wnoise comments on The Absolute Self-Selection Assumption - Less Wrong

16 Post author: paulfchristiano 11 April 2011 03:25PM

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Comment author: wnoise 11 April 2011 07:33:01PM 7 points [-]
  1. In an infinite universe, there are infinitely many copies of you (infinitely many of which are Boltzmann brains).

This is a meme I keep seeing, and it's just not true. You need a lot more assumptions to justify that, such as "randomly generated", or very very strong versions of the cosmological principle.

The real line is infinite, but there's only one copy of the number 7.

Comment author: paulfchristiano 11 April 2011 08:12:37PM *  4 points [-]

The randomness of quantum mechanics is enough to guarantee under very weak conditions that, in most Everett branches, there are infinitely many copies of any pattern which occurs with positive probability.

The paper I linked justifies this assumption for one set of cosmological beliefs.

Also, though I made this claim as fact, you could generously consider it to be the assumption of the least convenient possible world. Are you sufficiently confident that there are only finitely many copies of you that you are OK with anthropics that would collapse if there were infinitely many copies?

Comment author: wnoise 11 April 2011 09:20:10PM 4 points [-]

So you're going with "randomly generated". Which is fine, but it needs to be spelled out.

there are infinitely many copies of any pattern which occurs with positive probability.

You need to be very careful pulling intuitions about randomness from the finite case and applying it to the infinite case. In particular, it is no longer true that just because something happened, it has a positive probability. Any given real number has probability zero of being picked from the uniform distribution on [0,1) yet one certainly will be picked. And we can pick an infinite number of times and never encounter a duplicate.

the least convenient possible world

I'm not attacking this assumption in order to attack your final conclusion, I'm just attacking this assumption.

Comment author: Cyan 11 April 2011 10:22:47PM 7 points [-]

Any given real number has probability zero of being picked from the uniform distribution on [0,1) yet one certainly will be picked.

I have actually never observed a real number picked at random. I have often observed rational numbers picked at pseudo-random, though.

Comment author: wnoise 12 April 2011 12:59:01AM *  1 point [-]

Observing a Geiger counter near a piece of radioactive material was one of the highlights of my undergraduate physics labs. And the time distribution of clicks is random in the same sense that the OP was using.

Comment author: Sniffnoy 12 April 2011 01:58:27AM 2 points [-]

I think the bigger problem is not randomness vs. pseudorandomness, but rather the question of whether uncountable probability spaces actually exist in physical situations.

Comment author: wnoise 12 April 2011 05:00:10AM 1 point [-]

I believe they do for the same reasons I take seriously the existence of other Everett branches. In fact the mapping is rather straightforward: I can't observe or directly interact with them in full generality, but the laws governing them and what I can observe are so very much simpler than laws that excise the unobservable ones. Whether I can actually exhibit most real numbers is besides the point.

Comment author: Cyan 12 April 2011 05:11:24AM 0 points [-]

Is there a demonstration that a physics based on the computables is more complex than a physics based on the reals?

Comment author: JoshuaZ 12 April 2011 05:51:41AM 4 points [-]

Is there a demonstration that a physics based on the computables is more complex than a physics based on the reals?

This is a complicated question. In practice, it is difficult in this particular context to measure what we mean by more or less complicated. A Blum-Shub-Smale machine which is essentially the equivalent of a Turing machine but for real numbers can do anything a regular Turing machine can do. This would suggest that physics based on the real is in general capable of doing more. But in terms of describing rules, it seems that physics based on the reals is simpler. For example, trying to talk about points in space is a lot easier when one can have any real coordinate rather than any computable coordinate. If one wants to prove something about some sort of space that only has computable coordinates the easiest thing is generally to embed it in the corresponding real manifold or the like.

Comment author: Cyan 12 April 2011 03:29:05AM *  0 points [-]

As Sniffnoy notes, the bigger problem is about the observation of an actual real number. Any observable signal specifying the instant at which the particle triggered the counter has finite information content, unlike a true real number. This includes the signal sent by your ears to your brain.

I shouldn't have mentioned pseudo-random number generation in the grandparent -- it's a red herring.

Comment author: Perplexed 11 April 2011 10:59:34PM 0 points [-]

Any given real number has probability zero of being picked from the uniform distribution on [0,1) yet one certainly will be picked.

Not in a finite amount of time.

Comment author: wnoise 12 April 2011 01:00:28AM 0 points [-]

What do you mean?

Comment author: Manfred 11 April 2011 11:23:46PM *  0 points [-]

Drawing from a continuous distribution happens fairly often, so your comment confuses me. Or maybe you'd say that those aren't "really infinite" and are confined to a certain number of bits, but quantum mechanics would be an exception to that.

Comment author: Perplexed 12 April 2011 01:01:37AM 0 points [-]

As Cyan pointed out, when you choose a number confined to a certain number of bits, you are actually choosing from among the rationals.

I don't understand your reference to QM. I wasn't objecting to the randomness aspect. I was simply pointing out that to actually receive that randomly chosen real, you will (almost certainly) need to receive an infinite number of bits, and assuming finite channel capacity, that will take an infinite amount of time. So that event you mentioned, the one with an infinitesimal probability (zero probability for all practical purposes) is not going to actually happen (i.e. finish happening).

It was a minor quibble, which I now regret making.

Comment author: paulfchristiano 11 April 2011 09:27:31PM *  0 points [-]

Any given real number has probability zero of being picked from the uniform distribution on [0,1) yet one certainly will be picked

I believe there are probably only countably many distinguishable observer moments, in which case this can't happen by countable additivity.

But you are certainly correct, that a lot goes into this assumption. I should be more clear about this; in particular, I should probably add a bunch of "may"'s.