JoshuaZ comments on Is Kiryas Joel an Unhappy Place? - Less Wrong

20 Post author: gwern 23 April 2011 12:08AM

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Comment author: JoshuaZ 23 April 2011 12:37:19AM 18 points [-]

Kiryas Joel functions to some extent in a model much like the charedim in Israel, relying on the outside world to provide necessary economic infrastructure and support. The most relevant example paragraphs in that article are:

.Because the community typically votes as a bloc, it wields disproportionate political influence, which enables it to meet those challenges creatively. A luxurious 60-bed postnatal maternal care center was built with $10 million in state and federal grants

and

Most children attend religious schools, but transportation and textbooks are publicly financed. Several hundred handicapped students are educated by the village’s own public school district, which, because virtually all the students are poor and disabled, is eligible for sizable state and federal government grants.

I'm not sure their happiness is terribly relevant, even if they are happy, it is a deeply unsustainable situation.

I'm not sure that this is at all similar to Hanson's hypothetical. In his hypothetical the uploads don't have any rights or recourse. Here the people have political pull. The situation for uploads could be much worse.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 23 April 2011 03:31:39AM *  10 points [-]

I like to look at this as a vindication of efficient markets. As the Times reporter shrewdly remarks, democracy offers profit opportunities for groups that can coordinate to form disciplined voting blocks. The coordination problem here is very difficult, but we nevertheless see an example of a group that has solved it with amazing success, so that the profit opportunities are not left unexploited despite the collective action problem!

As for the unsustainability, well, a whole lot of high-status people live off rent-seeking these days, except that it tends to be couched in elaborate rationalizations and smug moralizing. The Kiryas Joel folks are just specializing in a form of rent-seeking where their culture gives them a strong competitive advantage (since it solves the coordination problem). If that source of income dried up, I have no doubt that they'd be smart and enterprising enough to come up with something else -- which might well be some productive work, as it probably would be even nowadays in a society where rent-seeking is harder and less lucrative.

(Besides, as the article suggests, the lack of social pathologies in their community means that they might not be such devourers of public funds after all, and they do some productive work, so the net balance isn't that clear.)

Comment author: JoshuaZ 23 April 2011 03:48:11AM 13 points [-]

. The Kiryas Joel folks are just specializing in a form of rent-seeking where their culture gives them a strong competitive advantage (since it solves the coordination problem). If that source of income dried up, I have no doubt that they'd be smart and enterprising enough to come up with something else -- which might well be some productive work, as it probably would be even nowadays in a society where rent-seeking is harder and less lucrative.

I don't think we're seeing anything that smart going on here. They are essentially just adopting that the MO the charedim use in Israel to the United States.

(Besides, as the article suggests, the lack of social pathologies in their community means that they might not be such devourers of public funds after all, and they do some productive work, so the net balance isn't that clear.)

The social pathology is there, it just is getting covered up and not addressed. Among the ultra-Orthodox there are terrible stigmas associated with mental illness for example. Similarly, spousal abuse is just not discussed. They try to cover up these issues since they can hurt status in the community and ruin the chances for arranged marriages. The evidence is that everything is underreported among the ultra-Orthodox, from eating disorders to child abuse. It is true that they aren't using up public resources when those events aren't reported, but that's a small comfort.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 23 April 2011 08:45:20PM *  7 points [-]

I don't think we're seeing anything that smart going on here. They are essentially just adopting that the MO the charedim use in Israel to the United States.

Well, yes, I don't think that their rabbis have studied The Encyclopedia of Public Choice and gleefully deduced an ingenious plan for hacking the American political system. However, even though their MO has had a complex and curious cultural evolution and draws on prior art from Israel, it works in both countries because the relevant aspects of their political systems are similar. It really is a workable plan for rent-seeking in any system that values disciplined voting blocks.

Also, do you think these ultra-Orthodox groups would not be able to adapt to participation in the regular economy if their sources of government support dried up? I have the impression that they would be able to adapt very well, and are presently just taking advantage of their exceptionally favorable position to take advantage of government support. However, I'm sure you know more about them than I do, so I'd be curious to hear what you think.

The social pathology is there, it just is getting covered up and not addressed.

Obviously, they don't live in a utopia; some pathologies are the inevitable lot of every human society. However, when it comes to those measures of social pathology that do vary a lot among different communities, most notably violent crime and breakdown of public order, it seems like they are doing exceptionally well.

Also, I should note that when it comes to some kinds of inevitable social pathologies, I have a very unfavorable view of the ways they are handled by modern institutions, so this could make me biased in favor of more traditional communities. But these are complex and difficult issues.

Comment author: JoshuaZ 24 April 2011 01:30:12AM *  8 points [-]

Also, do you think these ultra-Orthodox groups would not be able to adapt to participation in the regular economy if their sources of government support dried up? I have the impression that they would be able to adapt very well, and are presently just taking advantage of their exceptionally favorable position to take advantage of government support. However, I'm sure you know more about them than I do, so I'd be curious to hear what you think.

The short answer to this is I don't know. Over the last hundred years the ultra-orthodox have adopted a set of attitudes that has little in the way of historical precursors. Those attitudes include 1) a much more negative attitude towards secular schooling than existed previously and 2) an attitude that any line of work other than constant study of religious texts is bad 3) a strong aversion to interacting with people outside their own groups, even for business purposes. This makes it very difficult for them to do much other than this sort of rent-seeking behavior. However, in the other direction the more moderate end of the charedim have had some success getting jobs. A fair number are now doing work in IT or some actuarial jobs that minimize interaction with other people, and there are some lawyers as well. They actually have some advantages in that regard, in that the constant study of classical Jewish legal texts has trained their minds to think precisely given specific sets of constraints. But that's the moderate end of the ultra-Orthodox and you won't find almost any of them in a place like Kiryas Joel. Many people in places like Kiryas Joel consider such people to be borderline heretics.

Note that I'm glossing over here some complicating issues. The Kiryas Joel community is chassidic which is a proper subset, not a synomym, for ultra-orthodox. The specific group that controls Kiryas Joel and makes up the majority of the population are the Satmar chassidim, which are seen by many as more reactionary and conservative than most of the other chassidic sects or any non-chassidic charedi group. Moreover, the Satmars have had a complicated schism in the last few years which I don't understand in detail but my impression is that the less moderate faction is the one which ended up with control over Kiryas Joel, while the more moderate Satmars are in Williamsburg and Borough Park (which while largely Orthodox are both much more diverse areas among the Orthodox population than Kiryat Joel, and have some non-Orthodox population).

Comment author: Vladimir_M 24 April 2011 04:55:51AM 5 points [-]

Thanks for the answer! Looking at your comment and googling around a bit, it seems like I may have some significant misconceptions about various groups within the contemporary Judaism and their relations between each other and the wider world, especially on the Orthodox end of the spectrum. (For example, I just realized that my imagined Venn diagram of several of the groups you've mentioned was flawed.) Do you maybe know of some good book that has a comprehensive explanation of these divisions, preferably with reference to the historical context of their development, and also their ancestral geographic origins?

Comment author: JoshuaZ 24 April 2011 10:58:45PM *  10 points [-]

Do you maybe know of some good book that has a comprehensive explanation of these divisions, preferably with reference to the historical context of their development, and also their ancestral geographic origins?

Not really. As far as I'm aware most of the history books on this sort of thing are either books which focus on a specific group, or are books about the history of Jews from a very long time, and thus don't have as much focus on the last few hundred years when the modern divisions have arose. I've been told that Hayim Ben-Sasson's "A History of the Jewish People" is in general a good book written from a modern, scholarly perspective. It has a section on the modern era which should be good. I haven't read it myself though. I'm not aware of any book that focuses specifically on the chassidim which is what one would probably want. I suspect such books exist, but you can do a Google search as easily as I can, and I'm not going to be able to evaluate the books in any useful way.

