Amanojack comments on Conceptual Analysis and Moral Theory - Less Wrong

60 Post author: lukeprog 16 May 2011 06:28AM

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Comment author: Amanojack 23 May 2011 03:19:53PM 0 points [-]

By incoherent I simply mean "I don't know how to interpret the words." So far no one seems to want to help me do that, so I can only await a coherent definition of objective ethics and related terms. Then possibly an argument could start. (But this is all like deja vu from the recent metaethics threads.)

Comment author: Peterdjones 23 May 2011 03:34:41PM *  0 points [-]

Can you interpret the word "morality is subjective"? How about the the words "morality is not subjective"?

Comment author: Amanojack 23 May 2011 03:42:43PM 0 points [-]

"Morality is subjective": Each person has their own moral sentiments.

"Morality is not subjective": Each person does not have their own moral sentiments. Or there is something more than each person's moral sentiments that is worth calling "moral." <--- But I ask, what is that "something more"?

Comment author: Peterdjones 23 May 2011 03:56:16PM 0 points [-]

OK. That is not what "subjective" means. What it means is that if something is subjective, an opinion is guaranteed to be correct or the last word on the matter just because it is the person's opinion. And "objective" therefore means that it is possible for someone to be wrong in their opinion.

Comment author: Amanojack 23 May 2011 04:12:33PM 0 points [-]

I don't claim moral sentiments are correct, but simply that a person's moral sentiment is their moral sentiment. They feel some emotions, and that's all I know. You are seeming to say there is some way those emotions can be correct or incorrect, but in what sense? Or probably a clearer way to ask the question is, "What disadvantage can I anticipate if my emotions are incorrect?"

Comment author: Peterdjones 23 May 2011 04:29:10PM *  0 points [-]

An emotion, such as a feeling of elation or disgust, is not correct or incorrect per se; but an emotion per se is no basis for a moral sentiment, because moral sentiment has to be about something. You could think gay marriage is wrong because homosexuality disgusts you, or you could feel serial-killing is good because it elates you, but that doesn't mean the conclusions you are coming to are right. It may be a cast iron fact that you have those particular sentiments, but that says nothing about the correctness of their content, any more than any opinion you entertain is automatically correct.

ETA The disadvantages you can expect if your emotions are incorrect include being in the wrong whilst feeling you are in the right. Much as if you are entertaining incorrect opinions.

Comment author: Amanojack 23 May 2011 04:42:07PM 0 points [-]

What if I don't care about being wrong (if that's really the only consequence I experience)? What if I just want to win?

Comment author: Peterdjones 23 May 2011 04:53:09PM 0 points [-]

Then you are, or are likely to be, morally in the wrong. That is of course possible. You can choose to do wrong. But it doesn't constitute any kind of argument. Someone can elect to ignore the roundness of the world for some perverse reason, but that doesn't make "!he world is round" false or meaningless or subjective.

Comment author: Amanojack 23 May 2011 06:12:57PM 0 points [-]

You can choose to do wrong. But it doesn't constitute any kind of argument.

Indeed it is not an argument. Yet I can still say, "So what?" I am not going to worry about something that has no effect on my happiness. If there is some way it would have an effect, then I'd care about it.

Someone can elect to ignore the roundness of the world for some perverse reason, but that doesn't make "!he world is round" false or meaningless or subjective.

The difference is, believing "The world is round" affects whether I win or not, whereas believing "I'm morally in the wrong" does not.

Comment author: [deleted] 23 May 2011 07:11:06PM 1 point [-]

The difference is, believing "The world is round" affects whether I win or not, whereas believing "I'm morally in the wrong" does not.

That is apparently true in your hypothetical, but it's not true in the real world. Just as the roundness of the world has consequences, the wrongness of an action has consequences. For example, if you kill someone, then your fate is going to depend (probabilistically) on whether you were in the right (e.g. he attacked and you were defending your life) or in the wrong (e.g. you murdered him when he caught you burgling his house). The more in the right you were, then, ceteris paribus, the better your chances are.

Comment author: Peterdjones 24 May 2011 01:50:30PM 0 points [-]

Indeed it is not an argument. Yet I can still say, "So what?" I am not going to worry about something that has no effect on my happiness. If there is some way it would have an effect, then I'd care about it.

The fact that you are amoral does not mean there is anything wrong with morality, and is not an argument against it. You might as well be saying "there is a perfectly good rational argument that the world is round, but I prefer to be irrational".

The difference is, believing "The world is round" affects whether I win or not, whereas believing "I'm morally in the wrong" does not.

That doesn't constitute an argument unless you can explain why your winning is the only thing that should matter.

Comment author: Peterdjones 23 May 2011 06:44:29PM *  0 points [-]

The fact that you are not going to worry about morality, does not make morality a) false b) meaningless or c) subjective. Can I take it you are no longer arguing for any of claims a) b) or c) ?

The difference is, believing "The world is round" affects whether I win or not, whereas believing "I'm morally in the wrong" does not.

You have not succeeded in showing that winning is the most important thing.