unless we want to repeat standard debates about which concept is better for what.
Well, yes. Eliezer has suggested that "The ancient war between the Bayesians and the accursèd frequentists stretches back through decades", but Kilng's post describes a class of problems for which he presents the frequentist approach as being the reasonable one. I had rather hoped for a discussion, even if it started "standard".
The usual Bayesian position is that the Bayesian picture subsumes the frequentist one. In cases where there's a clear single frequentist answer to the question "what's P(X)?" the answer is typically the same for any Bayesian who doesn't have a crazy prior. Likewise for instances where you can get the answer "axiomatically".
So, with Kling's first example, everyone agrees: modulo quibbling about the usual idealizations, the probability is 1/2. An accursed frequentist might say that the Bayesian apparatus is unnecessary or confusing when a...
Related to: Beautiful Probability, Probability is in the Mind
Arnold Kling ponders probability:
In the tradition of Reddit, and a little inspired by Robin, this is a simple link to an interesting page somewhere else - I leave comment and discussion to the very awesome Less Wrong community.
Edit: Eliezer has in the past been uncomplimentary of the "accursèd frequentists". In at least Beautiful Probability and Probability is in the Mind, he has characterized (for at least some problems) the "frequentist" approach as being wrong, and the "Bayesian" approach as being right. Kling suggests different problems for which different approaches are approrpriate.