However, the main divisions aren't that complicated to summarize, and one doesn't need much detail to have the context to follow things like New York Times articles about them. Data dump follows:

In the late 1700s, the Ba'al Shem Tov started the chassidic movement. The movement initially emphasized song, dance and prayer over religious study. This was a big deal because it gave the regular Jews, not just the bright scholars, something to do. The movement also had a strong mystical element and a focus on charismatic leaders. The movement quickly split into groups based on separate charismatic leaders whom the members would refer to as "Rebbe" (which literally means "my Rabbi"). The different groups were divided up by essentially geographic lines, and became named after the various cities where they were centered. Lubavitch had the Lubavitchers, Satu Mare had the Satmars, etc. A humorous aside is to note that the very late formed Boston chassidim are stuck with a very American sounding name; that is sometimes made up for by calling them "Bostoners" with a heavy Yiddish accent.

There was a strong reaction against chassidic movement which disrupted the pre-existing social norms, and power struggles. Moreover, there was perception (of some but not much justification) that the chassidim were ideological descendants of Sabbatai Zevi, an extremely disruptive individual who claimed to be the messiah about a hundred and fifty years before. The people against the chassidim were often called "misnagdim" from the Hebrew word for "against", and a complicating factor arose that some people used misnagid to mean non-chassic (and chassidim still use it that way sometimes with very negative connotations).

This all took place during the general emancipation of Jews in Europe. Restrictions on their businesses and where they could live were dropped. The rise of the chassidic movement was thus one of a number of factors which severely disrupted the pre-existing social structure. In that chaos, other groups arose also, including Reform Judaism (around 1900 the Conservative movement would break off from the Reform, trying to return to more strict beliefs and practices but not nearly as strict as the Orthodox). At around this era, the notion of Orthodox started to arise as a separate term (prior to that no one needed a separate notion).

At the same time, in reaction to the Reform movement, the so called "ultra-Orthodox" or "charedi" arose becoming more religious and increasing how strict their observances were. At the same time, this group sort of pulled the chassidim along in some ways, making the chassidim more focused on learning and studying of classical texts, and at the same time, the chassidic movement started producing its own texts which became very important for each of the corresponding chassidic groups. Thus the chassidic groups as they exist today are more intellectual than classical chassidim. At the same time, some of the ideas that the chassidim had (especially about singing and dancing being fun things that are good in religious settings) became more common among the general Orthodox population. In that sense, the original chassidim in many ways won, in a similar way to how over time the Catholic church has adopted many ideas that the early Protestants were calling for.

The modern Orthodox also arose, which believed in keeping the classical laws while interacting with the secular world. In principle, this meant also accepting scientific knowledge about things like the age of the earth, however, studies (especially those by Alexander Nussbaum) show that among Orthodox students at secular universities, the acceptance of evolution, or the age of the Earth and similar issues is surprisingly low. The so-called "Modern Orthodox" have been more or less pulled in the last few years to the right in many ways, and attitudes about science is only one aspect. To complicate matters further, many Orthodox people don't like the large set of connotations that either "modern Orthodox" or "charedi/ultra-Orthodox" brings (the issues are similar to those of what constitutes a blegg) and so self-identify as only Orthodox or observant. Some sometimes use the Yiddish word "frum" or occasionally "shomer mitzvot" which is Hebrew for "guards the commandments". Also, some people when they hear the word "charedi" think one means non-chassidic ultra-Orthodox, this is especially true in Israel. And this can lead to some confusion if one isn't careful.

And now that I've typed all this I've realized that I haven't dealt with any of the different groups' attitudes towards the State of Israel, which is actually really important to understanding them in any modern context. So, um yeah, I guess this is a lot more complicated than I realized and I've just internalized it. If there's a real need I can explain that (there are a lot of misconceptions about this among both non-Orthodox Jews and non-Jews. In particular, the ultra-Orthodox are not generally the people who are pushing for right-wing policies in Israel regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.)

Comment author: Vladimir_M 25 April 2011 08:07:28AM *  5 points [-]

Thanks for the informative reply! As you note, however, the topic really is too complex to address in a single comment. For one, if I understand correctly, you're writing only about various Ashkenazi groups -- and one of the issues I find most puzzling is how they relate to the other geographic/linguistic/ethnic Jewish groups and their subdivisions. Another question where I can't find a clear answer is the relationship of various local Jewish groups with national governments, both in Israel and in other countries. In particular, in many countries there is the institution of "Chief Rabbi" that enjoys some government recognition, but which Jewish groups stand behind those?

