Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Just because we think Aristotle was wrong about some things doesn't mean we are obliged to disagree with him about everything.
Also, I'm pretty sure Aristotle did not invent induction. He may have been the first person to call it that, but he didn't invent the concept, which probably predates writing.
Thinking about it, dogs are capable of induction, which suggests that no human invented it at all, in the same way that no human invented sensory perception.
No, he invented it. Read Popper's The World of Parmenides. (BTW, Popper took the trouble to learn ancient Greek)
In several places in the sequences, Eliezer writes condescendingly about "Traditional Rationality". The impression given is that Traditional Rationality was OK in its day, but that today we have better varieties of rationality available.
That is fine, except that it is unclear to me just what the traditional kind of rationality included, and it is also unclear just what it failed to include. In one essay, Eliezer seems to be saying that Traditional Rationality was too concerned with process, whereas it should have been concerned with winning. In other passages, it seems that the missing ingredient in the traditional version was Bayesianism (a la Jaynes). Or sometimes, the missing ingredient seems to be an understanding of biases (a la Kahneman and Tversky).
In this essay, Eliezer laments that being a traditional rationalist was not enough to keep him from devising a Mysterious Answer to a mysterious question. That puzzles me because I would have thought that traditional ideas from Peirce, Popper, and Korzybski would have been sufficient to avoid that error. So apparently I fail to understand either what a Mysterious Answer is or just how weak the traditional form of rationality actually is.
Can anyone help to clarify this? By "Traditional Rationality", does Eliezer mean to designate a particular collection of ideas, or does he use it more loosely to indicate any thinking that is not quite up to his level?