Eliezer has mentioned Popper by name in a number of places and said that "Previously, the most popular philosophy of science was probably Karl Popper's falsificationism". See: http://yudkowsky.net/rational/bayes
So he thinks (or did think) Popperism is falsificationism. He doesn't realize he is criticizing a pop-culture myth.
He is also wrong about the popularity of Popper.
(BTW, this rate filtering is a pain. I'm now aware of three people, including myself, who are critical of Bayesianism and who have zero kharma. Does this happen a lot?)
There a variety of issues going on here. Manfred pointed out many of them. There's another issue here that is you've had an influx of users all of whom are arguing for essentially the same set of positions and not doing it very well with a bit of rudeness thrown in. One of the three is being particularly egregious, and I suspect that there may be some spill-over in attitude from that user's behavior towards how people are voting about you. I will note that in the threads responding to the various Popperian criticisms, various LW regulars are willing to say...
In several places in the sequences, Eliezer writes condescendingly about "Traditional Rationality". The impression given is that Traditional Rationality was OK in its day, but that today we have better varieties of rationality available.
That is fine, except that it is unclear to me just what the traditional kind of rationality included, and it is also unclear just what it failed to include. In one essay, Eliezer seems to be saying that Traditional Rationality was too concerned with process, whereas it should have been concerned with winning. In other passages, it seems that the missing ingredient in the traditional version was Bayesianism (a la Jaynes). Or sometimes, the missing ingredient seems to be an understanding of biases (a la Kahneman and Tversky).
In this essay, Eliezer laments that being a traditional rationalist was not enough to keep him from devising a Mysterious Answer to a mysterious question. That puzzles me because I would have thought that traditional ideas from Peirce, Popper, and Korzybski would have been sufficient to avoid that error. So apparently I fail to understand either what a Mysterious Answer is or just how weak the traditional form of rationality actually is.
Can anyone help to clarify this? By "Traditional Rationality", does Eliezer mean to designate a particular collection of ideas, or does he use it more loosely to indicate any thinking that is not quite up to his level?