Time: A-theory or B-theory?

Oh come one... at least word length labels give me a chance at guessing which philosophical position resolves to sane. A and B give me almost nothing!

The A-theory is identified with the view that "becoming" is somehow fundamental to the nature of the universe, and that it's not just an illusion created by, say, our only having memories of times t < t0 at time t0. A-theorists hold that, in some ultimate sense, points in time change their ontological status as they transition from the future, to the present, and into the past. To say "The event E will happen in the future" is not just to say that the time of E's occurrence has a larger coordinate than the time of the utterance. It is just to say that E will happen in the future, full stop. The process of becoming that is the universe just hasn't gotten to E yet. As this process of becoming unfolds, the truth-value of the statement will change.

At least, those are the kinds of things that A-theorists say. I have a heard time of making sense of it beyond its being a denial of the B-theory.

B-theorists subscribe to the "block-universe" view of time. All points in time have the same ontological status. All statements about the timing of events are really relative statements, perhaps about the relative timing of the statement's utterance and some event. Properly understood, the truth values of these statements are the same at all points of time. There is no becoming; this is an illusion, created perhaps by the physical state that our brains have at different points in time.

A priori knowledge: yes or no?

Yes, if we're talking about extrasensory perceptions. I am pretty sure some of what we know is genetically programmed and therefore not a direct result of sensory perceptions. I guess a Boltzmann brain would have to agree.

Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?

I think this is asking if the Mathematical universe hypothesis is true/false. I can't answer that, I would have to think about it. If someone would force me to answer then I'd pick Platonism (objects such as numbers and points exist naturally), because that sounds cool I guess.

Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?

Both.

Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?

Huh?

Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?

Whatever.

External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?

"...non-skeptical realism is the philosophical understanding that things exist independent of the mind and that it is possible to say something meaningful about them." Hell, if I answer Yes to Platonism I can hardly deny reality now? I actually don't think it makes much sense asking such questions except if you enjoy philosophy for the sake of it.

Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?

Bring me a good definition of what is meant by "free will" and I will attempt to answer this question. I wish people would just drop that term.

God: theism or atheism?

Given only those choices I pick atheism of course. I first wanted to write "Probabilism" until I noticed it is a real philosophical doctrine that I don't agree with.

Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?

I don't understand?

Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?

I think none of those.

Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?

...?

Logic: classical or non-classical?

Dunno.

Mental content: internalism or externalism?

Couldn't bother to read up on it.

Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?

Some sort of agent-dependent realism. My beliefs and knowledge of the associated terminology are too vague.

Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?

Naturalism means "the idea or belief that only natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces operate in the world" and "the idea or belief that nothing exists beyond the natural world." People who doubt this must be really confused.

Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?

Physicalism if non-physicalism means something like "supernatural"...I guess that if you doubt it even for a second it means that you have a bad philosophical cold. But ideas like Platonism just sound so cool that it makes me want to believe although it is probably not even wrong as there is no justification either logically or practically to believe such a thing. But if I accept Platonism, e.g. that there exist timeless mathematical patterns, then it is hard to see how they could be regarded as "physical".

Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?

Cognitivism, there are moral statements that are objectively true or false. But I still think those objective facts are dependent on the existence of different agents and not some sort of "natural laws". For example, it is an objective fact that I assign moral value to non-human beings and it is an objective fact that a paperclip maximizer doesn't. Maybe I am confused here, don't know.

Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?

I still don't know what this is supposed to mean. But I believe that our motivations to make moral statements are blurred between internal and external causations. Our moral intuitions are a fact about our genetic makeup, upbringing, education, culture and the circumstances.

Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?

One box.

Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?

Subjective consequentialism.

Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?

I have no idea what all this means. The time I took to think about consciousness so far didn't allow me to wrap my mind around that topic.

Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?

Utility-function. We are what we want, our values and goals.

Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?

None of the above.

Proper names: Fregean or Millian?

I wouldn't name my child Fregean or Millian.

Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?

Survival.

Time: A-theory or B-theory?

Hmm...

Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?

Switch.

Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?

Don't know.

Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?

Inconceivable (for me at least).