As for the attitude towards the State of Israel, my understanding is that religious Jews generally support it, except for an ultra-Orthodox fringe who believe that Zionism is an irreverent mockery, since it lacks explicit (Messianic?) signs of support from God, and it has created a secular state, which they dislike for obvious reasons. However, I have no idea where exactly on the Orthodox spectrum these ideas become prevalent, and I also don't know whether there is a significant opposition between more moderate anti-Zionist Orthodox groups and Neturei Karta (and perhaps other such groups that I don't know about?).

Of course, I'm sure all these questions are further complicated by the contrast between the official leadership proclamations and the situation on the ground, just like it is for various conflicts between Christian denominations.

Comment author: lessdazed 26 April 2011 10:10:32AM *  10 points [-]

As for the attitude towards the State of Israel, my understanding is that religious Jews generally support it, except for an ultra-Orthodox fringe who believe that Zionism is an irreverent mockery...

This is a good (even the best) first step in the process of going from confusion to knowledge, but it's mostly wrong, somewhat less enlightening than replacing the concept of a banana with the concept of molecules, while ignoring atoms and quarks.

"Support [Israel]" doesn't mean only one thing without more context, even in most people's minds, any more than "like people" would if I asked if you "like people". About half the self-identifying Orthodox Jews in Israel and far fewer than that in America do not find any religious justification or basis for the modern state of Israel and are the Chareidim. This includes almost all Chasidim. Worse than not finding warrant for it, there is Talmudic justification for opposing its creation, while reactions to finding it created predictably differ.

The most noticeable members of this group are the dozen or hundred or so portion of the Neturei Karta who spend a lot of time and effort seeking to replace the state with another state, any other state, even an Arab one, at any cost. They are better known in the West than influential or representative people for the same reason an Afghan might be more likely to know about the Westboro Baptist Church than the Anglicans.

The reaction of most Chareidi Jews to the state is more similar to their reaction to most things without scriptural warrant, such as glasses or air conditioning, i.e. little concern. At least, it would likely be so, if not for a few other important factors.

Sticking with religious issues for now, it is a largely secular state. It is not obvious how religious or coercive any religious person should want their government, but it's easy to see why autocratically minded theocrats could reach a (deceptively unanimous) consensus that the current state isn't religious enough, details aside. This widespread opinion is a theoretically defeasible concern, unlike the narrowly-held pure religious opposition to any non-Messianic state.

The next issue is a social reaction to the rest of the Jewish world, particularly the Religious Zionists but more broadly the Modern Orthodox in general. Religious Zionists find that the current state meets their religious criteria to deserve their full backing. This position is more popular among the less religiously extreme. Reaching it requires a more expedient and flexible reading of religious texts and understanding of what the tradition entails. The conclusion that Israel is A-OK is what the judge should feel in his heart before inquiring into the religious texts. To quote Barack Obama, "We need somebody who's got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what it's like to be a young teenage mom, the empathy to understand what it's like to be poor or African-American or gay or disabled or old - and that's the criterion by which I'll be selecting my judges." It is no coincidence that the "living constitution" branch of Judaism that decided to go along with what the other Jews were doing had previously decided that it wasn't necessary to wear fur hats in the summer.

The identification of the secular state of Israel as religiously significant is regarded by Chareidim as akin to idol worship, a reductio ad absurdum of deciding what the tradition says before examining it, and it is to Religious Zionism that the Chareidim are opposed, along with their opposition to the domestic policies of the state.

It is these less extreme religious Jews who are the "settlers", attempting to graft biblical injunctions of foreign policy to Israel. Interpretations of these vary widely, perhaps the most widespread interpretation absolutely forbids surrendering territory but is very lenient and practical regarding how hard one must try to conquer all of the designated land. Relatively fewer of these live in America, as they see it as necessary to dwell in the state, particularly where it advances Israel's strategic interests.

Less literal and more liberal Jews who are still Orthodox are more likely to have a standard set of liberal positions, including regarding Israel and church-state separation.

It is in one sense very unfair to call extremists more religious than non-extremists. Many self-identifying Orthodox Jews might even assert and/or believe that the greatest rabbis of the other camps are more religious than they are, even for less extreme camps. In another sense, it is of course quite fair.

So we see the flexibility of interpretation has led to the centrists being the most irredentist, a position one expects to find religious extremists occupying. It is generally false that the extremists compensate by having logically irreconcilable differences with the state, though this notion can be forgiven since the most visible do and the rest have practically irreconcilable differences with the state as it is.

Demographically, Chareidim in America are less extreme than those in Israel, particularly among the non-Chassidim. Religious Zionists are far fewer, and the Modern Orthodox form a solid continuum from Religious Zionists to the secular American left. The mainstream Israeli left is probably to the right of the American left's statements, though perhaps not to its actions, if you consider Obama representative or if you think important the left's non-response to Guantanamo staying open, drone strikes in Pakistan continuing, undeclared action in Libya, etc. American non-Chassidic Chareidim are somewhat more pro-Israel than one would expect from the extent to which they are less extreme than Israeli non-Chassidic Chareidim, and are probably less cheated by conflation with Chrisitian fundamentalists than any other Jewish group regarding their beliefs and degree of nationalism.

Sephardim never collectively went through the shock of the enlightenment and have more traditional social forces, such as social cohesion around place of origin rather than level of observance and extended families with all levels of observance represented. Even the less religious are generally unlikely to see Reform or Conservative as at all valid and consider Judaism as degrees of Orthodoxy, and Israeli Ashkenazim are similar in this respect. Sephardim generally have little sympathy for active anti--Zionism and behave more like liberal somewhat nationalistic Modern Orthodox Jews with mildly Religious Zionist Rabbis, the top leaders of whom are actually mildly anti-Zionist and confederate with Chareidim.

This is all intended to be an enlightenment for those who know only of bananas as fruit, in which I explain bananas are made of little bricks called molecules. If anyone wants to correct or add anything, or take this as a starting point for explaining how bananas are really made of quarks (but first we really must teach you atoms as if they were billiard balls...) feel free. This isn't the type of thing I have done any formal study of but it's the type of thing one develops a perspective on, however biased, and I find that regarding this topic there is so much confusion that I think reading this will help many.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 28 April 2011 05:20:51AM 1 point [-]

So we see the flexibility of interpretation has led to the centrists being the most irredentist, a position one expects to find religious extremists occupying.

This is actually more or less how I imagined it (though of course I'm nowhere as familiar with all the details). Thanks for the very informative comments.

Comment author: NancyLebovitz 26 April 2011 10:31:34AM 1 point [-]

Thanks for the details. It's unnerving to think that there's drastically more detail behind the details, but I'm interested in whatever you want to write about them.

Comment author: JoshuaZ 27 April 2011 01:34:50AM *  3 points [-]

Lessdazed gave what seems to me to be a good answer to most of these questions so I'll just address the remaining one (which unfortunately is one of the one's I don't know as much about.)

In particular, in many countries there is the institution of "Chief Rabbi" that enjoys some government recognition, but which Jewish groups stand behind those?

The Chief Rabbi as a separate institution evolved when in the late Middle Ages the various European states wanted official representatives of the Jewish population to talk to the government. Since for many purposes Jews were often autonomous groups this was the primary method of interaction. Somewhat similarly, in some places such as England, all recognized religions had to have a recognized chief clergy member who was actually considered to serve the monarch. For essentially historical reasons, this job has been generally taken up by a prominent Orthodox Rabbi in most countries where the title exists. In some countries with small Jewish populations (such as Norway and New Zealand) there's very rarely more than one Orthodox Rabbi and so this individual becomes the Chief Rabbi more or less by default. In countries with larger Jewish communities this position can be surrounded by heavy politics and other considerations. Also in some countries the Chief Rabbi is not actually a government recognized position but is the term used to refer to a certain position overseeing some large organization of shulls.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 28 April 2011 05:12:27AM *  1 point [-]

Thanks for all the info. For whatever reason, even though I usually have no problem finding and sorting out information about complicated and controversial topics, I find this one (i.e. the general topic of Jewish religious and ethnic divisions) very difficult to systematize, and your comments have clarified a lot. Of course, even I was much more knowledgeable about the topic, I'd still consider it a valuable opportunity to hear the perspective of someone who has some insider knowledge but nevertheless strives for objectivity.

