities about 'free will'..." = Less Wrong / Yudkowskian

Comment author: lukeprog 20 March 2011 10:46:54PM *  23 points [-]

Eliezer,

I'm not trying to say that you haven't made genuine contributions. Making genuine contributions in the Quinean path is what I mean when you say your work is part of that movement. And certainly, you speak a different language - the language of algorithms and AI rather than that of analytic philosophy. (Though there are quite a few who are doing philosophy in the language of AI, too: Judea Pearl is a shining example.)

'How an algorithm feels from the inside' is an important insight - an important way of seeing things. But your factual claims about free will are not radical. You agree with all naturalists that we do not have libertarian free will. We have no power to cause effects in the world without ourselves being fully caused, because we are fully part of nature. And you agree with naturalists that we are, nonetheless, able to deliberate about our actions. And that deliberation can, of course, affect the action we eventually choose. Our beliefs and desires affect our decisions, too.

Your differences with Quine look, to me at least, more like the differences that Quinean naturalists have with each other, rather than the differences that Quinean naturalists have with intuitionists and theists and postmodernists and phenomenologists, or even non-Quinean "naturalists" like Frank Jackson and David Chalmers.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 20 March 2011 10:52:15PM 10 points [-]

Luke,

From my perspective, the idea that we do not have libertarian free will is too obvious to be interesting. If you want to claim that places me in a particular philosophical camp, fine, but that doesn't mean they do the same sort of cognitive labor I do when I'm doing philosophy. I knew there wasn't libertarian free will the instant I first considered the problem, at I think maybe age fourteen or thereabouts; if that made me a master philosopher, great, but to me it seems like the distance from there to being able to resolve the algorithms of the brain into their component parts was the interesting part of the journey.

(And Judea Pearl I have quite well acknowledged as an explicit shoulder to stand upon, but so far as I know he's another case of an AI researcher coming in from outside and solving a problem where philosophers just spun their wheels because they didn't think in algorithms.)

Comment author: lukeprog 20 March 2011 10:59:02PM *  17 points [-]

I did not put you in the Quinean camp merely because of your agreement about libertarian free will. I listed about a dozen close comparisons on matters that are highly controversial in mainstream philosophy. And I placed special emphasis on your eerily echo-ish defense of Quine's naturalized epistemology, which is central to both your philosophy and his.

I agree with you about Judea Pearl coming from AI to solve problems on which philosophers had been mostly stalled for centuries. Like Dennett says, AI researchers are doing philosophy - and really good philosophy - without really knowing it. Except for Pearl, actually. He does know he's doing philosophy, as becomes apparent in his book on causality, for example, where he is regularly citing the mainstream philosophical literature on the subject (alongside statistics and AI and so on).

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 20 March 2011 11:04:11PM 2 points [-]

Look, if someone came to me and said, "I'm great at LW-style philosophy, and the proof of this is, I can argue there's no libertarian free will" I would reply "You have not yet done any difficult or worthwhile cognitive work." It's like saying you don't believe in astrology. Well, great, and yes there's lots of people who disagree with you about that, but there's a difference between doing grade school arithmetic and doing calculus, and "There is no libertarian free will" is grade school arithmetic. It doesn't interest me that this philosophical school agrees with me about that. It's too simple and basic, and part of what I object to in philosophy is that they are still arguing about problems like this instead of moving onto real questions.

Comment author: lukeprog 20 March 2011 11:06:45PM 33 points [-]

Eliezer,

I don't get it. Your comment here doesn't respond to anything I said in my previous comment. The first sentence of my previous comment is: "I did not put you in the Quinean camp merely because of your agreement about libertarian free will."

Comment author: gjm 20 March 2011 11:57:53PM 21 points [-]

I think Eliezer is suggesting that all the things you've mentioned that distinguish Quinean naturalists from other philosophers are similarly basic, and that "LW-style philosophy" takes (what turns out to be) Quinean naturalism as a starting point and then goes on to do things that no one working in mainstream philosophy has thought of.

In other words, that the problem with mainstream philosophy isn't that it's all wrong, but that much of it is wrong and that the part that isn't wrong is mostly not doing anything interesting with its not-wrongness.

