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Marius comments on What is Metaethics? - Less Wrong
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I don't understand what you mean by preferences when you say "intelligent agents trying to fulfill their preferences". I have met plenty of people who were trying to do things contrary to their preferences. Perhaps before you try (or someone tries for you) to distinguish morality from preferences, it might be helpful to distinguish precisely how preferences and behavior can differ?
Example? I prefer not to stay up late, but here I am doing it. It's not that I'm acting against my preferences, because my current preference is to continue typing this sentence. It's simply that English doesn't differentiate very well between "current preferences"= "my preferences right this moment" and "current preferences"= "preferences I have generally these days."
Seinfeld said it best.
But I want an example of people acting contrary to their preferences, you're giving one of yourself acting according to your current preferences. Hopefully, NMJablonski has an example of a common action that is genuinely contrary to the actor's preferences. Otherwise, the word "preference" simply means "behavior" to him and shouldn't be used by him. He would be able to simplify "the actions I prefer are the actions I perform," or "morality is just behavior", which isn't very interesting to talk about.
"This-moment preferences" are synonymous with "behavior," or more precisely, "(attempted/wished-for) action." In other words, in this moment, my current preferences = what I am currently striving for.
Jablonski seems to be using "morality" to mean something more like the general preferences that one exhibits on a recurring basis, not this-moment preferences. And this is a recurring theme: that morality is questions like, "What general preferences should I cultivate?" (to get more enjoyment out of life)
Ok, so if I understand you correctly: It is actually meaningful to ask "what general preferences should I cultivate to get more enjoyment out of life?" If so, you describe two types of preference: the higher-order preference (which I'll call a Preference) to get enjoyment out of life, and the lower-order "preference" (which I'll call a Habit or Current Behavior rather than a preference, to conform to more standard usage) of eating soggy bland french fries if they are sitting in front of you regardless of the likelihood of delicious pizza arriving. So because you prefer to save room for delicious pizza yet have the Habit of eating whatever is nearby and convenient, you can decide to change that Habit. You may do so by changing your behavior today and tomorrow and the day after, eventually forming a new Habit that conforms better to your preference for delicious foods.
Am I describing this appropriately? If so, by the above usage, is morality a matter of Behavior, Habit, or Preference?
Sounds fairly close to what I think Jablonski is saying, yes.
Preference isn't the best word choice. Ultimately it comes down to realizing that I want different things at different times, but in English future wanting is sometimes hard to distinguish from present wanting, which can easily result in a subtle equivocation. This semantic slippage is injecting confusion into the discussion.
Perhaps we have all had the experience of thinking something like, "When 11pm rolls around, I want to want to go to sleep." And it makes sense to ask, "How can I make it so that I want to go to sleep when 11pm rolls around?" Sure, I presently want to go to sleep early tonight, but will I want to then? How can I make sure I will want to? Such questions of pure personal long-term utility seem to exemplify Jablonksi's definition of morality.
ok cool, replying to the original post then.
Oops, I totally missed this subthread.
Amanojack has, I think, explained my meaning well. It may be useful to reduce down to physical brains and talk about actual computational facts (i.e. utility function) that lead to behavior rather than use the slippery words "want" or "preference".
Good idea. Like, "My present utility function calls for my future utility function to be such and such"?
I replied to Marius higher up in the thread with my efforts at preference-taboo.