lukeprog comments on Conceptual Analysis and Moral Theory - Less Wrong
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Yep. Another case in point of the danger of replying, "Tell me how you define X, and I'll tell you the answer" is Parfit in Reason and Persons concluding that whether or not an atom-by-atom duplicate constructed from you is "you" depends on how you define "you". Actually it turns out that there is a definite answer and the answer is knowably yes, because everything Parfit reasoned about "indexical identity" is sheer physical nonsense in a world built on configurations and amplitudes instead of Newtonian billiard balls.
PS: Very Tarskian and Bayesian of them, but are you sure they didn't say, "A belief in X is knowledge if one would never have it whenever not-X"?
Yes. In the next post, I'll be naming some definitions for moral terms that should be thrown out, for example those which rest on false assumptions about reality (e.g. "God exists.")