David_Gerard comments on Three consistent positions for computationalists - Less Wrong

5 Post author: dfranke 14 April 2011 01:15PM

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Comment author: David_Gerard 17 April 2011 07:32:53PM *  0 points [-]

Haven't read it, evidently it might be an idea ( /me adds it to the extensive queue). The description looks like large chunks of the sequences already written up as a book.

I mean, I can come up with my own idea of what "qualia" means (starting from "a word that means whatever wins my argument that consciousness is irreducible", mentioning the narrative fallacy and getting more acerb from there), but have trouble coming up with what it could mean as part of such an argument without being really obviously silly ...

edit: Found and glanced at section 2.5 in a PDF. Yeah, "a word that means whatever wins my argument that consciousness is irreducible" looks like the actual substance of the term "qualia" as an argument for irreducible consciousness, i.e. none to speak of. "I feel something! That counts as actual magic, doesn't it?" "Er, no." (The term "qualia" may have uses in a reductionist's conception of consciousness - I might have use for it in thinking about aesthetics - but those uses aren't these ones.)