Wei_Dai comments on When Intuitions Are Useful - Less Wrong

14 Post author: lukeprog 09 May 2011 07:40PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (12)

You are viewing a single comment's thread.

Comment author: Wei_Dai 10 May 2011 12:10:14AM 6 points [-]

Luke, this sequence of posts seems to touch upon (although from a very different angel) some of the same issues raised in my post Metaphilosophical Mysteries. I'm curious if you have any thoughts on that post.

Next time, we'll examine in more detail why intuitions are so unsuited for use in philosophy.

A couple of possibly premature comments:

  1. If intuitions are unsuited for use in philosophy, what is suited? Until we have at least a rough outline of an algorithm for doing philosophy, how can we possibly avoid using philosophical intuitions? Or do you just mean that we shouldn't uncritically rely upon our intuitions in philosophical matters?
  2. It's sometimes claimed around here that some people (e.g., Eliezer) have better philosophical intuitions than others. Do you think this is a real phenomenon? If so, perhaps there is a source of "good" philosophical intuitions besides the three sources that you list, and we just do not understand it yet?
Comment author: lukeprog 11 May 2011 04:13:26AM *  5 points [-]

It looks like you and I are concerned with many of the same problems, and for similar reasons. I'll keep 'Metaphilosophical Mysteries', and also this comment, in my mind as I continue to develop this sequence.

I don't have anything to say off the cuff, though. When talking about something as fuzzy and misunderstood as intuition, I want to be extra super duper careful how I speak. I do that better in a post that has been edited and tweaked over several days or weeks than in a comment.

I look forward to hearing your thoughts as I continue my work on this sequence! We have similar background assumptions and thinking methods, but you have higher g.