cousin_it comments on Why *I* fail to act rationally - Less Wrong

11 Post author: bentarm 26 March 2009 03:56AM

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Comment author: mattnewport 26 March 2009 05:42:32AM *  8 points [-]

This touches on what for me is one of the big open questions on what it means to act rationally. I question the common position that the kinds of 'irrational' decisions you describe are actually all that irrational. Many such decisions seem to be rational decisions for an agent with a high time preference at the moment of decision. They may seem irrational from the perspective of a future self who looks back on the decisions when dealing with the consequences but I see the problem as more one of conflicting interests between present selves and past/future selves than one strictly of rationality. As the recent post discussed, rationality doesn't provide goals, it only offers a system for achieving goals. Many apparently irrational decisions are I suspect rational responses to short term goals that conflict with longer term goals.

If I decide to eat a chocolate bar now to satisfy a current craving, I am not really acting irrationally. I have a powerful short term drive to eat chocolate and there is nothing irrational in my actions to satisfy that short term goal. Later on I may look at the scales and regret eating the chocolate but that reflects either a conflict between short term and long term goals or a conflict between the goals of my present self and my past self (really just alternative ways of looking at the same problem). It is not a failure of rationality in terms of short term decision making, it is a problem of incentives not aligning across time frames or between present and future selves. In order to find solutions to such dilemmas it seems more useful to look to micro-economics and the design of incentive structures that align incentives across time scales than to ways to improve the rationality of decisions. The steps I take to acquire chocolate are perfectly rational, the problem is with the conflicts in my incentive structure.

Comment author: cousin_it 26 March 2009 08:30:41PM *  4 points [-]

Many such decisions seem to be rational decisions for an agent with a high time preference at the moment of decision.

Emotions can also have a lower time preference than your conscious self. For example, a surge of anger can make you stand up against a bully and win much more than the present confrontation in long term self-respect and respect of others, even if you eventually "lose" this particular conflict. My subconscious is always tracking the intangible "social" terms of my long range utility function, and over the years I've come to appreciate that.

Comment author: ciphergoth 27 March 2009 09:01:58AM 2 points [-]

I'd describe that as a situation where your long-term interests and your very-short-term interests gang up on your short- to medium-term interests.

Comment author: cousin_it 27 March 2009 02:36:01PM *  1 point [-]

A great description, funny how it applies to other emotional acts such as cheating on your spouse (increase reproductive chances while risking comfort of family life). It might be enlightening to think of some emotions as optimizations for the very long term - for you and all your descendants (makes sense as emotions were created by evolution) - and the rational mind as optimizing for the short to medium term..