Comment author: gwern 23 April 2011 05:52:14PM *  9 points [-]

it is a deeply unsustainable situation.

It's deeply unsustainable in the sense that geometric population growth of any kind is unsustainable in the long run, yes. I don't know if it's unsustainable in the sense you seem to mean it.

Every community is in a sense free-riding off of other communities (public goods in general); no complete accounting exists for Kiryas Joel, although the last quarter of the NYT article is basically discussing whether Kiryas Joel is a drain or not, with no clear conclusion.

And the question strikes me as pretty much a distraction; if you don't like Kiryas Joel, one could look at more 'respectable' high-growth groups and ask the same Hansonian questions; the Amish and Mennonites come to mind as groups rarely criticized for being welfare queens and with high growth rates (sufficiently so that they keep spreading out and moving out of Pennsylvania to find farmland). Unfortunately, their rates are not so high as to be as dramatic as Kiryas Joel.

Comment author: Will_Sawin 23 April 2011 06:45:42PM 7 points [-]

I find the second parenthetical statement deeply, viscerally terrifying. I'm going to tap out in terms of my personal rationality on this issue, but I would just like to ask all the interesting questions this raises:

Will significant human natural selection happen before the extinction of the human race? If it were to happen, would it be a very bad thing?

Comment author: Vladimir_M 23 April 2011 09:59:57PM 10 points [-]

I find the second parenthetical statement deeply, viscerally terrifying.

Relax. These are genuinely nice people, even though they dress funny.

Comment author: gwern 24 April 2011 08:37:27PM *  6 points [-]

They're genuinely nice... aside from the Meidung, the restricted life opportunities and lack of many freedoms, whatever sexual (rape & incest, sometimes enabled by anesthetic) abuses are covered up by social structures, and all the other problems they have from our perspective. Let's not idealize them.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 25 April 2011 06:18:25AM *  9 points [-]

Indeed, but even if you take the worst imaginable view of them, you still have to admit that they respect the "good fences -- good neighbors" principle. I see no prospect that they might cease doing so in the foreseeable future, even if they expand greatly.

I sure won't be joining them anytime soon, but this still makes it irrational for me to be frightened by them, considering all the the high-status mainstream people whose Meidung I have to fear if I speak my mind with too much liberty, who limit my freedoms and opportunities in ways I find suffocating and frustrating, and who run the presently powerful institutions with an incomparably worse record of abuses. (The latter often aren't even covered up in an active and planned way, but rather kept from scrutiny merely by the high status of the institutions in question, making it a self-destructive status-lowering move just to start arguing against them.)

Comment author: Will_Sawin 23 April 2011 10:28:17PM 10 points [-]

Genuinely nice people who still prevent people who, like me and (presumably) you, are cognitively atypical, from finding similar people across the world to socialize with.

and the thousand other awesome things about the world we have created for ourselves.

and the thousand other awesome things about the world we will create.

I don't want to tile the world with tiny genuinely nice people.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 23 April 2011 10:38:22PM 13 points [-]

Consider various other groups that are presently in the process of demographic and migratory expansion, and whose typical members are similarly different from you, but whom it is low-status to rail against (and apt to invoke accusations of bigotry and extremism), unlike when it comes to fringe Christian groups. Does contemplating them fill you with similar fear and hostility?

Comment author: Will_Sawin 23 April 2011 10:56:18PM 1 point [-]

I can think of groups but I am not sure if they count as similarly different from me.

I experience fear and hostility but it is dissimilar and weaker. I consciously suppress it because I am aware that it is silly. It sometimes takes me a period of time to realize that a specific instance is silly.

It seems like the question at issue is whether fringe Christian groups are different enough that it is right to fear them or whether they are similar enough that it is wrong to fear them.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 23 April 2011 11:15:17PM *  18 points [-]

So when you catch yourself feeling fear and hostility towards some demographically expanding group that is not a fringe Christian group, so that in polite society it would be seen as disreputable and extremist to dislike and fear them, you start with the a priori assumption that it is silly and wrong to fear them and you try to suppress your fear consciously. In contrast, when it comes to demographically expanding fringe Christian groups, you start with the a priori assumption that it is eminently reasonable to dislike and fear them. And it doesn't seem to you like there might be some slight bias there?

(I tried to come up with a more charitable interpretation of your comment, but this looks like the plain meaning of what you wrote.)

Comment author: Will_Sawin 23 April 2011 11:58:35PM 5 points [-]

I object to your use of "a priori". I am aware of ironclad arguments that it is incorrect to dislike and fear certain groups. These arguments are not fully general - they do not apply to all groups.

Is it obvious to you that these cases are symmetrical? It is not obvious to me.

I never claimed to be unbiased. I, in fact, went out of the way to state a lack of confidence in my local rationality.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 25 April 2011 06:29:39AM 5 points [-]

Seeing your reply to Eugine Nier, I must admit that your position is more thought out than I had assumed. I still disagree with your view, and I think your arguments are significantly biased. However, as much as I'd like to try and straighten out the issue, I think getting into this discussion would lead too far into problematic ideologically sensitive topics. So I guess it would be best if we could respectfully agree to disagree at this point.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 24 April 2011 06:22:11PM *  5 points [-]

I am aware of ironclad arguments that it is incorrect to dislike and fear certain groups. These arguments are not fully general - they do not apply to all groups.

Really, I'm skeptical. Can we hear them?

Comment author: lessdazed 29 April 2011 01:42:33AM 2 points [-]

I would like to "flag" this post as the point where "experienc[ing] fear and hostility" was warped into "feeling fear and hostility towards". That makes comments below subject to equivocation. It does not mean anything, at least not any one thing, to "[feel] fear and hostility towards" anything. The fear and hostility are in the brain and do not emanate therefrom.

This is more than a semantic quibble. Consider the fallacy of composition. It is possible for a liberal to hate all poor people and love the poor, and for a Confederate soldier to have hated blacks and loved all blacks.

I don't think "dislike and fear certain groups" is precise enough to have an non-careful conversation about because it is more than one thing.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 01 May 2011 04:15:52AM 2 points [-]

I don't understand the relevant linguistic distinction here; it might be some finesse of English grammar that eludes me. Does saying "fear and hostility towards X" imply some observable action motivated by these feelings?

The sort of "fear and hostility" I had in mind is of the same sort as your hypothetical liberal's love of the poor.

Comment author: [deleted] 24 April 2011 08:57:07PM 8 points [-]

I don't want to tile the world with tiny genuinely nice people.

Beats the word eventually being tiled with very genuinely not nice people.

Comment author: Will_Sawin 24 April 2011 09:01:15PM 1 point [-]

That is a true moral statement.

Comment author: brazil84 25 April 2011 03:11:03PM 1 point [-]

What exactly is "natural selection" in this context? For example, smallpox is no longer part of our environment. Surely the absence of smallpox will have some effect on the gene pool. Would this count as natural selection?

By the way, I also find it a bit troubling that at least for the time being, secularism seems to be on track to extinction.

Comment author: Will_Sawin 25 April 2011 03:14:15PM 0 points [-]

Yes, but not significant in the sense I am using it here.

Natural selection is changes in the frequency of genes not planned by wise and well-intentioned humans.

Significant natural selection is when this leads to a shift in the fundamental values of the human race.

Comment author: brazil84 25 April 2011 03:23:54PM 2 points [-]

In that case, I would say that the answer is clearly "yes," in the sense that significant natural selection is taking place at a rapid clip in the present day. For example, the percentage of people in the world with blue eyes has surely dropped significantly over the last 100 years.

