lukeprog comments on Conceptual Analysis and Moral Theory - Less Wrong

60 Post author: lukeprog 16 May 2011 06:28AM

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Comment author: Will_Newsome 16 May 2011 07:02:10AM 16 points [-]

It almost annoys me, but I feel compelled to vote this up. (I know groundbreaking philosophy is not yet your intended purpose but) I didn't learn anything, I remain worried that the sequence is going to get way too ambitious, and I remain confused about where it's ultimately headed. But the presentation is so good -- clear language, straightforward application of LW wisdom, excellent use of hyperlinks, high skimmability, linked references, flattery of my peer group -- that I feel I have to support the algorithm that generated it.

Comment author: lukeprog 26 May 2011 09:39:23PM *  6 points [-]

This comment is for anyone who is confused about where the 'no-nonsense metaethics' sequence is going.

First, I had to write a bunch of prerequisites. More prerequisites are upcoming:
Intuitions and Philosophy
The Neuroscience of Desire
The Neuroscience of Pleasure
Inferring Our Desires
Heading Toward: No-Nonsense Metaethics
What is Metaethics?

Stage One of the sequence intends to solve or dissolve many of the central problems of mainstream metaethics. Stage one includes this post and a few others to come later. This is my solution to "much of metaethics" promised earlier. The "much of" refers to mainstream metaethics, not to Yudkowskian metaethics.

Stage Two of the sequence intends to catch everybody up with the progress on Yudkowskian metaethics that has been made by a few particular brains (mostly at SI) in the last few years but hasn't been written down anywhere yet.

Stage Three of the sequence intends to state the open problems of Yudkowskian metaethics as clearly as possible so that rationalists can make incremental progress on them, ala Gowers' Polymath Project or Hilbert's problems. (Unfortunately, problems in metaethics are not as clearly defined as problems in math.)