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Kai-o-logos comments on A Problem with Human Intuition about Conventional Statistics: - Less Wrong
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Quite honestly, I think a bigger problem is theists assuming that P(E|D) = 100%. That given a deity or more exists, they automatically assume the world would turn out like this - I would actually argue the opposite, that the number is very low.
Even assuming an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God, he could have still, I argue at least, have made the choice to remove our free will "for our own good". Even if P(E|D) is high, in no way is it close to 100%.
Furthermore, you can never assume a 100% probability!!! (http://yudkowsky.net/rational/technical). You could go to rationalist hell for that!
Conditional probabilities are allowed to be 100%, because they are probability ratios. In particular, P(A|A) is 100% by definition.
But P(E|D) is not 100% by any definition. Conditional probabilities are only 100% if
D-->E. And if that was true, why does this argument exist?
The reason they are assuming P(E|D) = 100% is probably because they are only envisioning what one particular god would do, not the whole search space: they are asking "What would God do?" instead of "What would X percentage of the zillion possible gods in the search space do?" The hard part is getting them to realize that P(E|D) includes Zeus, Loki, and the FSM as well as Jehovah.