Comment author: Will_Sawin 26 April 2011 01:29:11AM 0 points [-]

Technically using my odd definitions the debate on blue eyes is irrelevant because:

Blue eyes do not shift the fundamental values of the human race. I think.

Comment author: brazil84 26 April 2011 01:39:05AM 3 points [-]

Blue eyes do not shift the fundamental values of the human race

Fine, but now you need to specify what you mean by "fundamental values of the human race." :)

(By the way, I recall that there are studies out there corellating eye color with personality traits. I'm not sure if this affects the example I gave, but surely there are other genes which affect personality traits in subtle ways. And it seems likely that some of those personality traits affect a person's fertility given that a lot of people in the West flat out decide not to reproduce. So it's reasonable to suppose that natural selection, as you have defined it, continues in the present and affects human attributes less superficial than eye color.)

Comment author: FAWS 25 April 2011 08:08:01PM 0 points [-]

Because blue eyes are recessive and blue and brown eyed populations have mixed more than they used to? How is that an example of natural selection in progress?

Comment author: brazil84 25 April 2011 09:25:28PM 3 points [-]

Because blue eyes are found mainly in people of European descent and the percentage of world population of European descent has dropped quite a bit with the population booms in Asia and Africa.

Comment author: FAWS 25 April 2011 10:09:33PM 0 points [-]

Ok, but that's mostly because you use that particular cutoff point, European decended populations just have gone through the demographic transition earlier and their share of world population is similar to what it was in 1750. It has nothing to do with any selection against blue eyes in the usual sense.

Comment author: brazil84 25 April 2011 10:28:50PM 3 points [-]

Well that brings us back to the question of what you mean by "natural selection" which you defined earlier as

changes in the frequency of genes not planned by wise and well-intentioned humans.

It sounds like you are limiting natural selection to frequency changes which are a direct result of the effects of the genes in question. Is that right?

Comment author: gwern 23 April 2011 06:55:41PM 1 point [-]

Will significant human natural selection happen before the extinction of the human race?

In the absence of a Singularity? Who knows. Evolution wins eventually, somehow, but the details matter a great deal.

If it were to happen, would it be a very bad thing?

That is the fundamental question of this post. Kevin Kelly argues in a somewhat related essay, http://www.kk.org/thetechnium/archives/2008/11/the_origins_of.php , that evolution winning might not even stop progress.

Comment author: Will_Sawin 23 April 2011 07:32:49PM 4 points [-]

There are plausible scenarios for a singleton control without singularity. Our institutions could outpace evolution at the rate they get smarter and eventually decide to stop it. You'd just need to build some highly stable, global architecture.

But nothing is perfectly stable. So I'm going to agree with your contention that Who, in fact, knows.

Genetic evolution winning causes irreversible negative progress. If human value is complex, then genetic evolution necessarily destroys information about human value - information that will not be replaced because our descendants will not want to replace it.

The question is how much value?

Comment author: [deleted] 25 April 2011 10:15:37PM 0 points [-]

Genetic evolution winning causes irreversible negative progress. If human value is complex, then genetic evolution necessarily destroys information about human value - information that will not be replaced because our descendants will not want to replace it.

The question is how much value?

Indeed.

Comment author: NancyLebovitz 23 April 2011 03:02:33AM 1 point [-]

Has the article been withdrawn? The link to it doesn't work, and searching on Kiryas Joel doesn't turn up anything.

Comment author: JoshuaZ 23 April 2011 03:20:43AM 0 points [-]

Huh? Which article? Gwern's article is here. Do you mean the NYT article?

Comment author: NancyLebovitz 23 April 2011 04:19:44AM 0 points [-]

No, the post to LW.

Comment author: JoshuaZ 23 April 2011 04:24:53AM 0 points [-]

Right here. Note also that you can click from a comment to the general thread by clicking on the name of the thread at the way top of the comment.

Comment author: NancyLebovitz 23 April 2011 04:40:23AM 1 point [-]

Thanks. Your link worked. Clicking on the name of the thread at the top of the comment led to a "this page does not exist" notification.