Misha comments on Offense versus harm minimization - Less Wrong

60 Post author: Yvain 16 April 2011 01:06AM

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Comment author: [deleted] 16 April 2011 02:08:35AM 19 points [-]

I think the slippery slope you describe is not the correct slope to talk about. Rather, the argument I often hear is "if we accede to Muslims in this relatively trivial matter of pictures, they will see this as a sign of weakness, and expect stronger demands to be met as well."

Comment author: Lightwave 16 April 2011 08:21:26AM 1 point [-]

"if we accede to Muslims in this relatively trivial matter of pictures, they will see this as a sign of weakness, and expect stronger demands to be met as well."

While this might happen, isn't the nice thing to do to cooperate at least the first time? You can always later revise your position and refuse to concede further when pushed.

Comment author: Strange7 16 April 2011 09:01:53AM 9 points [-]

Where exactly do you draw the line, then? "I can quit whenever I want to" isn't much of a strategy.

Consider two timelines:

In A, the aggressive underdog starts by demanding a trivial concession under threat of violence, to which the complacent superpower accedes. Later, underdog wants a more significant concession, and again threatens violence. Superpower resists, underdog (considering superpower weak of resolve) follows through on the threat. People die, nothing is accomplished.

In B, the aggressive underdog starts by demanding a trivial concession under threat of violence, which the complacent superpower rejects derisively. Later, underdog wants a more significant concession, but has had no success with previous threats of violence and so considers what other bargaining chips they have. Superpower negotiates, and a mutually-acceptable compromise is reached.

Comment author: Lightwave 16 April 2011 10:26:16AM 1 point [-]

Later, underdog wants a more significant concession, but has had no success with previous threats of violence and so considers what other bargaining chips they have. Superpower negotiates, and a mutually-acceptable compromise is reached.

Well what I had in mind is that the superpower could attempt to negotiate a compromise right from the start. And to show that it's willing to compromise (not only in words), it might make the small concession first. Get the "moral high-ground", so to speak.

Now this might not work depending on who they're dealing with. But I doubt that "Muslims" in general are a group that can't be influenced in such a way. It almost certainly isn't going to be good enough for the types of people who threaten violence and follow-up on it, but they themselves could be influenced by other Muslims.

I could be expecting people to be more reasonable and rational than they actually are, so I might be wrong on how this will play out, I guess. Any (historical) real-world examples (or counter-examples)?

Comment author: Strange7 16 April 2011 02:17:29PM 14 points [-]

Neville Chamberlain.

By making a concession first, you are not starting a negotiation. You are, effectively, concluding a negotiation by agreeing to a minor variation on the deal they initially proposed: whatever they want in exchange for not getting hurt. The geopolitical equivalent of saying you 'don't want no trouble' and reaching for your wallet.

Comment author: khafra 16 April 2011 05:21:34PM 3 points [-]

You may be thinking of Reciprocity in Cialdini's Weapons of Influence. AFAIK, that works better on a person to person basis; if you're trying to negotiate between nation-states and religions, you're probably better off basing your work on the Strategy of Conflict.