(I make no comment on whether all, or some, or none, of that is correct. I'm just hoping to reduce the amount of talking-past-one-another here.)

Comment author: Alexandros 21 March 2011 12:03:51AM 11 points [-]

Eliezer is suggesting that the Quineans are "not doing anything interesting with [their] not-wrongness" after being aware of the field for all of an hour and a half?!

Comment author: [deleted] 21 March 2011 12:34:55PM 6 points [-]

Makes perfect sense to me. Someone comes up to me and says "This person is a brilliant mathematician! She just showed me a proof that there's no highest prime, and proved Pythagoras' theorem!" my response would be that that's still no evidence that she's made any worthwhile contribution to mathematics. She may have, but there's little reason to believe it from the original statement.

Comment author: Alexandros 21 March 2011 12:50:20PM *  5 points [-]

"still no evidence" is very much different to claims that certain properties do not exist in a given body of work. Absence of evidence (after an hour's looking, if that) is not evidence of absence.

Comment author: [deleted] 21 March 2011 04:20:27PM 11 points [-]

Seems to me less like that and more like, "this Euclid fellow was brilliant", followed by a list of things that Euclid proved before anybody else proved. Timing matters here. It's no coincidence that before Quine came along, the clever Eliezers were not taking Quinean naturalism for granted.

For another analogy, if someone came along and told you, "this Hugh Everett fellow was brilliant! Here, read this paper in which he argues that the wave function never collapses", would you say, "well, Eliezer already went through that a few years ago; there's still no evidence that Everett made any worthwhile contribution"?

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 21 March 2011 12:00:27AM 5 points [-]

I affirm this interpretation.

Comment author: BowDown 21 March 2011 07:42:34AM 15 points [-]

Eliezer's response does not. It looks like the response of one who feels their baby, LW style philosophy, is under attack. But it isn't.

Methinks Eliezer needs to spend more time practicing the virtues of scholarship by actually reading much of the philosophy that he is critiquing. His assessments of "naturalistic" philosophy seem like straw men. Furthermore, from a psychological perspective, it seems like Eliezer is trying to defend his previously made commitments to "LW-Style philosophy" at all costs. This is not the mark of true rationality - true rationality admits challenges to previous assumptions.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 20 March 2011 11:58:44PM 4 points [-]

Okay, so what have they done that I would consider cognitive philosophy? It doesn't matter how many verbal-type non-dissolved questions we agree on apart from that. I'm taking free will as an exemplar and saying, "But it's all like that, so far as I've been able to tell."

Comment author: [deleted] 21 March 2011 12:10:13PM 8 points [-]

Just taking the example I happen to know about, Sarah-Jane Leslie works on the meaning of generics. (What do we mean when we say "Tigers have stripes" ? All tigers? Most tigers? Normal tigers? But then how do we account for true statements like "Tigers eat people" when most tigers don't eat people, or "Peacocks have colorful tails" when female peacocks don't have colorful tails?) She answers this question directly using evidence from cognitive science. I think it counts as question-dissolving.

Comment author: lukeprog 21 March 2011 12:14:15AM *  17 points [-]

It doesn't matter how many verbal-type non-dissolved questions we agree on apart from that. I'm taking free will as an exemplar and saying, "But it's all like that, so far as I've been able to tell."

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that my claim that LW-style philosophy shares many central assumptions with Quinean naturalism in contrast to most of philosophy doesn't hinge on whether or not I can present a long list of things on which LW-style philosophy and Quinean naturalism agree on, in contrast to most of philosophy?

I suspect that's not what you're saying, but then... what do you think it was that I was claiming in the first place?

Or, another way to put it: Which sentence of my original article are you disagreeing with? Do you disagree with my claim that "standard Less Wrong positions on philosophical matters have been standard positions in a movement within mainstream philosophy for half a century"? Or perhaps you disagree with my claim that "Less Wrong-style philosophy is part of a movement within mainstream philosophy to massively reform philosophy in light of recent cognitive science - a movement that has been active for at least two decades"? Or perhaps you disagree with my claim that "Rationalists need not dismiss or avoid philosophy"?

