Offense versus harm minimization
Imagine that one night, an alien prankster secretly implants electrodes into the brains of an entire country - let's say Britain. The next day, everyone in Britain discovers that pictures of salmon suddenly give them jolts of painful psychic distress. Every time they see a picture of a salmon, or they hear about someone photographing a salmon, or they even contemplate taking such a picture themselves, they get a feeling of wrongness that ruins their entire day.
I think most decent people would be willing to go to some trouble to avoid taking pictures of salmon if British people politely asked this favor of them. If someone deliberately took lots of salmon photos and waved them in the Brits' faces, I think it would be fair to say ey isn't a nice person. And if the British government banned salmon photography, and refused to allow salmon pictures into the country, well, maybe not everyone would agree but I think most people would at least be able to understand and sympathize with the reasons for such a law.
So why don't most people extend the same sympathy they would give Brits who don't like pictures of salmon, to Muslims who don't like pictures of Mohammed?
SHOULD EVERYBODY DRAW MOHAMMED?
I first1 started thinking along these lines when I heard about Everybody Draw Mohammed Day, and revisited the issue recently after discovering http://www.reddit.com/r/mohammadpics/.
I have to admit, I find these funny. I want to like them. But my attempts to think of reasons why this is totally different from showing pictures of salmon to British people fail:
• You could argue Brits did not choose to have their abnormal sensitivity to salmon while Muslims might be considered to be choosing their sensitivity to Mohammed. But this requires a libertarian free will. Further, I see little difference between how a Muslim "chooses" to get upset at disrespect to Mohammed, and how a Westerner might "choose" to get upset if you called eir mother a whore. Even though the anger isn't being caused by alien technology, it doesn't feel like a "choice" and it's more than just a passing whim. And if tomorrow I tried to "choose" to become angry every time someone showed me a picture of a salmon, I couldn't do it - I could pretend to be angry, but I couldn't make myself feel genuine rage.
• Muslims' sensitivity to Mohammed is based on a falsehood; Islam is a false religion and Mohammed is too dead to care how anyone depicts him. I agree with this statement, but I don't think it licenses me to cause psychic pain to Muslims. I couldn't go around to mosques and punch Muslims in the face, shouting "Your religion is false, so you deserve it!".
• It is necessary to draw pictures of Mohammed to show Muslims that violence and terrorism are inappropriate responses. I think the logic here is that a few people drew pictures of Mohammed, some radicals sent out death threats and burned embassies, and now we need to draw more pictures of Mohammed to convince Muslims not to do this. But it sounds pretty stupid when you put it in exactly those words. Say a random Christian kicked a Muslim in the face, and a few other Muslims got really angry, blew the whole thing out of proportion, and killed him and his entire family. This would be an inappropriately strong response, and certainly you could be upset about it, but the proper response wouldn't be to go kicking random Muslims in the face. They didn't do it, and they probably don't even approve. But drawing pictures of Mohammed offends many Muslims, not just the ones who send death threats.
• The slippery slope argument: if we allow Muslims' concerns to prevent us from drawing pictures of Mohammed, sooner or later we'll have to accept every two-bit group with a ridiculous superstition and we'll never be able to get anything done. I take this more seriously than the previous three arguments, but I've previously argued that granting large established religions special rights is relatively immune to slippery-slope. And anyway, drawing pictures of Mohammed is such an unusual thing to do that we can stop doing it without giving up our right to keep doing something else that's actually useful if the situation comes up later.
None of these excuses really does it for me. So my provisional conclusion is that yes, people who draw pictures of Mohammed where Muslims can see them are bad people in the same way that people who go around showing photos of salmon to Brits are bad people.
So the big question is: why is this so controversial in the Mohammed example, when it seems so obvious in the salmon example?
A BLAME-BASED CONCEPT OF OFFENSE
I think several features of the salmon example trigger consequentialist moral reasoning, in which the goal is to figure out how to satisfy as many people's preferences as possible; several contrasting features of the Mohammed case trigger deontological moral reasoning, in which the goal is to figure out who is a good person or a bad person and to assign status and blame appropriately. These two forms of reasoning give different results in the two different cases.
The word that comes up a lot in discussions of this sort of issue is "offensive". When someone draws Mohammed, it is considered offensive to Muslims. When someone writes a story where all the sympathetic and interesting characters are male, it is considered offensive to women.
For me, the word "offensive" brings up connotations of "It was morally wrong to say this, and you are either inexcusably ignorant of this fact or deliberately malicious. You must immediately apologize, and it is up to the group you have offended to decide whether they accept your apology or whether they want to punish you in some well-deserved way."
This means that ever admitting you were offensive is a huge status hit implying you are some combination of callous, ignorant, and racist. Sometimes people may be willing to take this status hit, especially if upon reflection they believe they really were in the wrong, but since most people's actions seem reasonable to themselves they will not be willing to accept a narrative where they're the villain.
More likely, they will try to advance an alternative interpretation, in which their actions were not legitimately offensive or in which they have the "right" to take such actions. Such an interpretation may cast the offended party as a villain, trying to gain power and control by pretending to be offended, or unduly restricting the free speech of others.
The controversy over drawing Mohammed has several factors that predispose to this sort of interpretation. There is already a history of misunderstanding and some enmity between Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims' status as a minority makes ideas of "political correctness" readily primed and available, making people likely to miss the trees for the forest. Muslims are often of a different race than Christians, so conflicts with them risk tarring a person with the deeply insulting label of "racist". And because there are reports of Muslims rioting and hurting other people because of Mohammed drawings, they are easy to villainize.
This risks embroiling everyone in an unproductive argument about whether an action was "legitimately offensive" or not, with much status riding on the result.
A CONSEQUENTIALIST CONCEPT OF HARM MINIMIZATION
The British salmon example, on the other hand, was designed to avoid the idea of "offense" and trigger consequentialist notions of harm minimization2.
The example specifically refers to the displeasure that salmon cause the British as "psychic pain", priming ideas about whether it is acceptable to cause pain to another person. The British are described as politely asking us to avoid salmon photography as a favor to them, putting themselves in a low status position rather than demanding we respect their status. British are white and first world, so it's hard to think of this as a political correctness issue and wade into that particular quagmire. And because the whole salmon problem is the result of an alien prankster, there's no easily available narrative in which the British are at fault.
A consequentialist reasoner would consider how much disutility it causes not to be able to use pictures of salmon where the British might see them, then consider how much disutility it causes the British to see pictures of salmon, and if the latter outweighed the former, they'd stop with the salmon pictures. There's an argument to be made about slippery slope, but in this case the slope doesn't seem too slippery and other cases can be evaluated on their merits.
And a consequentialist British person, when considering how to convince a foreigner to stop using pictures of salmon, would try to phrase eir request in a way that minimizes the chances that the foreigner gets upset and confrontational, and maximizes the chances that they actually stop with the salmon.
If the foreigner refused to stop with the salmon pictures, the British person would try to shame and discredit the foreigner into doing so only if ey thought it would work better than any less confrontational method, and only if the chance of it successfully stopping the offending behavior was great enough that it outweighted the amount of bad feelings and confrontation it would cause.
This is a healthier and potentially more successful method of resolving offensive actions.
OFFENSE AND TYPICAL MIND FALLACY
I post on a forum where a bunch of regulars recently denounced the culture of verbal abuse. The abusers, for their part, said that the victims were making mountains out of molehills: exaggerating some good-natured teasing in order to look holier-than-thou.
I was friends with some of victims and with some abusers; neither side were majority bad people, and it surprised me that people would view requests to stop verbal abuse as a Machiavellian ploy.
Not to say that asking for verbal abuse to stop can't be a Machiavellian ploy. In fact, as far as Machiavellian ploys go, it's a pretty good one - take something your political enemies do, pretend to be deeply offended by it, and then act upset until your enemies are forced to stop, inconveniencing them and gaining you sympathy. A conspiracy such is this is not impossible, but why is it so often the first possibility people jump to?
I think it has to do with something I heard one of the abusers say: "I would never get upset over something little like that."
I know him and he is telling the truth. When someone is verbally confrontational with him, he takes it in stride or laughs it off, because that's the kind of guy he is.
I am of Jewish background. I've had someone use an anti-Semitic slur on me exactly once. My reaction was the same mix of confusion and amusement I'd feel if someone tried a vintage Shakespearean insult. And yet I also know of Jews who have been devastated by anti-Semitic slurs, to the point where they've stopped going to school because someone in school taunted them. These people may differ from me in terms of Jewish identity, extraversion, demographics, social status, anxiety, neurogenetics, and some hard-to-define factor we might as well just call "thin skin".
The point is, if I use my own reactions to model theirs, I will fail, miserably. I will try to connect their reaction to the most plausible situation in which my mind would generate the same reaction in the same situation - in which I am not really upset but am pretending to be so for Machiavellian motives.
In the case of anti-Semitism, it's easy to see factors - like a history of suffering from past prejudice - that make other people's responses differ from mine. It's less obvious why someone else might differ in their response to being called ugly, or stupid, or just being told to fuck off - but if these differences really exist, they might explain why people just can't agree about offensive actions.
A thick-skinned person just can't model a person with thinner skin all that well. And so when the latter gets upset over some insult, the thick-skinned person calls them "unreasonable", or assumes that they're making it up in order to gain sympathy. My friends in the online forum couldn't believe anyone could really be so sensitive as to find their comments abusive, and so they ended up doing some serious mental damage.
SUMMARY
Consequentialism suggests a specific course of action for both victims of offense and people performing potentially offensive actions. The victim should judge whether ey believes the offense causes more pain to em than it does benefit to the offender; if so, ey should nonjudgmentally request the offender stop while applying the Principle of Charity to the offender, and if ey wants the maximum chance of the offense stopping, ey should resist the urge to demand an apology or do anything else that could potentially turn it into a status game.
The offender, for eir part, should stop offending as soon as ey realizes that the amount of pain eir actions cause is greater than the amount of annoyance it would take to avoid the offending action, even if ey can't understand why it would cause any pain at all. If ey wishes, ey may choose to apologize even though no apology was demanded.
If the offender refuses, the victim should only then consider "punishment" by trying to shame the offender and make em appear low status, and only if ey thinks this has a real chance of stopping the offending behavior either in this case or in the future. Like all attempts to deliberately harm another person, this course of action requires of the victim exceptional certainty that ey is in the right.
Although people pretending to be offended for personal gain is a real problem, it is less common in reality than it is in people's imaginations. If a person appears to suffer from an action of yours which you find completely innocuous, you should consider the possibility that eir mind is different from yours before rejecting eir suffering as feigned.
FOOTNOTES
1) Thanks to Kaj Sotala, Vladimir Nesov, and kovacsa-whose-LW-name-I-don't-know for originally encouraging me to turn the original essay into an LW post.
2) The deontological notion of offense doesn't really supervene on an idea of pain to other people. If two white people, talking where no black people could possibly overhear them, make a racist joke about black people, that is still "offensive", because racism is wrong no matter what. A consequentialist notion of offense could better ground such examples by theorizing that whites telling racist jokes to other whites creates a climate in which racism is considered acceptable, which eventually will end up hurting someone directly. Or it could decide not to, if it decided the link was too tenuous and hokey - but now any disagreement on the matter is honest disagreement about empirical facts and not philosophical disagreement about who's a bad person.
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Comments (417)
I feel there are some significant differences between drawing Mohammed and showing the British person a picture of the salmon:
In case of Britain affected with the salmon ailment, it is not actually necessary to stop depicting salmon. For example, if you are a proud owner of a salmon-fisher’s blog, it is sufficient to put up a “CONTAINS SALMON” warning on the front page to prevent some unlucky Brit from wandering inside and getting a jolt. We do not stop selling peanut products because some people are allergic to them and might actually die from consuming those – we just put a highly visible “CONTAINS NUTS” label on the packaging. However, if you have a religious issue discussion blog that may contain some Mohammed art, posting a “CONTAINS PICTURES OF MOHHAMED” warning on the front page will only attract the kind of Muslims that are particularly averse to Mohammed art.
Another interesting point to consider is that being atheist, I do not have a duty or commandment not to draw a picture of Mohammed and neither do Christians, Buddhists, Jews or Hindus. Technically, if your commandments do not forbid it you are not committing a sacrilege. Now, waving a Mohammed pic in the Muslims’ face would be definitely a dick move, but publishing it in your blog/journal/whatever other media that a Muslim would have to actively seek out in order to be exposed should be ok.
A tit-for-tat argument – suppose that while Britain was affected by salmon aversion the rest of the world was struck by an aversion to cat pictures (the horror! Oh, the fluffy horror!). Now, if the British demand that we get rid of our salmon pics but keep flashing the cat pics all over the place, would you still feel that it is a dick move to keep your salmon? Getting back to the Mohammed issue, this is exactly what we see – the same Muslim groups that react most aggressively to the Mohammed pics are known for damaging and destroying various objects that hold cultural and religious value to non-Muslims. Is it right to cooperate when your opponent is known for defecting?
However, I do feel that my thinking might be influenced by a tribal-rivalry bias against Muslems. If you find anything of that sort – feel free to dig in.
My basic issue is that an outright Machiavellian lie and a true, real, cast-in-stone kind of amount of unchangeable felt pain are not the only two options.
Imagine that you are untrained but largely healthy, and forced (or strongly encouraged) to run 2-3km. It can be pretty painful, having to stop to pant for breath 10 times and so on, but how many repetitions it takes (with two days of rest) to make it okay? 20? 30 ? It is possible to get pretty quickly to a state where it does not hurt anymore, in mere months. Also factor in how the psychological pain can be different if you are for example doing it alone, or you are in a group of friends and a great trainer, great leader excellently motivating you all the way. The difference can be huge. In those circumstances, you get even quicker to the level where the whole thing is not negative sum, i.e. even before you get fit enough to enjoy it already the disutility of the panting etc. is small enough to offset by the positive emotional stuff like pride or togetherness.
Let's suppose emotional reactions to offense work the same way.
In such a world, it would be reasonable for the offense-giver to say society should be shaped so that everybody gets a certain amount of thick-skin training and then we all don't have to tiptoe around each other.
Your solution involves some kind of etiquette-and-sensitivity training. That is probably what isolated stoppages of offensive behavior lead to if organized with any sense of social efficiency. The question is, why not also desensitization training?
I think the difference here is that “Mohammed” (for sake of argument) does not exist outside of the context of Islam. To reference “Mohammed” is to reference a character that exists only as a historical character described through historical texts that deliberately do not offer an official image of him (…and no one is saying "you can't talk or write about Mohammed," at least not yet). The presumption here is that the Islamic character and the prohibition regarding his depiction are inseparable aspects of the same idea of “Mohammed.”
Salmon, on the other hand, exist outside of such context. One can draw or photograph a salmon without ever knowing what it is, but one can’t depict a Mohammed without referencing Islam.
Which is a roundabout way of saying, one has to go out of their way to create a visual depiction of Mohammed. To do that, one has to (1) know enough about Islam and Mohammed to even know what to depict, (2) presumably understand that there are few existing depictions of Mohammed because depiction is a cultural taboo; and (3) to label their drawing as specifically a depiction of Mohammed (so that someone else can't get confused and think it is just some random schmuck).
This is, so far as I understand it, a deliberate act of challenging a social norm. So when someone uses the defense of 'free speech,' someone else could counter with the claim that the depiction of Mohammed is by nature libelous/slanderous -- you are knowingly and willingly creating a false depiction (as all depictions are false) that defames or otherwise harms a group of people/beliefs and/or their reputation.
(Again assuming here that the Islamic character and the prohibition regarding his depiction are inseparable aspects of the same idea of “Mohammed.” I suppose one can compare this to how “Voldemort” must not be named because to name him is to cause deliberate harm/offense to any non-Muggles. Muggles will never find out about Voldemort unless some non-Muggle tells them about Voldemort, and even then, the Muggle will learn about Voldemort as “He-who-must-not-be-named” for reasons “x,y,z”. So for a Muggle to name Voldemort is to deliberately harm/offend the non-Muggle then).
Perhaps a better comparison and a better question would be as follows: A homeowner has put up a sign in front of their home saying "Do not draw pictures of QfwfQ." And what the heck is a "QfwfQ"? It is something the homeowner believes in, and inseparable from the belief in QfwfQ is the belief that QfwfQ does not like to be drawn (or it will punish the owner with twenty lashes when the owner meets the QfwfQ in an indeterminate future.) The homeowner has put that sign out as a special –and perhaps irrational-- precaution. An ordinary passerby would not think to draw pictures of the whatever it is, or even /why/ that rule might exit, and would generally ignore it.
However, there seem to be a group of people who, upon hearing of this sign and this rule and this person with their belief in QfwfQ, take it all as a provocation to challenge a rule simply because the rule exists. The homeowner, upon hearing this, reacts in a disproportionate manner. More people hear about this QfwfQ and his silly rules, and criticize the homeowner and his beliefs. The homeowner again reacts disproportionately, and this goes on in perpetuity until everyone has some idea of QfwfQ and the homeowner.
This continues until knowledge of QfwfQ and his silly rules reaches a hyper-logical culture that holds nothing sacred (not even things like “love” and “friendship,” unless there are explicit cost/benefit analyses supporting those ideas). To lampoon QfwfQ and to criticize it are permissible and in fact encouraged as a show of how tolerant and egalitarian this culture is (“Your QfwfQ is no better and no worse than anyone else’s sacred ideas!”).
This leads to what some may call a ‘culture war,’ which is what it seems to me is going on between the West’s caricatures of Mohammed, and the conservative Muslim reaction.
Now, if someone had spontaneously, halfway around the world, drawn a picture and called it QfwfQ, how would that homeowner have reacted? Perhaps the homeowner would request the artist's death. Perhaps, if on not being to explain the drawing as a deliberate aim on part of the artist to insult, defame, or otherwise comment on the homeowner's belief in QfwfQ, the homeowner might conclude that there was an act of divine inspiration, and the rules governing the depiction/non-depiction of QfwfQ will change. Except for in the case of divine inspiration, everyone else who drew a picture of QfwfQ would have done so having learned about QfwfQ from a sign that says "Don't draw QfwfQ"! So the act of their drawing would have been a deliberate rule-breaking, however arbitrary that rule is. Similarly, "Mohammed" does not exist outside of Islam, so in engaging "Mohammed," you are inadvertently also engaging Islam. There is no Jewish or Christian or Buddhist or American or British "Mohammed", though there may be American and European genii of salmon. It would be interesting to explore how people would react if Muslims were to say, "Do not depict the Islamic character of Moses, but feel free to depict Christian or Jewish variants of the same character." in specifying that the varient of "Moses" one had drawn was the Islamic version, would that be a deliberate offense then? This is worth exploring further because there is no explicit Quranic ruling forbidding the depiction of Mohammed (though one could make a case regarding 'though shalt not make false idols and fall into idoltry'): the “ban” regarding depiction comes from a particular set of interpretations of Islam. At prior times, Muslims have in fact created depictions of Mohammed, and onyl certain groups of Muslims get upset with the depiction of Mohammed -- other Muslims with other varients of belief don't care.
It seems to me that the people who are offended at requests that they modify their behavior so as not to be offensive might also be able to self-engineer so they wouldn't feel so strongly about the matter. Do they have any obligation to do so?
Hm. Interesting piece. I'm partially sold, but not on this: 'Further, I see little difference between how a Muslim "chooses" to get upset at disrespect to Mohammed, and how a Westerner might "choose" to get upset if you called eir mother a whore.'
I'm pretty content to call that a sort of choice, especially if you make it a fair comparison, ie a general remark not victimising one person that all mothers are whores. After all, there’s still a pretty big difference between that (or even the rather more inflammatory ‘all Western mothers are whores’), and (a sincerely offensive) ‘your mother is a whore’. One is basically bullying someone, assuming they’re not in a position to hurt you back equally; the other is the sort of casual prejudice that (cough) some of us discourage but don’t actually seek to ban.
On top of that, there’s a significant difference between drawing a picture of someone and drawing a picture of someone in a way calculated to piss people who like them off. In the Muhammad cartoons furore, it initially seemed to be Muslims who were trying to elide the difference – specifically by positioning the latter as very bad and the first as (almost) equally bad. If drawing the former is a political action against such a sentiment (or just an aesthetic statement, standing against those who’d repress a portrayal of something they thought was beautiful), then I hardly think it’s a reprehensible one. Here I think actual 'whores' - or rather porn stars - give a better analogy. Their portrayals offend a lot of people, but few sensible people think there’s a good argument for banning them a) because overturning our anti-censorship sentiments should require a pretty strong burden of evidence and b) because a lot of people very much like them, and why should they be deprived? After all, the naysayers choose not to look at something that exists, but the fans can’t do the reverse.
Lastly, (and leastly), there’s the question of accuracy of the original criticism. If your mother does sell herself for money, then, while victimising you for it is still pretty unpleasant, we would be more inclined to tolerate borderline cases of people pointing it out in a potentially offensive way than if it weren't true. But most of the times when someone’s mum is aggressively called a whore, she probably isn’t. On the other hand, by most accounts Muhammad was a brutal sex pest, who most likely would have ordered suicide bombings had the technology existed for him to do so.
Alonzo Fyfe wrote an article in response to Yvain's article above, here.
An interesting comment by Yvain but the thought experiment seems to not reflect the virulence of the meme involved. When I heard of the reaction of the Muslims to the Muhammed image I thought of the mindset behind shouting "Banzai" intensified by generations of feelings of inferiority and thousands of times more people. Muslims appear to me to be extremely unfortunate people. Their societies have been plagued by a centuries long irrationality as powerful as the Sendai earthquake in its cumulative effect but of course not as noticeable because it is stretched out over time.
This is one of those philosophical arguments where the premise is so absurdist as to make it impossible to take seriously, but at the end of the day I'm far less inclined to kowtow to the British example than the Islam.
Restricting an image is, at it's heart, restricting thought. Restricting nerve impulses and the way they interact with the brain. The Islam restriction is, to an extent, silly in this day and age - there are no pictures of Mohammed, therefore there can be no pictures of Mohammad; You can't commit that 'sin' anymore than you can commit the sin of operating heavy machinery while deceased.
Unless I go to the trouble of labelling, you can't even know I tried
O
/|\ <-- May or may not be Stick Man representation of Mohammad in XKCD
/ \
We obtain data from pictures, and the blow to nature photographers, is hardly the issue. Think about the problems regarding ecologists, wildlife preservationists, biologists, fisherman, et al.
As a matter which impinges upon no impulse to do so past contrarily labeling stickmen, of course I can politely consent not to draw Mohammed. Not photographing Salmon causes active harm.
Jonnan
I notice that I would not support showing British people pictures of Salmon.
I notice that I would support showing Muslim people pictures of Mohammad.
These two situations seem nearly identical.
I notice that I am confused.
I see two analogous situations, and yet I come to two different conclusions. Therefore, there must be some difference between them, even if it only lies in my perceptions. Perhaps by carving these situations at their joints, I can find why it is I come away with different conclusions. Explicitly, I remember the stated differences.
1) Race/Culturism - The British are British and not Muslim
2) Blame - The British are not "at fault" as victims of a prank while the Muslims are "at fault" by virtue of being members of a religion
As a detirminist, I cannot say that the Muslims chose to be Muslims any more than British people chose to be waylayed by a prankster in the night. That seems very damning; this only leaves the option that I must be racist. However, there is perhaps a third option that is missing. Implicitly, I notice a number of unstated differences that can only be assumed.
3) Treatability - The British people have an electrode installed, which implies to me they receive the same disutility for every salmon picture seen. After year of salmon pictures, the 366th day of seeing salmon pictures would hurt just as much as the 1st day. In Muslims, the disutility of seeing pictures of Mohammad decreases until it eventually disappears. It is possible to 'cure' a muslim of recieving disutility from pictures of Mohammad in a way it is not possible with the British.
4) Resistance - The British people do not want to have an aversion to salmon. If given the choice to remove the salmon reaction, they would do so. The Muslim people want to have an aversion to Mohammad. In fact, they consider it morally right to hate pictures of Mohammad.
5) Propagation - A salmon averse Briton would hate seeing pictures of Salmon all his life, and then would die. In the worst case, the world has to live without pictures of salmon for 100 years, assuming the singularity doesn't hit before then. Muslims will teach their children to have the same aversions they do. Worst case scenario, 10,000 years from now we'll be sending messages to our other planets across galaxies but we still can't make pictures of the prophet Mohammad.
6) Mutation - A Briton would be pained by pictures of only Salmon until their end of days. The aversion to pictures of Mohammad has already mutated into anything critical towards Islam. Specifically, Van Gogh died due to women's rights, a trait only marginally related to Mohammad in as much as his film used verses from the Quran. An appropriate analogy would be if salmon-aversion mutated to hating all pictures or discussion of fish, because they're somewhat similar to salmon.
7) Virulence - Losing the right to show salmon to British people would only hurt a small subset of nature photographers. Losing the right to criticize Islam already hampers a number of humanitarian efforts in the Middle East (eg women's rights). If we were to extend the salmon analogy, we would require the British to hate fighting climate change, because it's sort of related to saving fish.
8) Pathogenicity - The British seem to respond to seeing pictures of fish with polite inquiries to stop and social pressure. Muslim extremists respond to pictures of Mohammad or media critical of Islam with death threats, assassinations, and government blocks.
These are significant differences, and most of them I didn't notice until I started enumerating the differences. The question is, is the difference in my reaction caused by the explicit differences (#1-2) or the implicit differences (#3-8). I shall return to the original scenario and remove those explicit differences. If my reaction to the modified scenario remains constant, it means that I made my decision based on explicit differences. If my reaction to the modified scenario changes, it means I made my decision based on implicit differences.
Sweet zombie jesus! That's a scenario that sends shivers down my spine. I would do everything I could to burn out those salmon-hating microchips. It seems that the difference in my reactions really is based on implicit differences I could not easily identify. On further reflection, Race and Nationality and even (surprisingly) Religion were irrelevant to my decision making compared to the consequences caused by the salmon/Mohammad meme.
Now another scenario. Imagine that those Muslims who hate seeing Mohammad got chosen by the prankster to get the salmon-hating electrodes in their brain. (The original salmon-chips Yvain made, not these nightmarish self-replicating, self-mutating ones I made.) They hate seeing both pictures of Salmon and pictures of Mohammad. In this case I would not support showing the Muslims pictures of Salmon, but I would support showing the Muslims pictures of Mohammad. This is consistent with my prior decisions and internally consistent with my morals.
