This post is a followup to "We are not living in a simulation" and intended to help me (and you) better understand the claims of those who took a computationalist position in that thread. The questions below are aimed at you if you think the following statement both a) makes sense, and b) is true:
"Consciousness is really just computation"
I've made it no secret that I think this statement is hogwash, but I've done my best to make these questions as non-leading as possible: you should be able to answer them without having to dismantle them first. Of course, I could be wrong, and "the question is confused" is always a valid answer. So is "I don't know".
As it is used in the sentence "consciousness is really just computation", is computation: a) Something that an abstract machine does, as in "No oracle Turing machine can compute a decision to its own halting problem"? b) Something that a concrete machine does, as in "My calculator computed 2+2"? c) Or, is this distinction nonsensical or irrelevant?
If you answered "a" or "c" to question 1: is there any particular model, or particular class of models, of computation, such as Turing machines, register machines, lambda calculus, etc., that needs to be used in order to explain what makes us conscious? Or, is any Turing-equivalent model equally valid?
If you answered "b" or "c" to question 1: unpack what "the machine computed 2+2" means. What is that saying about the physical state of the machine before, during, and after the computation?
Are you able to make any sense of the concept of "computing red"? If so, what does this mean?
As far as consciousness goes, what matters in a computation: functions, or algorithms? That is, does any computation that give the same outputs for the same inputs feel the same from the inside (this is the "functions" answer), or do the intermediate steps matter (this is the "algorithms" answer)?
Would an axiomatization (as opposed to a complete exposition of the implications of these axioms) of a Theory of Everything that can explain consciousness include definitions of any computational devices, such as "and gate"?
Would an axiomatization of a Theory of Everything that can explain consciousness mention qualia?
Are all computations in some sense conscious, or only certain kinds?
ETA: By the way, I probably won't engage right away with individual commenters on this thread except to answer requests for clarification. In a few days I'll write another post analyzing the points that are brought up.
I'm not sure of what exactly you're after with this question, or what the question would even mean.
Any Turing-equivalent model seems equally valid.
In my mind, "a machine computed X" means that we can use the machine to figure out the answer to X. For instance, John Searle claims that any physical process can be interpreted to instantiate any computation, given a complex enough interpretation. According to this view, e.g. an arbitrary wall can be said to be computing 2+2 as well as 583403 + 573493. But the flaw here is that you cannot actually use the wall to tell you the answer to 583403 + 573493. If you already know the answer, you can come up with a contrived mapping of the wall's atoms to a computation giving the result, but then you cannot use this mapping to tell you the result to any other calculation. So "the machine computed 2+2" means that after the computation, the machine was in such a state that you could somehow read "2+2 = 4" from its state.
"Computing red" means that a system has an internal representation of the external world, where a specific kind of sensory data produced by the eyes (or equivalent sensors) is coded as being that specific type. This coding is subjectively experienced as the color red.
The intermediate steps matter. A giant look-up table wouldn't be conscious, though the process that originally produced the table could be.
I have no idea of what a physical theory explaining consciousness would be like. So I don't know.
See above.
Only certain kinds, though I'm unsure of the exact properties required.
This post is a followup to "We are not living in a simulation" and intended to help me (and you) better understand the claims of those who took a computationalist position in that thread. The questions below are aimed at you if you think the following statement both a) makes sense, and b) is true:
"Consciousness is really just computation"
I've made it no secret that I think this statement is hogwash, but I've done my best to make these questions as non-leading as possible: you should be able to answer them without having to dismantle them first. Of course, I could be wrong, and "the question is confused" is always a valid answer. So is "I don't know".
a) Something that an abstract machine does, as in "No oracle Turing machine can compute a decision to its own halting problem"?
b) Something that a concrete machine does, as in "My calculator computed 2+2"?
c) Or, is this distinction nonsensical or irrelevant?
ETA: By the way, I probably won't engage right away with individual commenters on this thread except to answer requests for clarification. In a few days I'll write another post analyzing the points that are brought up.