The only thing I have consistently rejected on LW is the metaethics. I find that a much simpler Friedmanite explanation of agents pursuing their separate interests fits my experience.

For example, I would pay a significant amount of money to preserve the life of a friend, and practically zero money to preserve the life of an unknown stranger. I would spend more money to preserve the life of a successful scientist or entrepreneur, than I would to preserve the life of a third world subsistence farmer.

This is simply because I value those persons differently. I recognize that some people have an altruistic terminal value of something like:

"See as many agents as possible having their preferences fulfilled."

... and I can see how the metaethics sequence / discussion are necessary for reducing that terminal value to a scientific, physical metric by which to judge possible futures (especially if one wants to use an AI). But, since I don't share that terminal value, I'm consistently left underwhelmed by the metaethics discussions.

That said, this looks like an ambitious sequence. Good luck!