Let me revisit my first statements now, with sticky and emotional words dissolved.
This analysis seems be assuming that Muslims will deconvert if only they're shown a sufficient number of pictures of Muhammad.
This needs more upvotes.
Yvain, I would urge you to read this post on assigning blame on the subject of diseases, written by a quite eloquent and enlightening writer. There is a very relevant snippet in there regarding the difference between the consequentialist model of blame and the deontological model.
If showing pictures of Salmon to British people helped degrade the salmon-pain-electrodes, then we should show pictures of Salmon to British people. If showing pictures of Mohammad to Muslim people helped reduce their reaction, then we should show pictures of Mohammad to Muslim people. If it doesn't work, we shouldn't do it. If kicking them in the face worked, we should do it; if kicking them in the face doesn't work, we shouldn't do it. Pure consequentialism.
Make no mistake, Muslims taking offense to pictures is a disease of the mind and not just because it's based on religion (and religion is false). People have received death threats over depictions of Mohammad. Others have been assassinated for creating media relating to the Muslim religion. Those who wish to end the oppression of women and other human rights abuses have a harder time because they are unable to create media critical of those practices. These are all aside from the general issue of freedom of speech. There are real world results caused by Muslims being overly sensitive and turning to violence or threats of violence as a result of that sensitivity.
Remember that nobody felt the need to make a "Everybody Draw Mohammad Day" when they were being asked politely to stop. When sensitivity crossed the line to death threats and assassination is the exact point that an 'issue to be sensitive about' turned into a 'disease to be cured'. Once it is classified as a disease the only questions are 'how you can cure it most effectively' and 'is Everybody Draw Mohammad Day an efficacious cure'.
Imagine a world where there are a billion Muslims who are exactly as offended by pictures of Mohammed as the average American student would be by a racist caricature of Martin Luther King. Does one "disease of the mind" need to be cured more than the other? In both cases, the "patient" wouldn't take a pill that cured him.
Now add to the picture one Muslim fanatic who is angry enough at depictions of Mohammed that he'd be ready to kill in retaliation. Is it worth hurting the other billion muslims to try to "cure" him (assumting the cure works, which is another question)? How many fanatics do you need before it makes utilitarian sense to use the cure?
And a lazy person probably couldn't be bothered to go out and get the drug that cures laziness, either. Hence the social presssure method.
Would they? I would, if it was cheap and available enough.
There's an important difference between things people would change if they could do it at zero cost (lazyness, disease, shyness, obesity, possibly a psychopath's pathology), and the things people wouldn't change even if they could at zero cost (being offended by racism, being offended by pictures of Mohammed, caring about other people). That's why I don't find that disease is a very good analogy.
Some features of diseases are applicable to this situation - most aren't, but if any of the features it does have recommend a treatment like social pressure, then 'disease' is a good enough analogy.
(For the record, I don't think disease is a good analogy. The closest this situation comes to being a disease is that we don't want them to have it; they want to keep it.)
This is an interesting thread.
Here's a difference between the British-salmon and Muslim-Mohammed scenarios.
In the British scenario, you've postulated that the British politely ask the rest of the world to refrain from waving photos of salmon in their faces.
In the Muslim scenario, the ultra-religious are DEMANDING that the rest of the world obey their edicts on what is appropriate to draw.
I personally feel a very visceral reaction when I'm told that I'm not allowed to draw/write about/think about something. "Who are you," I think, "to presume to tell me what I can and can't express? Just who do you think you are that you get to have that sort of control over my expressions?"
My gut instinct then, is to write/draw/think about/talk about that forbidden thing.
It's the difference between a suggestion and a command. Were the Muslim community to say something like, "Ok, do as you please, but for the sake of civility, we hope you'll refrain from exposing us to the images of Mohammed you might create," you know, I'd probably say sure, ok. That's civilized. But to say, "You may not, UNDER THREAT OF DEATH, make any images or jokes about X," that's just too dictatorial for me to accept, on any level.
Is that justified though? Suppose a subset of British go about demanding restriction on salmon image production. Would that justify you going out of your way to promote the production of such images, making them more likely to be seen by the subset not making such demands?
We don't have to suppose. This has happened in recent history. When a small group of british people turn hostile and violent for a specific cause, the media services and the population decry their actions, and the British government invariably arrests them. Thatnks to football hooligans, riots, the IRA, 7/7, and its nanny state system of CCTV cameras, the UK is actually quite good at this sort of thing.
In comparison the islamic world tends to take a 'boys will be boys' attitude to this kind of thing. While I appreciate the utility of avoiding words like 'blaim' and 'fault' it's kinda hard when the 'victims' are not only indirectly supporting terrorism but actively egging them on.
That might depend on whether it discouraged the salmon extremists from making such demands.
The above looks like a standard least convenient possible world adjustment; and the original post was already trying for a scenario like that, so I'm not sure why it was downvoted.
The question of why we experience that visceral revulsion at attempted control of our private thoughts and expressions is a fascinating one. I could try to attack it with introspection, but I'd like to see some experiments if anybody knows of relevant studies.
It makes game-theoretical sense. People who aren't willing to kick in a bit of extra vitriol when somebody touches their private thinky-parts tend to get violated and modified until that willingness increases.
What would you think of Brits who could have their electrodes removed, but preferred to leave them in?
Personally, it would reduce my interest in being careful with salmon pictures.
What if they claimed to experience benefits from the implants? For example, they might cure certain neurological conditions.
Would you then expect them to remove the implants or be jolted?
Precisely.
To say religion is not a choice would be to imply someone is being forced into it against their will. If it is against their will, surely their offence over blasphemy is insincere?
By the same line of argument that we shouldn't slander one particular long-dead paedophile warlord because he has a legion of sycophants at his metaphorical feet, we shouldn't slander a large number of other people who have a similar following and will take the same offence. So when someone says something not-so-nice about Nick Griffin, or draws a funny cartoon of him, is it not just as bad?
Yes. Say the Brits had put the electrodes in their own brains and built up a tradition of shocking themselves if others produced and published drawings of King Arthur.
To me, that seems closer to what the muslims in question are doing.
And people would be a lot less sympathetic with my Brits than Yvain's, for good reason.
Maybe so. And I'm a very thick skinned person. But if a thin skinned person takes offense when a thick skinned person intends none, then isn't it fair to say that the thin-skinned person isn't modeling the other very well either?
In your prescriptions for how to deal with this I don't see any consideration of the possibility that the offended could grow thicker skin. I really think this would be the most efficient protection of the offended from such offense in at least some cases, and perhaps in most cases.
If a person literally had thin skin such that he was vulnerable to being wounded by contact with rough surfaces it would be more efficient for him to put on protective clothing than to modify his entire environment.
Only if you understand my taking offense to mean that I'm inferring that you meant to offend me. If I understand perfectly well that you meant no offense and I'm offended anyway, it's possible I'm modeling you very well.
Efficiency in this context has to do with the ratio of costs to benefits, so how efficient that is presumably depends on the costs of growing that skin, which I expect varies among people and subjects.
That said, the cost to me of other people doing the work of not being offended by my actions is of course extremely low, which makes that strategy maximally efficient for me.
Sure, but as someone whose skin has become a lot thicker over time I see the primary benefit of that change is to me. I didn't require the cooperation of offenders to experience less pain.
With little further ongoing effort I'm now largely immune to what many experience as a world of hurt. For the rest of my life. Seems efficient to me. I think it was a lot easier than retraining the world to be less offensive to me.
Yes, growing a thicker skin might be very difficult for some, but most people can make very productive headway. This appears to have been overlooked by Yvain.
Fair enough.
I certainly agree that in cases where "growing a thicker skin" (which I understand to mean self-modifying to be less offended by a given act) is relatively cheap, it's worth considering.
Yes, that's what I mean. And "relatively cheap" has to factor in the benefit of all of the pain you avoid for the rest of your life by thickening your skin, not just the cost of modification of the "offender".
There's a lot of win on that table.
Sociopathy 101: the best response in this situation is usually to admit wrongdoing. If you try and defend yourself, you'll just dig yourself into a bigger hole. ("I'm not a racist, I just think ... " - we all know how that sounds). You don't need to actually believe you've done wrong, but make it at least sound like you've realised the error of your ways.
You still need to avoid a big status hit, so don't grovel. You should stay "on-message", and your message should be on the lines of "I'm sorry, I didn't realise I was being offensive, but I accept that I was. Thanks for helping me to be less prejudiced. I'm going to try and change in future". How you deliver this message depends on context - if you're not a public figure it's not like you can just hold a press conference, so you'll probably have to deliver this message to individuals, in which case you'll have to make it sound more personalised and natural.
Accepting a small status hit in this way can actually be high status. This strategy also works in the more general situation whenever someone accuses you of being X, where X is some negative trait. Ignore the overwhelming desire to explain why you are not X, with reasons. It will just make it sound like you don't "get it". Even if the criticism is totally invalid, the correct response is to accept it and promise to change.
Exceptions: if you think people will agree that your infraction was minor and the other party is overreacting (especially if they keep throwing new accusations at you after you accept the first), you can (and should) stand up for yourself.
If your infraction was very serious, or you've overused this tactic to the point people realise your tricks, it can backfire badly. I don't really know what to advise you in this situation, but you might need to accept some more-than-token punishment.
I'll add to this that if I want to avoid the "backfire" scenario, one useful technique is to be seen as actually changing the behavior that I promised to change.
The period over which the changed behavior must be sustained in order to placate suspicious observers depends significantly on how suspicious they are, so it's often best to do this before I notice them becoming overtly suspicious... that is, to establish a habit of following up my promise to change my behavior with an actual change in my behavior.
agree. To some extent, this all shows the best way to have a good reputation is to be good. But some awareness of how others perceive you goes a long way.
Why don't you use the terms European and Middle Easterner? Christianity as a religion is about as racially diverse as one can get and the same is true of Islam. Imagining a generic "average" global Christian insulting a generic "average" global Muslim and terming that racist makes little sense.
The charge of racism wouldn't be used by a Sudanese or PC minded Kenyan against a Christian Kenyan. In the context of Europe this is employed because of the inter-ethnic conflict present below the surface.
This is a very Eurocentric way of thinking (not saying its appropriate or inappropriate according to my values). I hope that after some careful thought it will be obvious to most LWers why this is so. Virtual cookie to the first one that gets it right.
In Fued based cultures attacking arbitrary members of an out-group in response to violence by a member of said out-group against one of yours is indeed an appropriate response.
(This is why I'm glad I don't live in a feud based culture.)
Enjoy your virtual cookie.
There is another way to view this... And I think it would be fair to point out that the basic popular arguiment for "draw Mohammed day" is behind it. Suppose you are subject to a law you consider unfair. Suppose many other people are as well. If you have the possibility of public collective action that makes the consistent enforcement of such a law impossible. Why not take it?
You might quibble that drawing Mohamed isn't illegal (though in some countries hate speech laws can be used to ban it, since Koran burnings have been punished), but this is a bit irrelevant. If there exist widely known formalized rules with organizations dedicated to punishing offenders, what difference does it make if the rules are formalized in a code of law or religious book? Indeed the distinction between the two is no where near universal to begin with. And what difference does it make if they are enforced for everyone not by my government but another state's or perhaps by a non-governmental organization?
The organization enforcing the rule and the popular will to enforce it are likley to erode. If every week a cartoonist draws Mohamed will Muslims bother to riot every week? Humans are lazy. What was once outrages can simply through repetition become a unsightly "feature" of those accursed infidels, much smaller in emotional affect and its impact on punishing a specific offender. It might become part of a wider motivation to act against the West in a organized fashion ... but the West has historically been pretty good at using organized violence.
Now you might ask why do they consider the law unjust and worth fighting?
Simple. Arguing for the enforcement of the law is enemy attire. Having the law upheld gives the other group a "privilege" (a form of protection we don't have because we've given it up in the past) and indicates high status for them.
There are also more moderate (and westernized) Muslims whose feelings are hurt when they see a deliberate attempt to offend Muslims, even if they wouldn't be particularly mind if they encountered a drawing of Mohammed in say a history book or even a cartoon also featuring Buddha, Jesus, Jehova etc. Many probably wouldn't mind if drawing Mohammed and burning the Qur'an were forbidden, but wouldn't go out of their way to make that happen.
I agree. In essence, drawing Mohammed is civil disobedience.
Because people who take their religion and its taboos seriously are low status in the West.
Mind projection fallacy: We assume most Muslims don't take their religion seriously like most Christians or Jews don't. We see them using a technicality to claim offence where there is none in order to control us or display dominance over our tribe.
They aren't part of our tribe. And worse they belong to a culturally powerful, demographically ascendant and politically threatening tribe.
Another thing I find interesting is that such a argument would never be set up using the example of piss Christ or a desecrated Talmud. I think the reason such a argument is employed using the Muslims as an example is because we quietly accept that Christians, Hindus, Shintoist and Jews are very unlikely to retaliate with violence compared to Muslims. We hide this so it seems that we are arguing about general principles but we are actually arguing about this specific situation based on appeal to consequences.
Note: I don't think this is the case with this LW article but I do think it is the case with many other ones available in the media and on-line.
PS: Excellent article! The debate it provoked is very much intriguing. Upvoted.
Interestingly, I have seen (less well-written) versions of this argument used for anti-Christian blasphemy, including "Piss Christ".