I wonder if you agree with gjm's suggestion that "LW-style philosophy takes (what turns out to be) Quinean naturalism as a starting point and then goes on to do things that no one working in mainstream philosophy has thought of." That's roughly what I said above, though of course I'll point out that lots of Quinean naturalists have taken Quinean naturalism as a starting point and done things that nobody else thought of. That's just what it means to make original contributions in the movement.

I'll be happy to provide examples of "cognitive philosophy" once I've got this above bit cleared up. I've given examples before (Schroeder 2004; Bishop & Trout 2004; Bickle 2003), but of course I could give more detail.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 21 March 2011 12:27:49AM 15 points [-]

Are you saying that my claim that LW-style philosophy shares many central assumptions with Quinean naturalism in contrast to most of philosophy doesn't hinge on whether or not I can present a long list of things on which LW-style philosophy and Quinean naturalism agree on, in contrast to most of philosophy?

I'm saying that the claim that LW-style philosophy shares many assumptions with Quinean naturalism in contrast to most of philosophy is unimportant, thus, presenting the long list of basic assumptions on which LW-style and Quinean naturalism agree is from my perspective irrelevant.

Do you disagree with my claim that "standard Less Wrong positions on philosophical matters have been standard positions in a movement within mainstream philosophy for half a century"?

Yes. What I would consider "standard LW positions" is not "there is no libertarian free will" but rather "the philosophical debate on free will arises from the execution of the following cognitive algorithms X, Y, and Z". If the latter has been a standard position then I would be quite interested.

Or perhaps you disagree with my claim that "Less Wrong-style philosophy is part of a movement within mainstream philosophy to massively reform philosophy in light of recent cognitive science - a movement that has been active for at least two decades"?

The kind of reforms you quote are extremely basic, along the lines of "OMG there are cognitive biases and they affect philosophers!" not "This is how this specific algorithm generates the following philosophical debate..." If the movement hasn't progressed to the second stage, then there seems little point in aspiring LW rationalists reading about it.

GJM's suggestion is correct but the thing which you seem to deny and which I think is true is that LW is at a different stage of doing this sort of philosophy than any Quinean naturalism I have heard of, so that the other Quineans "doing things that nobody else have thought of" don't seem to be doing commensurate work.

I am not asking for an example of someone who agrees with me that, sure, cognitive philosophy sounds like a great idea, by golly. There's a difference between saying "Sure, evolution is true!" and doing evolutionary biology.

I'm asking for someone who's dissolved a philosophical question into a cognitive algorithm, preferably in a way not previously seen before on LW.

Did you read the LW sequence on free will, both the setup and the solution? Apologies if you've already previously answered this question, I have a vague feeling that I asked you before and you said yes, but still, just checking.

On the whole, you seem to think that I should be really enthusiastic about finding philosophers who agree with my basic assumptions, because here are these possible valuable allies in academia - why, if we could reframe LW as Quineanism, we'd have a whole support base ready-made!

Whereas I'm thinking, "If you ask what sort of activity these people perform in their daily work, their skills are similar to those of other philosophers and unlike those of people trying to figure out what algorithm a brain is running" and so they can't be hired to do the sort of work we need without extensive retraining; and since we're not out to reform academic philosophy, per se, it's not clear that we need allies in a fight we could just bypass.

Comment author: [deleted] 21 March 2011 01:15:20AM *  28 points [-]

It might be useful, if only for gaining status and attention and funding, to connect your work directly to one or several academic fields. To present it as a synthesis of philosophy, computer science, and cognitive science (or some other combination of your choice.) When people ask me what LessWrong is, I generally say something like "It's philosophy from a computer scientist's perspective." Most people can only put a mental label on something when they have a rough idea of what it's like, and it's not practical to say, "Well, our work isn't like anything."

That doesn't mean you have to hire philosophers or join a philosophy department; it might not mean that you, personally, have to do anything. But I do think that more people would be interested, and have a smaller inferential distance, if LW ideas were generally presented as related to other disciplines.

Comment author: lukeprog 21 March 2011 01:07:27AM *  29 points [-]

I'm saying that the claim that LW-style philosophy shares many assumptions with Quinean naturalism in contrast to most of philosophy is unimportant...

Well, it's important to my claim that LW-style philosophy fits into the category of Quinean naturalism, which I think is undeniable. You may think Quinean naturalism is obvious, but well... that's what makes you a Quinean naturalist. Part of the purpose of my post is to place LW-style philosophy in the context of mainstream philosophy, and my list of shared assumptions between LW-style philosophy and Quinean philosophy does just that. That goal by itself wasn't meant to be very important. But I think it's a categorization that cuts reality near enough the joints to be useful.

What I would consider "standard LW positions" is not "there is no libertarian free will" but rather "the philosophical debate on free will arises from the execution of the following cognitive algorithms X, Y, and Z". If the latter has been a standard position then I would be quite interested.

Then we are using the word "standard" in different ways. If I were to ask most people to list some "standard LW positions", I'm pretty sure they would list things like reductionism, empiricism, the rejection of libertarian free will, atheism, the centrality of cognitive science to epistemology, and so on - long before they list anything like "the philosophical debate on free will arises from the execution of the following cognitive algorithms X, Y, and Z". I'm not even sure how much consensus that enjoys on Less Wrong. I doubt it is as much a 'standard' position on Less Wrong than the other things I mentioned.

But I'm not here to argue about the meaning of the word standard.

Disagreement: dissolved.

Moving on: Yes, I read the free will stuff. 'How an Algorithm Feels from the Inside' is one of my all-time favorite Yudkowsky posts.

I'll have to be more clear on what you think LW is doing that Quinean naturalists are not doing. But really, I don't even need to wait for that to respond. Even work by philosophers who are not Quinean naturalists can be useful in your very particular line of work - for example in clearing up your CEV article's conflation of "extrapolating" from means to ends and "extrapolating" from current ends to new ends after reflective equilibrium and other processes have taken place.

Finally, you say that if Quinean naturalism hasn't progressed from recognizing that biases affect philosophers to showing how a specific algorithm generates a philosophical debate then "there seems little point in aspiring LW rationalists reading about it."

This claim is, I think, both clearly false as stated and misrepresents the state of Quinean naturalism.

First, on falsity: There are many other useful things for philosophers (including Quinean naturalists) to be doing besides just working with scientists to figure out why our brains produce confused philosophical debates. Since your own philosophical work on Less Wrong has considered far more than just this, I assume you agree. Thus, it is not the case that Quinean naturalists aren't doing useful work unless they are discovering the cognitive algorithms that generate philosophical debates.

Second, on misrepresentation: Quinean naturalists don't just discuss the fact that cognitive biases affect philosophers. Quinean naturalists also discuss how to do philosophy amidst the influence of cognitive biases. That very question is a major subject of your writing on Less Wrong, so I doubt you see no value in it. Moreover, Quinean naturalists do sometimes discuss how cognitive algorithms generate philosophical debates. See, for example, Eric Schwitzgebel's recent work on how introspection works and why it generates philosophical confusions.

It seems you're not just resisting the classification of LW-style philosophy within the broader category of Quinean naturalism. You're also resisting the whole idea of seeing value in what mainstream naturalistic philosophers are doing, which I don't get. How do you think that thought got generated? Reading too much modal logic and not enough Dennett / Bickle / Bishop / Metzinger / Lokhorst / Thagard?

I'm not even trying to say that Eliezer Yudkowsky should read more naturalistic philosophy. I suspect that's not the best use of your time, especially given your strong aversion to it. But I am saying that the mainstream community has useful insights and clarifications and progress to contribute. You've already drawn heavily from the basic insights of Quinean naturalism, whether or not you got them from Quine himself. And you've drawn from some of the more advanced insights of people like Judea Pearl and Nick Bostrom.

So I guess I just don't get what looks to me like a strong aversion in you to rationalists looking through Quinean naturalistic philosophy for useful insights. I don't understand where that aversion is coming from. If you're not that familiar with Quinean naturalistic philosophy, why do you assume in advance that it's a bad idea to read through it for insights?

