Gilbert's book, Stumbling On Happiness, describes the research. People's ability to predict what will make them happy is even WORSE than your post makes it sound. Much worse.
In fact, it really does take an entire book to properly explain just HOW bad we are at guessing what will make us happy, although one could argue that near vs. far thinking has an awful lot to do with it.
(I routinely find that people who have difficulty setting or achieving goals (or who achieve them and aren't satisfied), are people who haven't immersively imagined what it would be like to live day-to-day with the getting or having of the goal. Immersive imagination, using "ideal day" exercises (e.g. imagining in present-tense detail what it would be like to live through a day where you have achieved your goal) usually provides surprising feedback on whether the goal is actually a good idea, and what modifications might need to be made.)
I am a big believer in this idea of realistic or immersive imagining. I submit that many people in the LW empirical personspace cluster spend far too much time on unrealistic fantasizing (e.g. through reading sci-fi/fantasy books), and that this is highly detrimental to their well-being. I used to live in a fantasy world myself; I'm slowly trying to break the habit.
When I tell people I think they should cut down on their consumption of fantasy novels they say "No, it's important to be imaginative!" Absolutely, but it's way more important to imag...
Today Ed Yong has a post on Not Exactly Rocket Science that is about updating - actually, the most extreme case in updating, where a person gets to choose between relying completely on their own judgement, or completely on the judgement of others. He describes 2 experiments by Daniel Gilbert of Harvard in which subjects are given information about experience X, and asked to predict how they would feel (on a linear scale) on experiencing X; they then experience X and rate what they felt on that linear scale.
In both cases, the correlation between post-experience judgements of different subjects is much higher than the correlation between the prediction and the post-experience judgement of each subject. This isn't surprising - the experiments are designed so that the experience provides much more information than the given pre-experience information does.
What might be surprising is that the subjects believe the opposite: that they can predict their response from information better than from the responses of others.
Whether these experiments are interesting depends on how the subjects were asked the question. If they were asked, before being given information or being told what that information would be, whether they could predict their response to an experience better by making their own judgement based on information, or from the responses of others, then the result is not interesting. The subjects in that case did not know that they would be given only a trivial amount of information relative to those who had the experience.
The result is only interesting if the subjects were given the information first, and then asked whether they could predict their response better from that information than from someone else's experience. Yong's post doesn't say which of these things happened, and doesn't cite the original article, so I can't look it up. Does anyone know?
I've heard studies like this cited as strong evidence that we should update more; but never heard that critical detail given for any such studies. Are there any studies which actually show what this study purports to show?
EDIT: Robin posted the citation. The original paper does not contain the crucial information. Details in my response to Robin.
EDIT: The original paper DOES contain the crucial info for the first experiment. I missed it the first time. It says: