Thanks much!
The paper says: "Ironically, 75% of the women believed that simulation information would have allowed them to make a more accurate forecast about their date with the man they met, and 84% believed that simulation information would allow them to make a more accurate forecast about a future date with a different man."
It doesn't say when women were asked this question. So the crucial information is missing.
The experimenters misunderstood their own experiment. They dutifully reported the manner in which the "data" was gathered, but failed to realize that the reported confidence of the subjects in the two types of information was actually the critical data.
In the second experiment, the experimenters also did the wrong thing: They asked judges which type of information would be more useful to them, descriptions of the 3 personality types, or reports written by people describing their responses. The article does not say that the judges were shown the descriptions of the 3 personality types. Thus, again, we can suppose that the judges decided that knowing the 3 personality types would be more useful was based on an erroneous supposition that the descriptions would contain more information than they actually did.
Also, the experimenters used a separate group of subjects to rate whether experiential or "simulation" information would be more valuable to them, than the group of subjects that they used to determine which type of information was more valuable. Why? They increased the expense of their study by 50% in order to make it less convincing. This makes no sense to me.
So this study is intriguing, but not convincing.
Today Ed Yong has a post on Not Exactly Rocket Science that is about updating - actually, the most extreme case in updating, where a person gets to choose between relying completely on their own judgement, or completely on the judgement of others. He describes 2 experiments by Daniel Gilbert of Harvard in which subjects are given information about experience X, and asked to predict how they would feel (on a linear scale) on experiencing X; they then experience X and rate what they felt on that linear scale.
In both cases, the correlation between post-experience judgements of different subjects is much higher than the correlation between the prediction and the post-experience judgement of each subject. This isn't surprising - the experiments are designed so that the experience provides much more information than the given pre-experience information does.
What might be surprising is that the subjects believe the opposite: that they can predict their response from information better than from the responses of others.
Whether these experiments are interesting depends on how the subjects were asked the question. If they were asked, before being given information or being told what that information would be, whether they could predict their response to an experience better by making their own judgement based on information, or from the responses of others, then the result is not interesting. The subjects in that case did not know that they would be given only a trivial amount of information relative to those who had the experience.
The result is only interesting if the subjects were given the information first, and then asked whether they could predict their response better from that information than from someone else's experience. Yong's post doesn't say which of these things happened, and doesn't cite the original article, so I can't look it up. Does anyone know?
I've heard studies like this cited as strong evidence that we should update more; but never heard that critical detail given for any such studies. Are there any studies which actually show what this study purports to show?
EDIT: Robin posted the citation. The original paper does not contain the crucial information. Details in my response to Robin.
EDIT: The original paper DOES contain the crucial info for the first experiment. I missed it the first time. It says: