... we do face the 'further question' of how much moral value to assign ...

Yes, and I did not even attempt to address that 'further question' because it seems to me that that question is at least an order of magnitude more confused than the relatively simple question about consciousness.

But, if I were to attempt to address it, I would begin with the lesson from Econ 101 that dissolves the question "What is the value of item X?". The dissolution begins by requesting the clarifications "Value to whom?" and "Valuable in what context?" So, armed with this analogy, I would ask some questions:

1. Moral value to whom? Moral value in what context?
2. If I came to believe that the people around me were p-zombies, would that opinion change my moral obligations toward them? If you shared my belief, would that change your answer to the previous question?
3. Believed to be conscious by whom? Believed to be conscious in what context? Is it possible that a program object could be conscious in some simulated universe, using some kind of simulated time, but would not be conscious in the real universe in real time?