Comment author: Alexandros 20 March 2011 11:26:13PM 14 points [-]

When I read your first post here, my mind immediately went to You're Entitled to Arguments, But Not (That Particular) Proof. I gave you you the benefit of the doubt since you called it a 'litmus test' (however arbitrary), but you seem to have anchored on that. If your work is in substantial agreement with an established field in philosophy, that means there are more intelligent people who could become allies, and a store of knowledge from where valuable insights could come. I don't know why you are looking this particular gift horse in the mouth.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 21 March 2011 12:04:07AM 7 points [-]

There's lots of people I think have valuable insights - cognitive scientists, AI researchers, statistical learning experts, mathematicians...

The question is whether high-grade academic philosophy belongs on the scholarship list, not whether scholarship is a virtue. The fact that they have managed to produce a minority school that agrees with Gary Drescher on the extremely basic question of whether there's libertarian free will (no) and people are made of atoms (yes), does not entitle them to a position next to "Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach".

Comment author: lukeprog 21 March 2011 01:16:23AM *  14 points [-]

Physicalism and the rejection of free will are both majority positions in Anglophone philosophy, actually, but I agree that agreement on those points doesn't put someone on the shelf next to AIMA.

Comment author: AlephNeil 21 March 2011 03:00:58AM *  15 points [-]

Physicalism and the rejection of free will are both majority positions in Anglophone philosophy

Regarding physicalism, I don't entirely trust that survey.

Firstly, most of those who call themselves physicalists nevertheless think that qualia exist and are Deeply Mysterious, such that one cannot deduce a priori, from objective physical facts, that Alfred isn't a zombie or that Alfred and Bob aren't qualia-inverted with respect to each other.

Secondly, in very recent years - 90s into the new century - I think there's been a rising tide of antimaterialism. Erstwhile physicalists such as Jaegwon Kim have defected. Anthologies are published with names like "The Waning of Materialism".

As the survey itself tell us, only 16% accept or lean towards "zombies are inconceivable".

This is all consistent with my experience in internet debates, where it seems that most upcoming or wannabe philosophers who have any confident opinions on the matter are antimaterialists.

Comment author: lukeprog 21 March 2011 03:08:51AM 11 points [-]

All good points. I take back the claim that physicalism is a majority position; that is under serious doubt.

How sad! :(

Comment author: [deleted] 21 March 2011 07:37:10AM *  6 points [-]

Firstly, most of those who call themselves physicalists nevertheless think that qualia exist and are Deeply Mysterious, such that one cannot deduce a priori, from objective physical facts, that Alfred isn't a zombie or that Alfred and Bob aren't qualia-inverted with respect to each other.

[...]

only 16% accept or lean towards "zombies are inconceivable".

Strictly speaking, I don't think either of these requires abandonment of physicalism by even a small degree. To say that one can or cannot conceive something is not to directly say anything about reality itself (#). To say that one can or cannot deduce something is, again, not directly to say anything about reality itself (#except in the trivial sense that it says something about what one, i.e. a real person, can or cannot deduce, or can or cannot conceive). Even if you want to argue that it says something about reality itself, however indirectly, it's not at all obvious that it says this particular thing (i.e. non-physicalism).

In particular, I am well aware of the severe limitations of deduction as a path to knowledge. Being so aware, I am not in the slightest surprised by, or troubled by, the inability to deduce that Alfred isn't a zombie. I don't see why I should be troubled. As for what I can conceive - well, I can conceive all sorts of things which have no obvious connection to reality. Why should examination of the limits of my imagination give me any sort of information about whether physicalism is true?

The key question for me is: is the hypothesis of physicalism tenable? I'm not asking for proof, deductive or otherwise. I am asking whether the hypothesis is consistent with the evidence and internally coherent. The fact that someone can conceive of zombies, and therefore conceive that the hypothesis is false, is no disproof of the hypothesis. And similarly, the fact that the hypothesis of physicalism cannot be deduced is no disproof either.

Comment author: PhilosophyTutor 22 March 2011 02:09:53AM 8 points [-]

Possibly you should state your hypothesis ahead of time and define what would count (or have counted in the past) as a worthwhile contribution to LW-style rationalism from within the analytic philosophy community.

Then we would have a concrete way to decide the question of whether analytic philosophy has contributed anything in the past, or contributes anything in the future.

It also might turn out in the process of formalising your definition of what counts as a worthwhile contribution that nothing outside of your specific field of AI research counts for you, which would in itself be a worthwhile realisation.

Acknowledging my own biases here, I'm an analytic philosopher who mostly teaches scientific methodology and ethics (with a minor side interest in statistics) and my reaction to perusing the LW content was that there were some very interesting and valuable nuggets here for me to fossick out but that the bulk of the content wasn't new or non-obvious to me.

Possibly there is so little for you in philosophy that has real novelty or value because there is already enormous overlap between what you do and what is done in the relevant subset of philosophy.

Being a philosopher makes you acutely aware of how deep the intellectual debts of most modern people are to philosophy, and how little awareness of this they have. It's all too easy to believe that one came to one's moral viewpoint entirely unassisted and entirely naturally, for example, without being aware that one is actually articulating a mixture of Kant and Bentham's ideas that you never would have come up with had you lived before Kant and Bentham. Many people who have never heard of Peter Singer take the animal liberation movement for granted, unaware that the term "animal liberation" was coined by a philosopher in 1975 drawing on previous work by philosophers in the 1970s.

Comment author: Peterdjones 22 May 2011 11:23:42PM -1 points [-]

You agree with all naturalists that we do not have libertarian free will.

Hello? Robert Kane?

Comment author: komponisto 21 March 2011 12:17:38AM 21 points [-]

the kind of thinking embodied in How An Algorithm Feels From the Inside which I've never seen anywhere else outside of Gary Drescher (and rumors that it's in Dennett books I haven't read).

Dennett is one of the leaders of mainstream philosophy. If it's in Dennett, Luke wins.

what I think standard "naturalistic" philosophy says

How did you acquire your beliefs about what standard "naturalistic" philosophy says? I have this impression that it was from outside caricatures rather than philosophers themselves.

Remember Scott Aaronson's critique of Stephen Wolfram? You seem at risk of being in a similar position with respect to mainstream analytic philosophy as Wolfram was with respect to mainstream science.

Comment author: Perplexed 20 March 2011 10:41:47PM 1 point [-]

A partial answer here:

Note his diagnosis of the problem of free will as being a result of philosophical confusion. Yes, of course, we will things and act according to our will, so in that sense, it’s free, but our will is itself caused.

Comment author: XiXiDu 21 March 2011 11:05:28AM *  1 point [-]

I have always been too shy to ask, but would anyone be willing to tell me how wrong I am about my musings regarding free will here? I haven't read the LW sequence on free will yet, as it states "aspiring reductionists should try to solve it on their own." I tried, any feedback?

Comment author: gwern 21 March 2011 04:38:06PM 2 points [-]

I don't think it's very good. (On the other hand, I have seen a great deal worse on free will.) There seem to be some outright errors or at least imprecisions, eg.:

No system can understand itself for that the very understanding would evade itself forever. A bin trying to contain itself.

To keep on topic, are you familiar with quining and all the ways of self-referencing?

Comment author: XiXiDu 22 March 2011 09:12:51AM 2 points [-]

To keep on topic, are you familiar with quining and all the ways of self-referencing?

I am vaguely aware of it. As far as I know a Quine can be seen as an artifact of a given language rather than a complete and consistent self-reference. Every Quine is missing some of its own definition, e.g. "when preceded by" or "print" need external interpreters to work as intended. No closed system can contain a perfect model of itself and is consequently unable to predict its actions, therefore no libertarian free will can exist.

There seem to be some outright errors or at least imprecisions...

What is outright wrong or imprecise about it?

The main point I tried to make is that a definition of free will that does satisfy our understanding of being free agents is possible if you disregard free from and concentrate on free to.

Comment author: Peterdjones 22 May 2011 11:12:54PM *  -1 points [-]

The "What an Algorithm.." dissolution of FW seemed old hat to me.