I live in Ireland, which is known for it's strong Catholic values. So ... yup, this seems to fit with your theory.
I noticed Tim Minchin wisely omitted the Pope song from his lineup when visiting Ireland.
:)
Several times you seem to equate speech or illustration with a punch in the face. They don't seem interchangeable to me. The American founding fathers made a strong case for protecting speech, they argued that people should be able to say what they would without fear of violence in return. I'm pretty sure they never contemplated that face punching should be protected. I see the a bright line between the two behaviors.
Some of the people passing around pictures of Mohammed surely mean to insult. Others are demanding that a bright line between speech and physical harm be observed by all. They are appealing to more reasonable muslims to "police their area" and part of the plan is draw out the muslims who need policing.
I'm not defending that as an optimal plan but I sure think the bright line is a swell idea.
The whole point of Yvain's post was to call that bright line into question on consequentialist grounds. You may very well disagree, but you should engage with the arguments more than "they don't seem interchangeable to me".
To hold that speech is interchangeable with violence is to hold that a bullet can be the appropriate answer to an argument.
I wouldn't consider a picture of Muhammad to be an "argument", would you?
But the argument here is going the other way - less permissive, not more. The equivalent analogy would be:
To hold that speech is interchangeable with violence is to hold that certain forms of speech are no more an appropriate answer than a bullet.
The issue at stake is why. Why is speech OK, but a punch not? Presumably because one causes physical pain and the other not. So, in Yvain's salmon situation, when such speech does now cause pain should we treat it the same or different from violence? Why or why not? What then about other forms of mental torment, such as emotional pain, hurt feelings or offence? There are times I've had my feelings hurt by mere words that frankly, I'd have gladly exchanged for a kicking, so mere intensity doesn't seem the relevant criteria. So what is, and why is it justified?
To just repeat "violence is different from speech" is to duck the issue, because you haven't answered this why question, which was the whole point of bringing it up.
No, I'm defending a bright line which Yvain would obliterate. If they are interchangeable it follows that answering an argument with a bullet may be the efficient solution.
So which to which argument would you prefer a bullet?
The brits are feeling the pain of a real physical assault, under the skin. That's not mental torment, it's electrodes.
A crucial difference is that we can change our minds about what offends us but we cannot choose not to respond to electrodes in the brain and we cannot choose not to bleed when pierced by a bullet.
It is not my comprehensive answer but I think it is a sufficient answer. They are not interchangeable. Many words would have hurt me deeply 15 years ago but hardly any can now because I've changed my mind about them. It is within my power to feel zero pain from anything you might say. People really can change their minds to take less offense if they want to. They cant choose to not be harmed by a punch or a bullet.
Different.
That's clearly not the case. If they're interchangable, it merely means they'd be equally appropriate, but that doesn't say anything about their absolute appropriateness level. If neither are appropriate responses, that's just as interchangable as both being appropriate - and it's clearly that more restrictive route being advocated here (ie. moving such speech into the bullet category, rather than moving the bullet category into the region of such speech).
So what distinguishes that from emotional pain? It's all electrochemistry in the end after all. Would things change if it were extreme emotional torment being inflicted by pictures of salmon, rather than pain receptors being stimulated? Eg. inducing an state equivalent to clinical depression, or the feeling of having been dumped by a loved-one. I don't see an inherent reason to treat these differently - there are occassions where I'd gladly have traded such feelings for a kick in the nuts, so from a utlitarian perspective they seem to be at least as bad.
The intensity in this case is obviously different - offence vs depression is obviously a big difference, so it may be fine to say that one's OK and the other not because it falls into a tolerable level - but that certainly moves away from the notion of a bright line towards a grey continuum.
This is a better argument (indeed it's one brought up by the post). I'm not sure it's entirely valid though, for the reasons Yvain gave there. We can't entirely choose what hurts us without a much better control over our emotional state than I, at least, posess. If I were brought up in a society where this was the ultimate taboo, I don't think I could simply choose not to be, anymore than I could choose to be offended by them now. You say "It is within my power to feel zero pain from anything you might say", but I'll tell you, it's not within mine. That may be a failing, but it's one shared by billions. Further, I'm not sure it would be justified to go around insulting random strangers on the grounds that they can choose to take no harm, which suggests to me that offending is certainly not morally neutral.
Personally, I think one answer we could give to why the situations are different is a more pragmatic one. Accept that causing offence is indeed a bad action, but that it's justified collateral damage in support of a more important goal. Ie. free speech is important enough that we need to establish that even trying to prevent it will be met by an indescriminate backlash doing the exact opposite. (Though there are also pragmatic grounds to oppose this, such that it's manipulable by rabble-rousers for political ends).
I don't understand this... the notion of a "more restrictive route" doesn't seem to make much of a difference to the objection - the suggested move involves placing a certain type of speech act into the realm of "bullets", and as such makes bullets an appropriate response to such acts, whereas they were not before. Is that right?
Edit: That is, if speech B is now equivalent to shooting someone, it's not a case of "harmless speech A can now be responded to with bullets or B," but of "speech B can now be responded to with bullets."
Ah, I think I've misunderstood you - I thought you were talking about the initiating act (ie. that it was as appropriate to initiate shooting someone as to insult them), whereas you're talking about the response to the act: that bullets are an appropriate response to bullets, therefore if interchangable, they're an appropriate response to speech too. However, I don't think you can take the first part of that as given - many (including me) would disagree that bullets are an appropriate response to bullets, but rather that they're only an appropriate response to the specific case of averting an immediate threat (ie. shoot if it prevents killing, but oppose applying the death penalty once out of danger), and some pacifists may disagree even with violence to prevent other violence.
However, it seems that it's the initiating act that's the issue here: is it any more justified to causing offence as to shoot someone. I think it could be argued that they are equivalent issues, though of lesser intensity (ie. back to continuums, not bright lines).
I'm only interjecting, if there is a misunderstanding, it's probably with jtk3. For my part I think the positions being argued are much clearer now, thank you!
Any for which the consequences of the alternatives are less desirable than the consequences of a bullet. Such situations are rare but not unheard-of in practice, though it's not hard to come up with hypotheticals to demonstrate this.
What would you say to someone who replied "Many punches would have hurt me deeply 15 years ago but hardly any can now because I've studied martial arts. It is within my power to feel zero pain from any blow you might deliver. People really can change their physical capabilities to take less physical pain if they want to."?
A series of physical blows can endanger a person's life and, even more probably, incapacitate them for a prolonged period or permanently by breaking a bone, rupturing an internal organ, and the like. For this reason, a physical assault must be taken very seriously.
If an action proximally causes psychological suffering, that does not make the action, merely for that reason alone, wrong in the slightest. Suffering of the sort caused by speech is caused by disappointment of our desires, and we typically do not have an inherent right to have the desires in question fulfilled. If we suffer, there are two causes of our suffering: (a) that we desired a certain state of affairs, and (b) that our desire was thwarted. Someone who is insulted, desired to be treated with respect, and his desire was thwarted. Someone who has been rejected romantically, similarly, desired acceptance, and his desire was thwarted. In neither of these cases did the person have any right to get what he desired. That he suffered on account of his disappointment does not in the slightest increase his right to get what he wanted. If it did increase his right, then a person could thereby gain the right to anything he wanted merely by wanting it very very much. Rights would then be assigned to whoever could throw the most impressive temper tantrum.
I would like to second this and more generally point out that I am bothered by the focus on pain rather than damage from physical assaults. Of course, this is not LCPW; we can talk about attacks that are primarily about pain rather than damage, e.g. slapping someone. I just think we should be explicit about doing so.
I agree, or at least close enough, with all of that. But none of it is unique to psychological suffering.
For example, diseases caused by airborne pathogens can cause physical suffering. They can endanger a person's life, incapacitate them for a prolonged period or permanently, and I therefore endorse taking them seriously. However, if someone's immune system is so compromised that they cannot be around other people without becoming extremely ill, they don't thereby gain the right to go wherever they like and have everyone else leave.
If your goal is to argue that suffering doesn't give me the right to get what I want, I'm right there with you... but you don't need to draw an artificial bright line between physically mediated suffering and psychologically mediated suffering in order to achieve that goal.
I'm not sure about that. Let's look at the example.
This is true. But the obvious explanation is this: a person who is harmed may have harmed himself. He may be to blame. So it's not that there isn't any harm in the first place, but merely that he may be to blame for any harm that results to himself. Someone with a compromised immune system who goes out in public has only himself to blame if he's infected.
In contrast, someone whose desires are disappointed hasn't typically been harmed to begin with. That's where it typically stops. It doesn't rise to the level of identifying a culprit, because there isn't anything to be a culprit about, because no harm has been done.
If someone knowingly exposes himself to the possibility of infection, we typically think such a person deserves an Honorary Darwin Award and the ridicule that goes with it (with occasional exceptions, e.g. if he is being heroic). But if somebody deliberately exposes himself to disappointment - well, what's so terrible about that? That only means that he's shooting for the stars, etc. Usually it's the people who avoid disappointment by never striving for anything that we think are approaching life the wrong way.
As far as I know, not even the Muslims who threaten the lives of artists who depict Mohammed are interpreting their own feelings of disappointment as a harm. They don't seem to be interested in their own psychological state. They seem to be interested in the act of depiction itself, which they evidently believe they have a right and a religious duty to stop. I am talking specifically here about those who threatened artists for depicting Mohammed.
From Wikipedia:
That doesn't seem particularly interested in the psychological suffering caused by the depiction of Mohammed. It's focused on the depiction itself, which is called "stupid". The word is not "hurtful", but "stupid". There is scant expressed interest here in the speaker's own psychological state.
Okay, so we agree on that, and that's a pretty important point. Maybe everything else is just splitting hairs.
This isn't entirely accurate. The thwarting of a desire may be required for suffering, but it isn't sufficient. One must also have an attachment to the object of desire - a belief that one should have the desire fulfilled, or that something bad will result if it is not.
Desire and attachment are commonly conflated, but they are distinct. One can have attachment without desire, and desire without attachment.
Sounds like a Buddhist analysis.
Because I stole the word "attachment" from them, yes. But really, it's a matter of affective asynchrony -- i.e., the ability to have mixed feelings.
Human motivational emotions aren't a single scale, where disutility is subtracted from utility to yield an output value. Instead, they're points on a plane, where utility and disutility are axes, and certain co-ordinates are unreachable.
So, it's possible to have things whose absence causes pain, but whose presence doesn't cause any pleasure (aka "satisficers"), and things whose presence creates pleasure, but whose absence doesn't cause any pain. (Among other possible combinations.)
The "axes" for these things seem relatively independently programmable - that is, you can usually remove an "attachment" (conditioned displeasure) without affecting the "desire". (I've never tried the reverse.)
(Also, this is still a bit of a simplification, since "desire" is kind of vague -- we have things we feel driven to do, but which don't provide us any pleasure, and things which provide us pleasure, but which we don't feel driven to do. Human beings are seriously f'd up in the head. ;-) )
Yes, but also one that does a good job of describing certain situations.
For example: Alicorn has recently moved in with me. We have what should be a very agreeable situation when it comes to keeping the house clean: I don't care and strongly prefer not to clean; Alicorn cares slightly more and doesn't mind cleaning; we each clean only to the degree that we feel like cleaning or want the house to be clean, and so far that's actually working quite well. (The fact that normal fairness is mostly not relevant here probably helps, though Alicorn and I being unusually compatible as roommates go may be a larger factor.)
However, I was raised with the idea that people will care about cleanliness to a degree that will cause them to consider the usual state of our living space unacceptable. This is not something I desire, but it is a thought to which I am attached, and as a result I find it mildly stressful to ignore that in favor of reality - I find myself worrying about whether it's really okay, or if Alicorn is just putting up with it and will eventually start complaining, or silly things like that. It's relatively minor in this case - I trust Alicorn enough in the relevant ways that I don't really think she thinks those things - but if I were more predisposed to that kind of worry I could certainly see it turning into a significant source of discomfort even in the face of evidence. (And yes, I'm working on it. She's only been here two and a half months and it's already significantly better than it was.)
There is play there, but the ability to your ability to change your body is really not remotely close to your ability to change your mind.
It seems to follow that the "bright line" between physical and psychological harm is a quantitative difference.
More precisely, it's not that people are able to "choose not to be harmed" by psychological influences but unable to do so for physical ones, but rather that people are more able to choose not to be harmed by psychological than physical influences.
Based on that I conclude that the important factor here is how much ability the sufferer has to protect themselves from suffering, and what the cost to them of doing so would be. Whether the suffering is physical or psychological or neither is at best a stand-in for that; it is not important in and of itself.
Obliterating the "bright line" you want to draw here (as you claim yvain does) and replacing it with a consideration for ability to protect oneself does not justify "answering an argument with a bullet."
Sure, if in a particular case we're for some reason unable to come up with a better estimate of how much ability the sufferer had to protect themselves, we can select a prior based on a clumsy metric like "you can protect yourself from psychological harm but not physical harm."
For example, if I know nothing more about a particular conflict than that person A was talking to person B and person B shot person A in response, I have a pretty high confidence that person B reacted inappropriately.
But I don't have to embrace a misleading sharp line between physical and psychological harm in order to reach that conclusion.
But what it it's one person A who is committed to drawing cartoons which offend a billion muslims. He flatly refuses to stop over an extended period of time. Eventually one (or more) of them kills A..
Did the killer(s) act inappropriately in this case? It looks efficient under Yvain's calculus, doesn't it?
So, I'll emphasize that the point that you quote was tangential to this, and had to do with the implications of reasoning under conditions of incomplete information.
But, to answer your question: I don't endorse murder as an appropriate response to offense.
Why not? Well, one simple reason is that I would rather live in a culture where people offend one another without recourse than a culture where people kill one another without sanction over idiosyncratic grounds for offense, were those the only choices (which, of course, they aren't).
That said, if you could convince me that no, actually, we'd all be better off if we established the cultural convention that killing people for drawing offensive cartoons was acceptable, I would (reluctantly) change my position. I can't imagine how you could actually convince me of that in the real world, though.
Moreover, it seems to me that this sort of consequentialist reasoning for what is and is not an appropriate response is entirely consistent with Yvain's post, and I don't expect that he will disagree with my conclusion. (Though I'd be interested if he did.)
And, just to be clear about this, the difference between physical and psychological harm that you started out arguing the importance of is completely orthogonal to my reasoning here. If instead of killing A, the hypothetical muslims put A in a sensory-deprivation tank until A goes irreversibly mad, my answer doesn't significantly change. (Does yours?)
Digressing a little... note that when the grounds for offense are sufficiently endorsed by the mainstream culture, we have a way of no longer calling it "murder"... or, if we do, we create special categories to distinguish it from, you know, real murder. For example, there exist municipalities where, if I walk in on my wife having sex with another man and kill him in response, this is considered different from if I walk in on my wife serving ice cream and kill him in response... and this is completely independent of my personal feelings about sex and ice cream.
Conversely, when an act offends enough of us, or offends powerful enough individuals, we often criminalize it... whereupon we respond to it by deputizing state agents to forcibly restrain the person and deprive them of safety, comfort, and liberty (and, in extreme cases, life).
All of which is to say that this business of responding to "merely psychological" offenses with "physical" retaliation is not solely the province of putative extremists from a different culture than my own. Not that you were stating otherwise, but I often find it helpful to explicitly remind myself of that.
I think this is very nicely put, and is sort of what I was thinking when I commented, but couldn't articulate. Thanks!
Would you be willing to support/expand on that claim further? I have low confidence since I haven't spent a whole lot of time thinking about it, but this runs counter to my intuition.
Actually, I think you're wrong about this. Pretending to be angry, offended, or sad has the effect of making one angry, offended, or sad, in my experience. Not as much as you pretend, at least at first, but it really can become genuine, even if you actually don't care about salmon at all, as long as you choose to pretend convincingly enough.
[Edit: ...but I see Vladimir M has already made this point, better.]
I'm not sure that this is clear to most non-Muslims. In fact, I think that if you took a survey of Westerner non-Muslims, you'd find that they expect that Muslims more likely to (actually rather than ritually) be offended by such pictures are also more likely to send death threats.
See, this is exactly where your analogy falls apart for me. The Muslims to whose behavior people are objecting in "everybody draw Muhammad" are not politely asking for the favor of avoiding creating images of Muhammad in future. They are approaching creators of existing images with serious threats of violence. In situations like the South Park incident, it seems quite distinct from the infliction of psychic pain in that - well, to blow another hole in the salmon analogy, does it mean that Americans should stop making television programs about how to cook salmon? So... yeah.
A bit of a side note, but from what I've read/heard from Muslims, what they object to isn't the drawing of Mohammed per se, but the mocking of Mohammed. I've also heard some express annoyance that the media would misrepresent their view as if the problem was a religious edict against drawing Mohammed and not the mocking (I don't think the media represents the views of Muslims any more faithfully than it represents the views of Singularitarians).
If you're American want a better idea of how Muslims feel, imagine if for some reason Chinese people had a national "draw Martin Luther King with big lips eating watermelon" day. Would the reactions be very different?
Empirically this isn't the case. See e.g.the initial cartoon for Everyone Draw Muhammad day which resulted in the artist having to go into hiding from the death threats.
Also if you look at the relevant Wikipedia talk pages, there are almost daily Muslims showing up demanding that we remove all pictures of Muhammad. In another instance, at one college, the Muslim students were sufficiently offended by smiling stick figures labeled Muhammad that they added "Ali" after each so they would instead say they were Muhammad Ali. There might be some moderates claiming to only be offended by mockery, but it seems pretty clear that there are a lot of Muslims who are offended by any attempted depiction.
I agree a lot of Muslims seem to be offended by any depiction of Mohammed - as I said to Vladimir, I was talking of those I have some experience with, i.e. French speaking (which tends to be biased towards the more educated and westernized).
(And come on, the bit about adding "Ali" was a funny and appropriate response, no ? :) )
It was a lot better and more humorous than other responses. But that point was that they were still offended enough to take that action. (Note also by the way that since this occurred at a major college campus this is presumably some of the more educated and Westernized Muslims).
I find it very normal that they took action - the purpose of the whole "Everybody draw Mohammed day" thing is to annoy Muslims, so a Muslim encountering a drawing of Mohammed in that context (as opposed to in a history book etc.) knows it's purpose is to offend him or someone like him. Even if he doesn't mind the actual drawing, he knows about the intent behind the drawing.
That doesn't make sense because the cartoons weren't actually mocking Mohammed. Have you seen them?
This one and this one are.
These seem more accusatory than mocking.
But surely you see that if Muslims get angry about those pictures, it's not only because they think visual representations of Mohammed are bad?
A lot of people around the world and in the United States hate the United States and make no secret of it, so we don't need to imagine. The very fact that you didn't talk about actual American reactions to the actually expressed loathing for the United States (by mockery of cherished American symbols among other means) suggests that you already intuit that the reaction of the average American to the very visible seething hatred for the US does not give us much of an idea of how Muslims feel.
If you are not aware of the seething hatred for the US, which I think is possible if you live in the US and limit yourself to American mainstream media, it is not because the hatred is not inherently visible - it is, for example by appearing on the covers of major European magazines - but because Americans don't magnify its visibility within the US by obsessing about it in their own publications. In contrast, the visibility of the notorious cartoons of Mohammed is almost entirely an effect of the extreme reaction to it on the part of many Muslims.
But the US parallel is not even close to the best parallel. Islam isn't a country, it's a religion, so a much better parallel would be to Andres Serrano's Piss Christ, which mocks Jesus Christ, or Chris Ofili's Holy Virgin Mary, which mocks the mother of Jesus Christ. As far as I know neither of these artists were murdered by a Christian, as the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was murdered by a Muslim. The Christian reaction to these artistic provocations was massively more muted than the Muslim reaction to the Mohammed cartoons.
I'm well aware of anti-Americanism (I'm French) - I've heard my dad cheer when hearing of the death of American soldiers in Iraq, a Chinese student say that he approved of the 9-11 attacks because of America's support for Taiwan, etc.
(It's funny you mention the Piss Christ; it was exposed in Avignon (here in France) and yesterday a group of catholics forced their way into the exposition, neutralized a guard and vandalized the photograph with a hammer. A far cry from Theo Van Gogh, I agree, but still not a completely pacifist response.)
What, you think Americans would react by rioting and killing people?
No, but neither would the brits in the Salmon Scenario. And I don't think "exposure therapy" would work any better for Martin Luther King caricatures than it would with Mohammed caricatures.
Actually in this particular example I can imagine there being some violence against Chinese Americans and perhaps some disorders, thought not full blown riots. Under worse economic conditions perhaps even this is not out of the picture.
As far as I know, there are significant differences in this regard between different Islamic denominations, sects, schools, and folk practices, but many Muslims consider even respectful portrayal of Mohammed as unacceptable because it constitutes idolatry. Basically, anyone wishing to portray Mohammed is in a Catch-22 situation: if it's done in a spirit of veneration, it's idolatry, and otherwise it's mocking and disrespectful.
Oh, I agree that representing Mohammed is generally forbidden in Islam, it's just that when I looked for what the Muslims themselves were saying (on forums mostly frequented by Muslims), they were talking about how it wasn't right to mock Mohammed, not Mohammed, and they were also complaining about how the media would represent their position (even though some Mulsims do try to pressure the west on any depiction of Mohammed), and they were also complaining about violent fundamentalist hicks giving their religion a bad name.
Rereading my post, it can be interpreted as saying that all Muslims take that position (mocking not good, but no big objection to just drawing Muslims), which would explain the downvotes.
I think they have more to do with your false-to-fact comparison with a potential American analog.
I never claimed it was a perfect analogy - I still think it's a better one than the Salmon Pictures.
How would you personally feel about a national "draw Martin Luther King with big lips eating watermelon" day, done by foreigners? I don't expect you'd go out and burn stuff, but I also expect you'd prefer it didn't happen (if this doesn't apply to you you, it probably does to quite a few Americans on this site, I don't even know if you're American). I mean, I tend to be a pro-free-speech bullet biter, but I wouldn't like it.
And many of the arguments that have been made (here or elswewhere) about Everybody Draw Mohammed Day could be made about that too.
Well you're right about that at least.
That's precisely the point.
Well, after the US Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Westboro Baptist Church's right to free speech, all the major newspapers ran editorials supporting the decision. In fact, this blog post argues that its easier to support free speech for extreme groups like the WBC since you get free warm fuzzies for supporting free speech without having to worry that they'll actually persuade anybody.
Yvain's salmon analogy has drawn some criticism. I have to agree that it is not a perfect analogy. Analogies rarely are perfect. The best course, I find, is to offer a choice of analogies and let people choose the one with the most resonance. Pick one from this list:
Photoshop the Queen with a salmon day. We don't need to surgically alter the Brits. Just have a bit of fun with their national symbol. If insulting the Queen doesn't work, try Lady Di.
Tell an ethnic joke day. Stereotyping can be funny and is never physically harmful. If an ethnic group is capable of making fun of itself, then everyone should be able to make fun of them. It is all just in fun.
Use a bad word day. Isn't it ridiculous that people get offended at the use of certain four letter words - particularly those denoting body parts or normal biological functions. Isn't it clever to make people angry when they are unable to justify their anger rationally?
Let it all hang out day. And some people are offended not just by hearing about body parts, but also by seeing them. The occasional practice of public nudism (weather permitting) will help to make the world a better, less neurotic, place.
Use racial epithets day. Sticks and stones can break your bones, but words can never hurt you. Some people, though, don't seem to realize this. It is time to confront their irrational viewpoint that speech should not be completely free.
Desecrate a religious symbol day. Don't draw Mohammed - he already has a day. Instead, burn a Torah, feed a sacremental host to rats, pull the pins out of a voodoo doll. Lets show some imagination here. What can we do in Delhi to a sacred cow? Catapults can be fun.
Piss in someone's vegetable garden day. Some people have the uninformed impression that human urine is unsanitary. Not true, it is actually a sterile medium. People in India sometimes consume small quantities of their own urine much as people in the West drink herbal teas. Its time to dispell this anti-urine superstition.
Barbecue a cat day. Confront dietary prejudices head on, and also lend a hand to the Humane Society in addressing the cat overpopulation problem. Actually killing and butchering the cats publicly provides a more vivid demonstration. And as an added benefit, leading people to care less about kittens will make the internet a more productive environment and may even increase contributions to the SIAI.
I have to admit that if I actually encountered one of the protests on this list in real life, my initial reaction would be amusement. Repetition might change that to annoyance. But only one of those ideas actually offends me. Which one? I won't tell. YMMV.
A quick search shows that (the being most likely to be identified with the label) Lady Di is already dead.
People can still become offended by insults aimed at a deceased person, under certain circumstances. Perhaps confusingly, the intent wouldn't be to offend the Queen / Lady Di!
I don't see what's wrong with any of those.
Don't have Break a paperclip day. Or Unbend a paperclip day. Or Frivolously waste metal day.
What if I credibly believe that the long-term consequence of endorsing "unbend a paperclip day" will be that large numbers of contrarians will start to increasingly value properly-bent paperclips, resulting in more properly-bent paperclips existing in the long run?
You would be using incorrect reasoning.
With the exception of evicting the pisser from your garden I'd say none of these actions justifies a violent response. As a believer in the value of free speech I defend them all even if I would not choose to participate in them.
Healthy urine is sterile. Unhealthy urine may not be. (To say nothing of the desirability of adulterating others' food with even the most harmless additives - I don't want mint oil on my vegetables, even though I'm certain it won't do me physical harm. I don't like the taste of mint.)
Also, large quantities of nitrogen in one spot (overfertilisation) can mess up a garden.
But it's barbecue a cat day that really offends me, since (unlike vegetables) cats have feelings too.
Cat overpopulation is an actual problem, gobs of cats are put down by the Humane Society every day. I don't know what they do with their dead cats, but I find wasting perfectly usable meat and tissue more offensive than the proposed barbecue.
FWIW, I am both a cat owner and a vegetarian.
I was not under the impression that cats tasted good.
That's a good point. However, the danger with a cat BBQ is that people develop a taste for them and, rather than eating the leftovers from the Humane Society, breed their own for good flavour. In fact, I pretty much guarantee that, should Barbecue-a-Cat-Day ever catch on (and be celebrated in earnest), then this will indeed happen.
I wonder if more or fewer people would adopt cats if the cats would otherwise be barbecued.
That is a ridiculously sensible proposal, and I feel silly for not having thought of it myself.
Are you a vegetarian?
Mostly. I could go into detail if you care.
All of the above days seem quite fun and fine to me.
As for the original article point - I agree that there isn't any significant difference between the hypothetical British salmon case and Mohammad's case, but it this fact doesn't change anything. There isn't a right to never be offended. There is no duty to abstain from offending others. It's nice if others are nice, but you can't demand everybody to be nice - most of them will be indifferent, and some will be not nice, and you just have to live with it and deal with it without using violence - and if you don't know how to handle it without violence, then you are still a 'child' in that sense and have to learn proper reaction, so everybody can (and probably should) provoke you until you learn to deal with it.
Well said! It is shameful that many folks' response to this is that we need to punish those who act to offend. Those who enforce and enable the unreasonable standard of a right to not be offended are at blame.
There was a time when Christians frequently did kill each other over seemingly minor religious differences. The wars of religion led to a backlash that eventually gave us the political theories of Hobbes, Locke etc. When people talk about the need for a reformation in Islam, they are really thinking of the period after those wars which we accept as normal.
I was going to link to Bryan Caplan on applying the Coase theorem to offense, but turned out I confused him with Alex Tabarrok on envy. He does extend his analysis to offense though.
I do recall Robin Hanson debating with Bryan Caplan and saying that it is a utilitarian best outcome for the majority of believers not to be subjected to atheist speech. I normally assume Caplan is wrong in any disagreement with Hanson, but there I lean more towards his free speech absolutism. That may be because my behaviorist leanings lead me to discount claims of psychic distress (or utility monsters) to zero. On the other hand, I don't value the ability to make atheist polemics all that highly and would be open to "make a deal" along those lines, though I'd be upset if the deal was made without my consent.
The Volokh Conspiracy often discusses the heckler's veto.
The premise of your essay is deeply flawed... SOME Muslims are offended by depictions of Mohammed. OTHERS are not and see a looser standard as part of a generally more tolerant and functional environment in which to worship.
So if you were to refine your premise a bit and more strongly acknowledge the struggles WITHIN Islam, the decision of how the "rest of the world" ought to behave starts to get rather murky. Cultural is probably way more permeable than we all at first imagine.
I'm afraid you've tripped up on a stereotype whereby "Muslims" march lock-step in antipathy to "everyone else"
The premise of the essay is not flawed. In fact, your criticism could be completely addressed by appending "some" in front of every instance of "Muslim" in the essay. You should get into the habit of always appending "some" in front of every generalisation anyone ever makes.
While a generalisation is technically for all x, x has property y and can be falsified with a single example this x has property z which is opposite of y, our best model of how generalisations work in the human brain is something more along the lines of for enough x that it matters, x has property y. Also, a narrowing of x to only those x that have property y.
So to actually address the premise of Yvain's post, you'd want something more like "This characterisation isn't even close to what most Muslims are like. This behaviour is exhibited by fundamentalists, who in most cases are disowned by Muslim communities in the same way that most Baptists would disown Jerry Falwell. Because the people you are dealing with are fundamentalists, several of the assumptions made in the post fall down: this, this, and this." And so on.
I think people are implicitly confusing two levels of thinking.
Level 1 thinking is "drawing Mohammed is bad", "people who get offended at drawings of Mohammed are silly", "we should punish them", etc. I think most people on this forum are beyond this sort of thinking.
Level 2 thinking is about status, evo-psych and harm minimization.
Problems occur when you mix the levels of thinking. You end up with "People who get offended at pictures of Mohammed are genuinely offended but they're still doing it for status reasons, so they're bad people and we should punish them by drawing lots of Mohammeds".
Think of Draw A Mohammed Day. It's the exact opposite of a good idea. Its organizers incur a status hit - they make America look like dicks - and they commit the massive strategic failure of letting their opponents frame the debate. And then on top of that they create some disutility by offending people.
A much more effective approach would be to think of a game-theoretic strategy which would win the status game (or at least stop others winning by ramping up the display of being offended).
I'll concede that some sort of game-theoretic "punishment" may be needed to disincentivize the "getting offended" behaviour. But that punishment doesn't have to be in the form of more offense. It can be to make the opponent look silly. It can be to portray him as a violent thug who flips out over nothing (though this is not to be preferred as it will tend to incur a "racism" status hit).
And once you've got a good strategy for playing the status game, you can then try and tune it to remove as much offense-disutility as possible.
I believe this is called the "Rage Boy" meme. But the actual person who is depicted in the "Rage Boy" meme is apparently a torture victim and demonstration organizer, not a killer.
I think this is a winning strategy. They are easily made to look like dicks - and then their opponents either embark on what could be easily represented as a murderous rampage, or renege on their threat. Either option is a bigger status hit for the opponent.
These are good points. I was just curious as to why the conversation wasn't framed as "accept that offense is a type of harm; now let's discuss the winning strategy"
Probably because most commentors weren't aware that their response to the situation was a case of what the algorithm feels like from inside. They determined a winning move, but in status games (and bargaining Schelling style) an unreasonable or irrational attachment to a winning move is much more effective than selecting that move because it's the best.
Of the motivations described above, I think this is the closest, but still not quite accurate. The point of Everybody Draw Muhammad Day, as I saw it anyhow, wasn't to show that violence and terrorism are inappropriate responses, but that they are ineffective responses. It isn't about teaching Muslims not to threaten others, but teaching others to defy threats of censorship. It's a group exercise in defying threats of violence; it's one of those "the pen is mightier than the sword" things.
Another modern event dealing with the preservation of freedom of speech is Banned Books Week, which celebrates defiance against censorship, especially in libraries and schools. It's an event that celebrates your right to read Huckleberry Finn, Lolita, Slaughterhouse-Five, or Heather Has Two Mommies by encouraging people to read books that have been, in one context or another, banned or threatened with being banned.
Is Banned Books Week offensive to people who think these books should be banned, and that encouraging people to read them is evil? Yes, in fact it is.
I basically agree. The point is to show would-be intimidators that we will not be intimidated. The point is to resist those would would impose an unjust law.
" if British people politely asked this favor of them"
The problem is that the Muslims are not asking nicely. Fundamentally, this is no different from civil disobedience.
Well, "the Muslims" don't do anything at all. Individual people do. Some of them do violence; others do peaceful protest; others write letters-to-the-editor and blog posts.
As Eliezer said way back here, and as many other advocates of the Enlightenment have said before: "Bad argument gets counterargument. Does not get bullet. Never. Never ever never for ever."
The Enlightenment difference is not between "the Muslims" and "the West", or any other sectarian difference. It is between those who respond to bad argument with bullet, and those who do not.
It seems to me that on the whole Islam was a lot less fully engaged with the Enlightenment than Christianity.
Put another way, Christianity got it's balls cut off and Islam didn't. A lot of muslims are aware of this and recognize the Enlightenment as bent on cutting the balls off their religion. And they're right about that.
"Well, 'the Muslims' don't do anything at all. Individual people do"
I disagree, sometimes people act in concert. For example, it's reasonable to say that the US invaded Afghanistan even though at another level, it was a few hundred thousand soldiers, all wearing the same uniform, who did so.
To be sure, "Muslims" is a significantly less coherent group than the US. However, there seems to be reasonably broad consensus among Muslim leadership that their principle -- that Koran burning should be seen as a crime -- is more important than the Western principle that it should not be so.
In any event, your point is a bit of a side point since the original post speaks of "British People" in the same group-oriented way. Reasonable people reading the original post will understand the phrase "British people asked politely" to mean some consensus of British leadership. I was referring to "Muslims" in the same way.
And sometimes people coerce or trick other people into supporting them or identifying with them. I'm in the US, and pay taxes to the US government, but I didn't invade Afghanistan. Joe Storeowner may pay "protection money" to the New York Mafia, but Joe didn't have a gang war with the New Jersey Mafia. Yet from the point of view of a Mafia historian, "New York had a war with New Jersey" and Joe's opinion is irrelevant; he is merely a citizen of the New York Mafia's territory.
The original thought-experiment asked us to imagine that all British people suffered from salmon-phobia. This assumes a level of distinction that in real life, we would regard as a fallacy — because in the thought-experiment world, we could truly say that if someone wasn't offended by salmon, that proved they weren't British.
In other words, in the world of the thought-experiment, the "no true Scotsman" fallacy is not a fallacy at all, but defined to be true.
I don't think the original thought experiment would change much if the aliens only hacked 85% of British people chosen at random rather than every single one.
"I'm in the US, and pay taxes to the US government, but I didn't invade Afghanistan."
I agree, that's exactly the point. When I said that "Muslims are not asking nicely," I was not referring to every last Muslim.
"The original thought-experiment asked us to imagine that all British people suffered from salmon-phobia. This assumes a level of distinction that in real life, we would regard as a fallacy"
Agree, the original thought experiment would be more accurate if British people had the same sort of general feeling about fish which Muslims have about Koran-burning.
And in that case, my original point still stands.
There are commenters who note that the use of "ey" and other gender neutral pronouns hurts their head. You may understand this and still use "ey" as part of a larger attempt to accustom people to language that is ultimately more convenient, even if it's worse in the short run. Which is a perfect example of what I was going to say:
When you do your harm minimization calculation, you really need to include the entire path over time, and not just the snapshot. It is often true that hurting people today makes them stronger in the future, resulting in a better outcome. It could be, for instance, that gay marriage today offends more people more deeply than it benefits, but that by pushing for its spread, many of the formerly offended people end up desensitized to it (see also any number of past civil rights issues). Or, if by showing the Brits enough pictures of salmon we could actually desensitize them to the pain, in the long run we may all be better off.
A big difference between the salmon and mohammed example is that you built into the first that Brits can't adapt to the pain. But some people may be imagining a future, better world where everyone has free speech and nobody has a problem with it. And they imagine that the way to get there is by exercising that freedom now, even if it's bad in the short run.
Personally, my feeling is that retaining offendability on some topics can easily confer benefits, but I am sympathetic to people who have not realized this, and I can understand why they would feel some compunction to wave their free speech rights in the faces of others, without necessarily being "bad" people.
I'm sure you don't actually have any confusion here, but I feel compelled to point out that you kind of did that thing where you only expect a member of Minority X to be offended by *ism against Minority X, where in fact everyone should join in sharing the offense caused by it, because that's just part of being a decent person.
(I probably wouldn't have mentioned this but for the fact that we're having a meta-discussion about how offense works!)
Yvain didn't write "considered offensive by women". He wrote "to", which only very weakly implies the idea you criticize and can be charitably read as saying no such thing.
I see, thanks. I was thinking of "to" as just being the other direction of "by", but you can interpret it as more like "towards" and then it's all good.
Oh, I bet it's because the previous sentence was "When someone draws Mohammed, it is considered offensive to Muslims.", and that one seemed like a straightforward "no-one except Muslims is being offended by this" mapping, which was then extended to cover sexism.
I think this an excellent scheme for thinking about the issue because it really does help draw together different intuitions onto the same field in a way where we can imagine useful evaluations.
One issue which may create fractures in reasoning is that the alien brain implant is somewhat different than other psychological reactions. At least when I first interpret the mechanism, the brain implant would not attenuate with time. The idea of "thicker skin" is bound up with growing one, allowing our responses to offensiveness attenuate from "my god, how awful" to "whyd do people think that's funny".
I think this leads to an important objection: if we could, through photographic salmon exposure* attenuate the pain until it no longer is actually felt, we would object much less to showing salmonitypes to Brits. Indeed, we may perceive that they have a duty to therest of us, even on general utility grounds, to attenuate their impulse.
I don't think this is an unreasonable objection and it meshes well with our other general moral commands. Children, for example, no doubt are greatly harmed by not getting what they want but we perceive a need for adults not to remain shrill 8 year olds and cultivate some serenity in this regard. (In fact, I had a conversation interrupted just tonight when the table next to mine began making a scene about salad prices, with obvious disutility to the tables around them.)
So I think this is a critical difference which should be addressed as it is not unreasonable to believe, at least from the muted reactions in the first world, that these feelings can attenuate with socialization or small personal effort.
*If this is not the name of a band, it should be.
This is an interesting post, but Yvain, your made-up pronouns hurt my head. Every time I come to one it disrupts my reading flow and feels like my train of thought crashes into a brick wall. It genuinely makes the post more difficult and less pleasant to read for me. Couldn't you just flip a coin for each new character you reference and give them male or female pronouns based on that?
I always use "one" as an indefinite pronoun, similar to how I would do it in German. Is that wrong?
or
From what I've heard, these days there are attempts to condemn man in German as sexist.
In English, I also like using "one" but it's often too clumsy. As for those "ey" and "eir" pronouns, I find them not just extremely ugly, but also a very annoying obstruction while reading.
Is it worth working to eliminate that negative reaction?
For what it's worth, alternate pronouns don't bother me. I don't love them-- I've never wanted to use alternate pronouns-- but I just treat them like new vocabulary in science fiction (deduce meaning from context) and proceed.
Is that what that was? I had assumed that the text had been copied from some typesetting system that made a 'th' ligature glyph which didn't survive the copying process.
I actually stopped noticing it pretty quickly. That's what comes from reading a lot of poorly OCRed ebooks.
True (because it is pronounced the same way as "Mann"), but what can we do about such problems? It seems that using "made up" pronouns until they are integrated is the most natural way of fixing the problem?
You could also work around the problem though, but it requires some effort:
versus
Or you simply use "an agent" so that you can use "it"...
In the grammars of Slavic languages, including my native one (Croatian), grammatical gender is so pervasive that it would be altogether impossible to speak without using the masculine gender as the default. For example, in the past tense even verbs have gender, so if you want to ask, say, "who was that?", you have to say "who masculine-was that?" Asking "who feminine-was that?" is ungrammatical, even if the answer is certain to be female. There are countless such situations where you simply have to accept that the male subsumes the female to be able to speak at all.
Therefore, when someone claims that using masculine by default is evil, he (hah!) is thereby claiming that my native language is evil, and irreparably so. Should I get offended?
(shrug) "Evil" confuses the issue.
Just to get away from the politics around real-world examples, suppose I speak a language that genders its verbs based on the height of the object -- that is, there are separate markings for above-average height, below-average height, and average height.
It's an empirical question whether, if I'm figuring out who to hire for a job, asking the question "Whom should we tall-hire?" makes me more likely to hire a tall person than asking "Whom should we short-hire?" If it's true, it is; evil doesn't enter into it under most understandings of evil. It's just a fact about the language and about cognitive biases.
If the best available candidate for the job happens to be tall, but I ask myself whom I should short-hire, the way I'm talking about the job introduces bias into my hiring process that makes me less likely to hire the best available candidate. This also isn't evil, but it's a mistake.
If my language's rules are such that this height-based gender-marking is non-optional, then this mistake is non-optional. My native language is, in that case, irreparably bias-ridden in this way.
Suppose I want to hire the best candidates. What can I do then?
Well, one thing I might do is deliberately alternate among "short-hire," "tall-hire," and "average-hire" in my speech, so as to reduce the systematic bias introduced by my choice of verb. Of course, if my language forces me to use "short-hire" for an unspecified-height target, then doing that is ungrammatical.
Another option is to make up a new way of speaking about hiring... perhaps borrow the equivalent verb from another language, or make up new words, so I can ask "whom should I hire?" without using a height-based gender marking at all. But maybe, inconveniently, my language is such that foreign loan verbs must also be marked in this way.
A third option is to systematically train myself so I am no longer subject to the selection bias that naive speakers of my language demonstrate. But there are opportunity costs associated with that training process, and maybe I don't want to bother.
Ultimately, what I do will depend on how important speaking grammatically is to me, how important hiring optimal employees is, and so forth. If I lose significant status or clarity by speaking ungrammatically, I may prefer to hire suboptimal employees.
Should I get offended if someone points that out? Again, it depends on my goals. If I want to improve my ability to choose the best available candidate, then getting offended in that case is counter-productive. If I want to defend my choice to speak traditionally, then getting offended works reasonably well.
My above comment was made in a bit of jest, as I hope is clear. Still, some people do make a deep moral issue over "sexist" language, and insofar as they do, moral condemnation of much more heavily gendered languages than English is an inevitable logical consequence.
Regarding the supposed biases arising due to gendered language, do you think that they exist to a significant degree in practice? While it's not a watertight argument to the contrary, I still think it's significant that, to my knowledge, nobody has ever demonstrated any cross-cultural correlation between gender-related norms and customs and the linguistic role of gender. (For what that's worth, of all Indo-European languages, the old I-E gender system has been most thoroughly lost in Persian, which doesn't even have the he-she distinction.)
Also, when I reflect on my own native language and the all-pervasive use of masculine as the default gender, I honestly can't imagine any plausible concrete examples of biases analogous to your hypothetical example with height. Of course, I may be biased in this regard myself.
I agree that some people do treat as moral failings many practices that, to my mind, are better treated as mistakes.
I also think that some people react to that by defending practices that, to my mind, are better treated as mistakes.
I'm not sure.
One way I might approach the question is to teach an experimental subject some new words to denote new roles, and then have the subjects select people to fill those roles based on resumes. By manipulating the genderedness of the name used for the role (e.g., "farner," "farness," or "farnist") and the nominal sex of the candidate (e.g., male or female), we could determine what effect an X-gendered term had on the odds of choosing a Y-sexed candidate.
I have no idea if that study has been performed.
So, for example, would I expect English-speakers (on average) selecting a candidate for the role of "farness" to select a female candidate more often than for the role of "farner"?
Yes, I think so. Probably not a huge difference, though. Call it a 65% confidence for a statistically significant difference.
What's your estimate? (Or, if you'd rather operationalize the question differently, go for it.)
I was going to write a more detailed reply, but seeing the literature cited in the book linked by Conchis, I should probably read up on the topic before expressing any further opinions. It could be that I'm underestimating the magnitude of such effects.
That said, one huge difficulty with issues of prejudice and discrimination in general is that what looks like a bias caused by malice, ignorance, or unconscious error is often in fact an instance of accurate statistical discrimination. Rational statistical discrimination is usually very hard to disentangle from various factors that supposedly trigger irrational biases, since all kinds of non-obvious correlations might be lurking everywhere. At the same time, a supposed finding of a factor that triggers irrational bias is a valuable and publishable result for people researching such things, so before I accept any of these findings, I'll have to give them a careful look.
Agreed that attribution of things like malice, ignorance, error, and bias to people is tricky... much as with evil, earlier.
This is why I reframed your original question (asking me whether I thought gendered language introduced bias to a significant degree) in a more operational form, actually.
In any case, though, I endorse holding off on expressing opinions while one gathers data (for all that I don't seem to do it very much myself).
My understanding of the relevant research* is that it's a fairly consistent finding that masculine generics (a) do cause people to imagine men rather than women, and (b) that this can have negative effects ranging from impaired recall, comprehension, and self-esteem in women, to reducing female job applications. (Some of these negative effects have also been established for men from feminine generics as well, which favours using they/them/their rather than she/her as replacements.)
* There's an overview of some of this here (from p.26).
I wonder if they tested whether individuals suffer similar negative effects from plural generics.
Sometimes I wonder why it's called "grammatical gender" at all, when it so often has no connection to actual gender whatsoever. In your example, there's no gender information transferred at all! It may as well be called "grammatical colour" or "grammatical arbitrary class".
On the other hand, you'd be lucky to be able to exert enough control on convention to make "he" into that kind of word.
Although I agree it's odd, it does in fact seem that there is gender information transferred / inferred from grammatical gender.
From Lera Boroditsky's Edge piece
As it turns out, that's exactly the original meaning of the word "gender" -- of which the French translation is genre.
Well, that's interesting, although it still doesn't explain - or rather, justify - the use of the words masculine and feminine for a distinction that has nothing to do with sex. You'd just end up with people getting confused by the words and thinking words like feminine-was have genders or something (whatever it even means for a string of phonemes to have a gender).
The Chinese and Japanese character for "sex" (as in, which reproductive organs you have) can also be translated as "a quality" or "nature": 性 is the same character used for "nature" in the expression "Buddha-nature", i.e. "the characteristic quality of a Buddha". The concept could possibly also be expressed as "distinction", as in the limerick of the young lady from Exeter; or as "difference" as in the French expression "Vive la différence" ("Long live the difference" between men and women).
The concept of "grammatical gender" in linguistics is often taken to be a specialization of the more general concept of "noun class". Some languages, particularly African languages closer to the likely point of origin of human language, grammatically distinguish a large number of different noun classes, for particular kinds of things. Some European languages make a distinction between animate and inanimate nouns, but most preserve only the distinction between masculine and feminine nouns.
This may be taken as indicating that as human languages continually diversify and mix in human societies, that the distinctions which are preserved are those which human societies find the most significant: distinctions of sex. Which isn't surprising, since humans do need language to talk about and perform mate selection, where (for almost all humans) sex is highly significant.
English does not express grammatical gender on nouns in general, as French or German do. Indeed, even remaining feminizing suffixes such as -ess are falling out of use: uses such as "poetess" and "authoress" are now seen as dated (and sexist), and even "actress" is obsolescent. However, like other Indo-European languages (but unlike the Finno-Ugric languages, or many East Asian languages) English retains gendered pronouns.
It is not at all clear that removing gender from pronouns is a step in the direction of a less sexist society. Japanese does not use gendered pronouns except for intimate relations; but few would assert that Japan had perfect sexual equality. Sweden is often identified as a society with an unusually high level of sexual equality; but Swedish has gendered pronouns. However, deliberately using gender-neutral pronouns in English draws attention to the gender distinction, and implicitly asks, "Why are we making this distinction here, when we're not doing mate selection right now?"
Only partially true: the Japanese language has differently gendered versions of "I". Pronouns for "you" are indeed generally reserved for intimate relations, and third person pronouns don't seem to exist at all, as far as I can tell.
It's generally correct in English to use "one" as an indefinite pronoun, but it's not common casual usage and is not easy to do smoothly.
Though I would nevertheless consider it preferable every time to using made-up pronouns. Singular "they" generally works more smoothly than either alternative.
Another option would be to use "they".
Are the effects of the alien practical joke curable?
I think the crucial difference between the salmon/Brit and the drawings/Muslims is form-invariance, which is present in the latter, but not the former.
The Muslims in question don't merely say, "Hey, don't draw pictures that have the form of Muhammad." They say, "Don't express any critique coupled to our offense at that narrow part of artspace." (including, e.g., Drawing an anonymous stick figure and saying, "I call that Muhammad ... is that enough to offend you, or does it have to ...?")
In contrast, there are workarounds in the Brit/salmon case that allow one to reference salmon anywhere and everywhere -- even right in front of Brits! -- without triggering their hardwired response:
Heck, the Brit-requested prohibition would ever permit you to (incorrectly) argue that the kind of mod the aliens did is impossible.
Yet Muslims expect all of the analog activities to cease.
Now, you can revise the situation to force consideration of the least-convenient possible world, but then you'd be constructing a scenario in which the aliens implant strong AI that can identify every possible kind of salmon reference. But at that point, you're no longer talking about Brits at all, but beings with a different identity, which reduces your dilemma to "Brits are killed and replaced with robots. What else would start to suck about that situation?" Er, the problem was the identity deletion, and any further harm pales in comparison.
I think you can connect the dots from here: there is a difference between expecting others to restrict the manner in which they do something, vs. whether they do it at all. Indeed, even the Americans you criticize have no problem with time/place/manner restrictions of free speech: e.g. "Sure you can say a candidate's great, but not through spam, and not by blasting an airhorn at 3am."
In the case of your alien-hacked British, they would notice their mass modification and be able to search for a cause. They would be able to scan their own brains and see the electrodes that were implanted by aliens. The idea of repudiating their new emotional reactions would be cognitively accessible, and this would inflect much of their behavior and the politics around the phenomenon.
Even as they outlawed pictures of salmon, they could (for example) put time limits on the laws, fund medical research into safe electrode removal, and make efforts to ensure that their foolish emotional reactions weren't memetically passed on into subsequent generations.
In the case of Muslims, there are no electrodes, and no hope of removing the electrodes. The material cause of their psychological situation is thus distinct and raises many of the issues from the diseased thinking essay. In practice, the people with the relevant emotional reaction were brought into being by cultural practices that include a philosophic endorsement of their over-reactions. The religious leaders benefit from the installation of this craziness in their followers by cultivating and directing the emotions it produces. People in their culture will publicly praise high fidelity memetic transmission of the emotional reactions and so the craziness can be expected to propagate like something living instead of receding like an injury healed by the passage of time.
The emotional reactions of Muslims to sacrilegious symbols are woven into their identities, and thus in some ways deserve more respect than the alien-hacked British with "photofishophobia", but in other ways they seem to me to deserve less respect.
Communities potentially have self-regulating agency over time. If a community has chosen to cultivate bad values over years and centuries (and partially succeeded in this project) , then the thing that gives them the most respect as self-regulating humans is to disrespect their poor regulatory choices.
Absent free will I don't understand why you'd be more critical the supposed offending parties than the offended ones.
Some people born and raised in America who freely take up Islam in adulthood and proceed to take offense at such things as pictures of Mohammed which they previously would not have taken offense at. One may not directly choose to take such offense but it's a consequence of choices and one may choose otherwise.
Out of a billion muslims I'd bet there are many who are not deeply offended when outsiders print such pictures. The choice to take less offense is there.
Growing up I had a strong and deeply ingrained aversion to homosexuality. I could feel physically ill at the description or depiction of men kissing, for instance. The aversion was so strong that I identified it as an instinctive part of my nature. Over time however I chose to discount the aversion. I was able to do so. Presumably you would not have thought gays should have refrained from acts which offended me.
I'm confident muslims are also capable of discounting irrational beliefs. If one didn't think people could do this then what would be the point of lesswrong?
I think the central issue here gets folded into the "utility/disutility" distinction, which makes it easy to miss. The current thing with drawing Mohammed is probably best seen as a sort of culture war between East and West - we value free speech, they do not. The opening salvo was political cartoons in a Danish newspaper. If the opening salvo had been posting similar cartoons on the side of a Mosque, the West would look a lot worse.
Generally, though, targeted offensive behaviour - racial slurs, drawing Mohammed on churches, forcing very religious people to view hardcore pornography - is of virtually no social value and the offender suffers very little from having to avoid doing it.
Conversely, untargeted offensive behaviour - the Klansmen getting upset over seeing an interracial couple - tends to be much more expensive for the offender to avoid, so the appropriate solution is for the offended person to stop being offended.
How hard something is to avoid is obviously a bit fuzzy. It seems it can break down into "intended to harm" versus "not specifically intended to harm." The Mohammed cartoons are mostly in the latter category, as they were intended as a political criticism of a religion.
In other words, I think this is more of a debate over where the utility calculus should come out, because "offense" describes such a broad range.
Can you point to an example where that actually happened? The vastly more frequent occurrence is of religious people objecting to the mere existence of pornography.
This?
In all seriousness, it's a hypothetical example. If it is something that happens, it's not going to make the news, or probably even the interweb. I'm thinking of something like the scene in Clerks where a customer at a store expresses offense at an extremely lewd conversation the employees are having, to which an employee responds, "If you think that's offensive, look at this!" and shows him the spread in the porn mag he's holding.
This kind of little thing probably does actually happen, but I agree that general objections to the existence of pornography are more common, and they fall cleanly into the other category.
This strikes me as a bad analogy. Seeing pictures of Mohammed is only offensive to Muslims because of their conviction in a poorly evidenced falsehood, whereas punching someone in the face is an offense regardless of what they believe. I think that a more apt comparison would be holding communion wafers hostage in order to offend Catholics.
If I thought that actions like these would discourage people from taking offense due to falsehoods, I would consider that to be a strong argument in their favor, but I don't see that they're actually doing much aside from fueling persecution complexes and feeding conflict.
How's this for a metaphor: suppose I thought my mother had died in the Holocaust, when in fact she'd escaped the Holocaust without incident and simply lost contact with me. Someone makes Nazi jokes around me, or says that everyone who died in the Holocaust deserved it and went to Hell, or something equally offensive.
Suppose my interlocutor knows that my mother did not die in the Holocaust, and knows that if I believed my mother didn't die in the Holocaust I wouldn't be offended by what ey's saying. Ey also knows that since I do believe my mother died in the Holocaust, I definitely will be offended.
Even in this situation - in which I am only suffering because I have a false belief, and for reasons directly related to that false belief - I still think my interlocutor is very much in the wrong.
You wouldn't be suffering only because you had a false belief, another reason would be that you weren't sufficiently thick skinned to decline to be offended.
At this point I would ask myself "Of what consequence is this person's opinion to me"? And I'd instantly conclude: None.
To cause me real pain a statement would have to be justified in my own judgment.
Your interlucotur clearly wouldn't be behaving nicely and would clearly be pushing for some confrontation - but does it mean that it is wrong or not allowed? This feels the same as if (s)he simply and directly called you a jackass in your face - it is an insult and potentially hostile, but it's clearly legal and 'allowed'; there are often quite understandable valid reasons to (re)act in such a way against someone, and it wouldn't really be an excuse in a murder trial (and the original problem does involve murders as reaction to perceived insults).
I don't think this is completely true. Speaking as a former Orthodox Jew, the idea of someone desecrating a Torah scroll fills with me with deep emotional pain even though I know that there's nothing at all holy or sacred about it. Once that sort of offense becomes ingrained it is very hard to remove even when one understands that it isn't based on any actual part of reality.
Someone damaging physical artifacts of one's religion is a reasonable thing to make into a Schelling point. That's quite different from someone creating media that is counter to your religion.
Sure, we can make that distinction (and there are other possible distinctions). I was merely making my remark in the context of Derstopa's claim that the offense is that strongly tied to the actual belief.
I don't think this offense is without any basis in reality. If someone goes around desecrating Torahs, you would be completely rational to conclude that he probably has an issue with Jews in general and feel threatened. Even if you no longer believe in Judaism, and even if you no longer identify as a Jew, this doesn't mean that Jew-haters will leave you off the hook. You may disown your religious, ethnic, or tribal affiliations, but this doesn't mean others will stop perceiving and treating you as still bound by them. (As many found out the hard way in Germany in the 1930s, to give only the most dramatic example.)
To get back to the question from the original post, this also implies that it may be rational for Muslims to sense hostility and feel threatened by people who go around committing blasphemy according to their norms, and similar for every other religion. However, it still doesn't mean that every feeling of offense is a legitimate response to hostility -- as with any human interaction where interests clash, we see a complicated interplay of signaling, Schellingian strategy, and dancing around focal points looking for ways to move them in a favorable direction. Of course, things also depend on the more explicit relations of power, wealth, status, alliances, etc. between the parties involved.
The error of the original post is to assume that these complex and highly situation-dependent questions can be analyzed with a naive consequentialist approach, but it would also be an error to simply reverse its conclusion. In different situations when offense is felt and expressed, many different scenarios may be taking place.
Particularly when the 'blasphemy' is committed for the express purpose of committing blasphemy. By contrast, a Jehovah's Witness considers it blasphemy when someone salutes a flag, but probably realizes that every act of reverence for a flag is not done for the express purpose of offending the JWs.
Here's a possible litmus test: how would you feel about another former Orthodox Jew desecrating a Torah scroll as a symbol of eir change in belief.
Just to bring in the real world, I've never heard of an ex-Orthodox Jew desecrating a Torah to symbolize their break with the religion. I have heard of them eating emphatically non-kosher food.
Interesting. I seem to have the same flinch effect JoshuaZ described, despite believing that religion in general and Judaism in particular are great evils of the world which separated my family from me.
Can you tell how much of that flinch is because it's the Torah specifically, and how much is just because it's a book period?
"Okay, so there's a run-away train bearing down on a copy of 'Godel, Escher, Bach', and a really fat copy of the Torah standing at the edge of a cliff above the track. You are standing behind the Torah, and it's immediately clear to you that if you push it, it will fall on the tracks, stopping the train and saving the copy of GEB..."
Personally, I once found the B volume of some encyclopedia on top of a mountain while hiking, and carried it home through a thunder storm, even though I certainly wasn't expecting me or anybody else to ever actually read it.
A Torah scroll isn't the same thing as a book. It's hand-written on parchment, and it's a long rectangle (rather than on pages) wrapped around rollers. It will probably have an ornamented cover, and more ornaments on the ends of the rollers.
Simchat Torah is an annual holiday at the end of the cycle of reading it in which the scrolls are paraded around the synagogue. "On each occasion, when the ark is opened, all the worshippers leave their seats to dance and sing with all the Torah scrolls in a joyous celebration that often lasts for several hours and more." I have to admit things weren't that exuberant at the synagogue my family went to.
If a Torah is too worn out to be used, it is buried in a Jewish cemetery.
So we aren't just talking about reactions to a book being damaged. though they may certainly be part of what's going on.
One thing that's occurring to me is that you really can't make reliable guesses about the details of religions you aren't familiar with.
Oh right, I actually remember that thing about the 'book funeral' and all. They do the same thing in Sikhism with their own super special book, the... whichamacallit... ah yes, the "Sri Guru Granth Sahib".
In fact, it's so similar that it leads me to suspect that there are some details about unfamiliar religions that you should be able to make reliable guesses about :P
Anyway, the 'flinch' could still be produced for secular reasons. Not only is the 'preserve books' thing in force, but also the 'preserve works of art' thing.
I mean, I definitely flinch at the thought of someone desecrating a Torah or an Adi Granth (different, shorter name), and that's certainly not due to a religious upbringing or any ingrained respect for it. I mean, I'd even forgotten about the 'book funeral' stuff with the Torah, and had to google to double check the spelling of the Adi Granth.
And it's not even that I'm worried about offending adherents. I'd feel the same way if all religions were extinct and the books just museum material (what a wonderful world!).
I guess it's just a flinch towards violently/hatefully wrecking things in general. So the idea of some deconvert burning one copy of a mass market paperback of their former holy book in some sort of secular ceremony, peacefully symbolizing that they're personally moving on, not intending to uselessly provoke anyone... that shouldn't bother me. And I don't think it does.
Hm. I think it's fair to say that I would probably be about equally reluctant to wreck any other artwork containing an equal amount of painstaking effort.
(Whew!)
Yeah, I second that "whew!" I was afraid for a second there that I might be a secret jewish sikh, and I have a feeling that would be complicated.
I see it more in terms of economic value. A Torah is worth about as much as as a new Honda Civic at the low end and a luxury car at the high end. I would be reluctant to wreck anything worth $20,000 - $60,000... presumably the owner of said material object is going to be upset. And if you are the owner, why are you blowing up your own car? You'd almost always make a better statement by selling your Torah/car and giving the money to charity.
Edit: You can get a refurb Torah for only $9,500! o.0 http://www.ahuva.com/prod-Sefer_Torah_Scroll-1279.aspx
I think i have some further interesting datapoints to add here: I feel I'd flinch away from unbending a papperclip or disturbing a prime numbered heap of pebbles, much more strongly than before reading the LW material where those were used as examples.
I'm so glad I'm not the only one.
Edit: Although now that I think about this, I feel this much more strongly about paperclips than heaps of pebbles. This is probably because of the more long-term influence of interacting with User:Clippy.
That's an interesting test. My background (never belief, exactly) is Conservative (that is, intermediate between Orthodox and Reform), and that scenario makes me queasy. My first thought was that it represents a level of rage which I'm not comfortable with (and this isn't totally nonsense), but I do find it more distressing than imagining an ex-Christian doing the same to a Christian bible, even a hand-lettered bible.
It's interesting that you find a hypothetical Torah scroll desecration to be indicative of rage. Before I lost my Jewish faith I, too, would have associated Torah-desecration with villainy and hate — partially because there were stories and legends about villainous Torah-desecrators, and partially because the Torah evoked such feelings of sanctity and purity that the idea of desecrating a Torah only made sense if there was rage or depravity involved. But of course, I can now easily imagine other emotions that would motivate hypothetical Torah desecrators, like trollishness.
I think it's more that I'm generally apt to underestimate the impulse to trollishness, though I do think it overlaps hate. Pissing people off for the lulz has something to do with malice towards those people, though I grant that rage has a lot of emotional intensity while trolling has some distance.
Wow, really? From an atheist background, to me I'm much more horrified by the thought of any unique hand-created book being burned than any printed thing for which there are endless copies.
Is the emotion the same if someone made a sufficiently detailed scan of it before they burnt it?
If it's detailed enough that sufficiently advanced technology could rebuild it indistinguishably, I'm happy. I'm curious how other people feel about this!
Er, Torah scrolls are hand-written. The scroll form is always made by a scribe, not printed.
I think you missed what ciphergoth was reacting to-- I said that I'd be more upset at a Torah scroll being destroyed than a hand-written Christian bible. This doesn't mean that I'd have no reaction to the Christian destroying a hand-written Christian bible.
What I was imagining for the hand-written bible was one without illustrations, but that probably wouldn't make any emotional difference for ciphergoth.
is enlightened thanks!
I think I'd still feel emotional unpleasantness although probably not as much as in the generic case. This suggests that Vladimir's concern is partially correct but that that's not the whole thing and some really is just residual emotional feelings. There's another side issue that may also be involved, in that the burning of books of any form or similar objects (such as scrolls) makes me deeply pained regardless. But that connects to what Vladimir M was talking about in that part of that deep pain is the historical connection between book burning and censorship.
"Another"? I assume this question is directed at Joshua Z. I am not a former Orthodox Jew, nor any other kind of Jew for that matter. I'm Catholic.
That said, as I wrote in my above comment, clearly the context of an offensive/blasphemous act or utterance matters a lot. As for the concrete scenario you list, I find it hard to imagine that a Jew who has left the religion would symbolically desecrate Torah -- the act has such a strong connotation of anti-Jewish pogroms that I'd imagine even a non-religious Jew would find it scary, almost like brandishing swastikas. That's my outsider's impression at least; I'd be curious to hear the opinion of someone more knowledgeable.
Yes, the question was for Joshua Z; I should have made that more clear.
Just out of curiosity, in what sense are you Catholic (heritage, culture, belief)? (No need to answer if you prefer not to.)
Well, legally, I am a Catholic in good standing (I'm baptized, and I've never renounced it nor been excommunicated). In my practices, I am largely lapsed, though I value the heritage, the art, the community, and the folkways a lot. As for beliefs, obviously there is a lot that doesn't stand up to rational scrutiny, though like in any long-standing tradition, many things that may seem irrational or backward are in fact closer to reality than various modern fashionable beliefs. (Clearly, a simple blog comment can't do justice to this topic.)
What I would point out however is that I often find the North American (presumably Protestant) attitudes in this regard quite alien and strange. What I mean is the tendency to see one's belonging to a church as an either-or matter, and breaking with it as a grand and dramatic event. Among Catholics, the normal thing to do is simply to adjust the level of your practices and your closeness to the community to whatever you find to your liking. (ETA: Though conversion to a different religion, as opposed to merely neglecting one's own, would be a big deal.)
I'd recommend Nick Szabo's essay Objective Versus Intersubjective Truth as a good first explanation of the topic.
Note: The website appears to be down at the moment, Google cache available here.
Any other recommendations in a vaguely similar vein? (I've already read Szabo's other stuff.)
Szabo's website is up as of May 4, 2012.
I assume you've read his blog as well. In that case there are several things I'd recommend. If you haven't read all of Paul Graham's essays, you should. There's also Walter Mead's essay of what he, rather anachronistically, calls the "Blue Social Model". He also talks about these ideas in more depth on his blog (along with all kinds of other stuff ETA: mostly on current events).
Also possibly John C Wright's blog if you're more interested in religious stuff.