it also prevents you from attaining greater happiness elsewhere
Do you imply "always prevents", "sometimes prevents", or "could possibly prevent"?
wireheading is very similar to this situation
Hm. So the equivalent statement would be "Happiness produced by wireheading is not valuable". Two things pop into my head: first, happiness and pleasure are different, wireheading produces the latter but not the former; and second, I still don't understand what does "is not valuable" mean.
I still don't understand what does "is not valuable" mean.
Seriously?
If I say that a year of happy, healthy, pleasurable life is valuable, it seems to me I've said something admirably clear. If I say that the loss of a year of happy, healthy, pleasurable life is not valuable, I think I've said something equally clear.
Do these statements seem ambiguous to you?
Can you summarize what their competing interpretations are?
I was browsing my RSS feed, as one does, and came across a New York Times article, "A Village With the Numbers, Not the Image, of the Poorest Place", about the Satmar Hasidic Jews of Kiryas Joel (NY).
Their interest lies in their extraordinarily high birthrate & population growth, and their poverty - which are connected. From the article:
From Wikipedia:
Robin Hanson has argued that uploaded/emulated minds will establish a new Malthusian/Darwinian equilibrium in "IF UPLOADS COME FIRST: The crack of a future dawn" - an equilibrium in comparison to which our own economy will look like a delusive dreamtime of impossibly unfit and libertine behavior. The demographic transition will not last forever. But despite our own distaste for countless lives living at near-subsistence rather than our own extreme per-capita wealth (see the Repugnant Conclusion), those many lives will be happy ones (even amidst disaster).
So. Are the inhabitants of Kiryas Joel unhappy?