It's slow loading for me due to a slow internet connection, but if the questions at the end are included, I was the one who asked about insurance companies.
I don't think his response was very satisfactory, though I have a better version of my question.
Suppose I give you some odds p:q and force you to bet on some proposition X (say, Democrats win in 2012) being true, but I let you pick which side of the bet you take; a payoff of p if X is true, or a payoff of q if X is false. For some (unique) value of p/q, you'll switch which side you want to take.
It seems this can force you to assign probabilities to arbitrary hypothesis.
Suppose I give you some odds p:q and force you to bet on some proposition X (say, Democrats win in 2012) being true, but I let you pick which side of the bet you take; a payoff of p if X is true, or a payoff of q if X is false. For some (unique) value of p/q, you'll switch which side you want to take.
It seems this can force you to assign probabilities to arbitrary hypothesis.
So, how precise should these probabilities be? Any why can't I apply this argument to force the probabilities to have arbitrary high precision?
http://vimeo.com/22099396
What do people think of this, from a Bayesian perspective?
It is a talk given to the Oxford Transhumanists. Their previous speaker was Eliezer Yudkowsky. Audio version and past talks here: http://groupspaces.com/oxfordtranshumanists/pages/past-talks