The mind projection fallacy (or more specifically, the Less Wrong sequence on it) is >more than sufficient as an explanation for how mental and supernatural entities are >perceived;

I disagree.I don't see the specific application at all.

I'm saying the Less Wrong sequences on reductionism and quantum physics will be useful in dissolving your confusion about qualia.

OK.I'm saying I already know quite a lot about both subjects, and I don't see the application. You need to stop assuming that I am ignorant, and start putting forward relevant arguments. Repetition of "you are confused" won't cut it.

I have read arguments for and against qualia, and found them both to be based on reason.

But not Bayesian evidence, which is what's relevant on LessWrong.com.

I don't see the relevance of Bayes. The topic is at the level of of clarifying concepts, not of making computations on datasets.

This is a community devoted to furthering the practice of Bayesian rationalism, not > the discussion of philosophy in general,

To say that qualia don't exist, as you have been, is philosophy in general. To say that philsophy as a whole is wrong-headed, as you have been, is metaphilosophy. Your position is inconsistent. You say both that philosophy is wrong headed and that a certain philosophical problem is (dis)solved in the Sequences (in a typically philosophical way, dismissed as a verbal/conceptual confusion).

or what philosophers consider to be reasonable or not reasonable. This is a >community that considers dissolution of the confusion about "free will" to be a basic >exercise in rationality, rather than an abstruse philosophical question requiring >years of argument, or something that's still considered an unsettled open question, >subject to disagreement.

If it is a community based on reason, it will be open to reasoned objections.

that's why I suggested the Sequences to you, in case you're genuinely interested in being able to settle philosophical arguments once and for all, instead of just having >philosophical arguments. ;-)

That seems laughably naive to me. You don;t have an algortihm for settling phil. arguments, because they do depend on evaluations, and other stumbling blocks you haven't thought of. You think it is just obvious that we should ditch the idea of qualia to retain physicalism and avoid epiphenomenalism. But that isn't an obvious objective fact which other people are toostupid to understand: that is you de-valuing qualia and subjective experience.

You didn't need to. Any argument for epiphenomenalism

I didn't mention epiphenomenalism either, and I don't believe in it..or, rather, I value theories that avoid it.

reduces in roughly the same way: if it has an effect, then the effect is phenomenal > and reducible. If it doesn't have an effect (i.e. produces no difference in our predicted observations), why do we care?

Ontologically fundamental mental entities of any sort require

I haven't said qualia are fundamental. and they are not defined that way.