OK, I've read the whole FAQ. Clearly, a really detailed critique would have to be given at similar length. Therefore, here is just a sketch of the problems I see with your exposition.

For start, you use several invalid examples, or at least controversial examples that you incorrectly present as clear-cut. For example, the phlogiston theory was nothing like the silly strawman you present. It was a falsifiable scientific theory that was abandoned because it was eventually falsified (when it was discovered that burning stuff adds mass due to oxidation, rather than losing mass due to escaped phlogiston). It was certainly a reductionist theory -- it attempted to reduce fire (which itself has different manifestations) and the human and animal metabolism to the same underlying physical process. (Google "Becher-Stahl theory".) Or, at another place, you present the issue of "opposing condoms" as a clear-cut case of "a horrendous decision" from a consequentialist perspective -- although in reality the question is far less clear.

Otherwise, up to Section 4, your argumentation is passable. But then it goes completely off the rails. I'll list just a few main issues:

• In the discussion of the trolley problem, you present a miserable caricature of the "don't push" arguments. The real reason why pushing the fat main is problematic requires delving into a broader game-theoretic analysis that establishes the Schelling points that hold in interactions between people, including those gravest ones that define unprovoked deadly assault. The reason why any sort of organized society is possible is that you can trust that other people will always respect these Schelling points without regards to any cost-benefit calculations, except perhaps when the alternative to violating them is by orders of magnitude more awful than in the trolley examples. (I have compressed an essay's worth of arguments into a few sentences, but I hope the main point is clear.)

• In Section 5, you don't even mention the key problem of how utilities are supposed to be compared and aggregated interpersonally. If you cannot address this issue convincingly, the whole edifice crumbles.

• In Section 6, at first it seems like you get the important point that even if we agree on some aggregate welfare maximization, we have no hope of getting any practical guidelines for action beyond quasi-deontologist heuristics. But they you boldly declare that "we do have procedures in place for breaking the heuristic when we need to." No, we don't. You may think we have them, but what we actually have are either somewhat more finely tuned heuristics that aren't captured by simple first-order formulations (which is good), or rationalizations and other nonsensical arguments couched in terms of a plausible-sounding consequentialist analysis (which is often a recipe for disaster). The law of unintended consequences often bites even in seemingly clear-cut "what could possibly go wrong?" situations.

• Along similar lines, you note that in any conflict all parties are quick to point out that their natural rights are at stake. Well, guess what. If they just have smart enough advocates, they can also all come up with different consequentialist analyses whose implications favor their interests. Different ways of interpersonal utility comparison are often themselves enough to tilt the scales as you like. Further, these analyses will all by necessity be based on spherical-cow models of the real world, which you can usually engineer to get pretty much any implication you like.

• Section 7 is rather incoherent. You jump from one case study to another arguing that even when it seems like consequentialism might imply something revolting, that's not really so. Well, if you're ready to bite awful consequentialist bullets like Robin Hanson does, then be explicit about it. Otherwise, clarify where exactly you draw the lines.

• Since we're already at biting bullets, your FAQ fails to address another crucial issue: it is normal for humans to value the welfare of some people more than others. You clearly value your own welfare and the welfare of your family and friends more than strangers (and even for strangers there are normally multiple circles of diminishing caring). How to reconcile this with global maximization of aggregate utility? Or do you bite the bullet that it's immoral to care about one's own family and friends more than strangers?

• Question 7.6 is the only one where you give even a passing nod to game-theoretical issues. Considering their fundamental importance in the human social order and all human interactions, and their complex and often counter-intuitive nature, this fact by itself means that most of your discussion is likely to be remote from reality. This is another aspect of the law of unintended consequences that you nonchalantly ignore.

• Finally, your idea that it is possible to employ economists and statisticians and get accurate and objective consequentialist analysis to guide public policy is altogether utopian. If such things were possible, economic central planning would be a path to prosperity, not the disaster that it is. (That particular consequentialist folly was finally abandoned in the mainstream after it had produced utter disaster in a sizable part of the world, but many currently fashionable ideas about "scientific" management of government and society suffer from similar delusions.)