If computation isn't the real thing, only the movement is, then a simulation (which is the complete representation of a thing using a different movement which can however be seen as performing the same computation) is not the thing itself
You keep using that word "is", but I don't think it means what you think it means. ;-)
Try making your beliefs pay rent: what differences do you expect to observe in reality, between different states of this "is"?
That is, what different predictions will you make, based on "is" or "is not" in your statement?
Consider that one carefully, before you continue.
The question of qualia and subjective experience isn't a mere "confusion".
Really? Would you care to explain what differences you predict to see in the world, as a result of the existence or non-existence of these concepts?
I don't see that we have need of such convoluted hypotheses, when the simpler explanation is merely that our neural architecture more closely resembles Eliezer's Network B, than Network A... which is a very modest hypothesis indeed, since Network B has many evolutionary advantages compared to Network A.
Try making your beliefs pay rent, what differences do you expect to observe in reality, between different states of this "is"?
.
Would you care to explain what differences you predict to see in the world, as a result of the existence or non-existence of these concepts?
Sure. Here's two simple ones:
If consciousness isn't just computation, then I don't expect to ever observe waking up as a simulation in a computer.
If consciousness isn't just computation, then I don't expect to ever see evolved or self-improved (not intentionally designed t
You all know the rules: