Alicorn comments on What is Metaethics? - Less Wrong
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Should that be "The error theorist can't hold that a statement like 'Murder is not wrong' is true"?
(Also, it's not clear to me that classifying error theory as cognitivist is correct. If it claims that all moral statements are based on a fundamentally mistaken intuition, so that "Murder is wrong" has no more factual content than "Murder is flibberty", then is it not asserting that moral claims are not coherent enough to actually be proper beliefs (even false ones)? (And if classifying a metaethic as cognitivist requires only that it implies that moral claims feel like proper beliefs, not necessarily that they actually are proper beliefs, then that would include emotivism too in most cases.))
No. The error theorist may hold "murder is not wrong" and "murder is not right" to be true. Ey just has to hold "murder is wrong" and "murder is right" to be false, and if ey wants to endorse the "not" statements I guess a rule that "things don't have to be either right or wrong" must operate in the background.