To point people to some additional references on conceptual analysis in philosophy. Audi's (1983, p. 90) "rough characterization" of conceptual analysis is, I think, standard: "Let us simply construe it as an attempt to provide an illuminating set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the (correct) application of a concept."

Or, Ramsey's (1992) take on conceptual analysis: "philosophers propose and reject definitions for a given abstract concept by thinking hard about intuitive instances of the concept and trying to determine what their essential properties might be."

Sandin (2006) gives an example:

Enter Freddie, philosopher, who has set out to analyse the concept of knowledge. Freddie sits back in his armchair and thinks hard about knowledge and the ‘‘what-we-would-say-when’’ of the term knowledge. He tentatively proposes and either rejects or accepts necessary and sufficient conditions for (his) correct use of the term knowledge. After a while, he feels he has succeeded, writes down his analysis and publishes it. End of part 1. Part 2: Enter a second philosopher, Eddie. Eddie reads Freddie’s paper about knowledge. Eddie’s room is also furnished with an appropriate armchair, in which he sits back and tries to concoct a counterexample to Freddie’s proposed analysis. He feels he has succeeded, writes down his counterexample and publishes it. End of part 2.

This is precisely what Albert and Barry are doing with regard to 'sound'.

Audi (1983). The Applications of Conceptual Analysis. Metaphilosophy 14: 87-106.

Ramsey (1992). Prototypes and Conceptual Analysis. Topoi, 11: 59-70.

Sandin (2006). Has psychology debunked conceptual analysis? Metaphilosophy, 37: 26-33.