A priori: kinda, but it's not clear that "knowledge" is the right word. Abstracta: nominalism. Aesthetics: subjective. Analytic-synthetic: it's a useful approximation. Epistemic justification: externalism, if I've understood the distinction correctly. External world: non-skeptical realism. Free will: depends on definitions; at any rate, incompatibilist free will doesn't exist and may not even be a coherent notion. God: atheism. Knowledge: empiricism. Knowledge claims: contextualism, I guess. Laws of nature: tentatively non-Humean. Logic: classical. Mental content: internalism about the beliefs/attitudes themselves, but how we describe them, what we do with them, etc., have to engage with the external world. Meta-ethics: anti-realism. Metaphilosophy: naturalism. Mind: physicalism, kinda. (Minds are physical in the same sort of sense as computer programs are.) Moral judgement: mixed (roughly, I think moral judgements originate non-cognitively but then we process them with a lot of the same mental machinery as we use for propositions about matters of fact). Moral motivation: internalism. Newcomb: one box. Normative ethics: consequentialism, with the proviso that various human mental limitations make it advisable (on consequentialist grounds!) not to behave as a pure consequentialist. Perceptual experience: representationalism, I think. Personal identity: psychological, with the proviso that there are imaginable-and-maybe-possible situations in which the notion of "identity" breaks down. Politics: mixed. Proper names: approximately Fregean. Science: realism. Teletransporter: survival, with the same proviso as above. Time: B-theory. Trolley: switch. Truth: correspondence or deflationary; would need to think more to decide whether it matters. Zombies: inconceivable or conceivable but impossible, depending on how you understand "conceivable"; I prefer the former.

Philosophers: Hume, Lewis, Mill, Quine, Russell most. Berkeley, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Rousseau least.