http://www.stephanhartmann.org/HartmannSprenger_BayesEpis.pdf

Bayesian epistemology therefore complements traditional epistemology; it does not replace it or aim at replacing it.

Since Popper refuted traditional epistemology (source: his books, and the failure of anyone to come up with any good criticisms of his main ideas), and Bayesian Epistemology retains it, then Bayesian Epistemology is refuted too. And discussing this issue can be done without mentioning probability, Bayes' theorem, or Solomonoff induction. Bringing those up cannot be a relevant defense since traditional epistemology, which doesn't use them, is retained.

Bayesian epistemology is, in the first place, a philosophical project, and that it is its ambition to further progress in philosophy.

Why are most Less Wrong people anti-philosophy then? There's so much instrumentalism, empiricism, reductionism and borderline postivism. Not much interest in philosophy.

Section 2 introduces the probability calculus and explains why degrees of belief obey the probability calculus. Section 3 applies the formal machinery to an analysis of the notion of evidence, and high- lights potential application. Section 4 discusses Bayesian models of coherence and testimony, and section 5 ends this essay with a comparison of traditional epistemology and Bayesian epistemology.

Sections 2-4 are irrelevant. They are already assuming mistakes from traditional epistemology. Moving on to 5, which is only one page.

Bayesian epistemology, on the other hand, draws much of its power from the mathematical machinery of probability theory. It starts with a mathematical intuition.

Advocating intuitionism is very silly.

traditional epistemology inspires Bayesian accounts.

So Bayesians should care about criticisms of traditional epistemoloyg, and be willing to engage with them directly without even mentioning any Bayesian stuff.

Both Bayesian epistemology and traditional epistemology do not much consider empirical data. Both are based on intuitions,

That's not even close to what most Less Wrong people told me. They mostly are very focussed on empirical data.

This might be a problem as privilege is given to the philosopher’s intuitions.

Might be? lol... What a hedge. They know it's a problem and equivocate.

non-philosophers may have different intuitions.

Also Popperian philosophers, and all other types that don't agree with you.

While it is debatable how serious these intuitions should be taken (maybe peo- ple are simply wrong!)

But not traditional philosophers, who have reliable intuitions? This is just plain silly.

It is therefore advisable that philosophers also keep on paying attention to other formal frameworks

But not informal frameworks, because your intuition says that formality is next to Godliness?