pjeby comments on Three consistent positions for computationalists - Less Wrong

5 Post author: dfranke 14 April 2011 01:15PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (176)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: pjeby 18 April 2011 08:54:57PM 0 points [-]

If you don't think that these arguments can be settled, there is no point in continuing this discussion.

And if you don't think that Bayes matters to updating your beliefs, then you are not a Bayesian rationalist.

The reason I asked about the sequences was to find out whether you were someone trying to learn an application of Bayesian rationalism, or someone who's just trying to have a philosophical argument.

Apparently, you fall in the latter category, which means I have no interest in continuing the discussion.

If it is a community based on reason, it will be open to reasoned objections.

What is considered "reasoning" by philosophy doesn't reach the level of rigor that is required here... as was amply demonstrated by statements of yours such as:

You don;t have an algortihm for settling phil. arguments, because they do depend on evaluations

They only depend on evaluations if you're interested in having an argument, as opposed to finding the truth (with or without a capital T) of a situation. Here, we expect arguments to be supported (or at least not opposed) by physics and cognitive science, in order to be considered "reasonable", and we expect that hypotheses not be privileged.

Comment author: Peterdjones 18 April 2011 10:02:44PM *  -1 points [-]

I don't think they have been settled. And I think there is value in reversing the Dunning Kruger Effect: getting someone to realise how difficult something really is.

I didn't claim to be a Bayesian or not. I am comparing Bayes to Popper and various other things at the moment. What I did say, and stand by, is that the formal part of Bayes is only applicable to problem areas that have already been marshalled into a less ambigous and non-linear form than typical phil, problems.

You can say you have some wonderfully high level of reasoning, but I don't have to believe you. I can judge from the examples supplied. You have not applied Bayesian reasoning as a formalism to any problem. and the material you directed me to in the sequences didn't either. It is all typical philosophical reasoning, neither particularly good not particularly bad.

They only depend on evaluations if you're interested in having an argument, as opposed to finding the truth (with or without a capital T) of a situation. Here, we expect arguments to be supported (or at least not opposed) by physics and cognitive science, in order to be considered "reasonable", and we expect that hypotheses not be privilege oopposed to finding the truth (with or without a capital T) of a situation. Here, we expect arguments to be supported (or at least not opposed) by physics and cognitive science, in order to be considered "reasonable", and we expect that hypotheses not be privileged.

Ie...you value science.

But the idea that just by basing your philosophical arguments on science, you can Avoid Arguments and Find Truth is very naive. Most English-speaking philosophy is science based, and is full of plenty of disagreements. Why don't you know that? Oh yeah: the Dunning-Kruger effect means that the less someone knows about a subject, the more they over-estimate their own abilities at it...